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[...] in the universe of not-understood phenomena, service activities form
one continent, only slightly explored from diﬀerent angles.
Sven Illeris (1996) pp.8
The etymology of the word service is from the Latin servitium meaning “condition
of a slave, body of slaves”. As early as the XIV century, the verb “serve” was recorded
in the expression “to attend a (customer)”.1 Through the centuries the noun “service”
became used to signify an ever widening range of notions. The Merriam-Webster
online dictionary2 presents 11 entries for the noun “service”. Among these, the entries
more closely related to services as economic activities are:
(i) the occupation or function of serving;
(ii) contribution to the welfare of others;
(iii) the act of serving as a useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity;
(iv) a facility supplying some public demand;
(v) a facility providing maintenance and repair.
Notably, these notions refer to services as immaterial products that generate value as
well as to physical objects used to facilitate the generation of some immaterial ob-
ject of mainly subjective value, e.g., public telephone boots, parks, hospitals, watch
repairs. It might be due to the wide range of activities that fall under the category
of “services”, that economists initially deﬁned economic services as the “tertiary” or
“residual” sector in the economy, see Fuchs (1968). As Illeris (1996) discusses in his
1See the Online Etymology Dictionary at http://www.etymonline.com.
2See www.m-w.com.
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book, several authors criticize this deﬁnition because it brings together very hetero-
geneous activities. Attempts have also been made to provide an alternative deﬁnition
of economic services based on their unifying characteristics. In this respect the dis-
cussion by Hill (1977) takes a prominent place in the literature. According to him,
A service is a change in the condition of an economic unit, which results
from the activity of another economic unit.
Economic services are hence regarded as relational activities of one economic unit
withanothersuchthattheformerone‘serves’thelatter. Oftenthe‘production’andthe
‘consumption’ processes are one and the same. This property of economic services
is called by Illeris (1996) “uno actu principle”. This is most evident in education,
where the transfer of knowledge is contingent on the characteristics of both teacher
and student. Furthermore, as Hill (1977) underlies the fact that in (physically) chan-
ging its condition, the “good (person) does not lose its identity”. This property is what
distinguishes production of goods from services that aﬀect goods such as repairs. It
also implies that usually the anonymity assumption between the “producer” and “con-
sumer” valid for commodities does not hold for services. Furthermore, it follows that
the “output” of a service is diﬃcult to quantify and standardize as it is unique to the
pair of economic units involved. As a result, the decision to be involved in a service
activity is almost always a decision under uncertainty. Last, as Illeris (1996) point
out, the eﬀect of a service performed may be irreversible, or it may have long-term
eﬀects such as the performance of surgery or receiving education. Hence, unlike in
the analysis of commodities, in the analysis of economic services one cannot assume
free-disposal.
The above properties call for a methodologically distinct framework of economic
services relative to consumption goods. However, mainstream economic theory seems
to be uninterested in developing such framework, and, if anything, treats economic
services as “immaterial goods”.3 As Fuchs (1968) put it, economic services were
treated as the “stepchild of economic research”.
One reason for this attitude might be that the labor involved in the production of
services has been long ago characterized as “unproductive labor” by classical eco-
nomists starting from Adam Smith.4 Though, it has also been acknowledged, e.g.,
Hill (1977), that some services may lead to an increase in labor productivity in the
long run. For example, health care services allow individuals to work longer, while
education improves their skills.
3See Hill (1977) for a discussion.
4See Smith (1937).INTRODUCTION 3
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Furthermore, since the service sector is very labor intensive, it does not exhibit
economies of scale, and it is less likely to beneﬁt from increase in productivity due to
innovation. This led the famous neoclassical economist William Baumol to claim that
service activities cause a ‘cost-disease’ that would lead to economic stagnation, e.g.,
Baumol and Bowen (1966), Baumol (1967). The reason for this is that the costs in
this sector will grow faster than the real output due to the diﬀerences in productivity
growth between the service and non-service sectors.
To this, a number of authors5 respond that the productivity growth in the manufac-
turing sector is in fact possible due to existence of relational activities in the service
sectors. Hence, the higher costs in the service sector should also be taken to reﬂect the
additional beneﬁts in terms of productivity growth in the non-service sectors.
Indeed, one would expect an unproductive activity to be driven to a halt, while
the growth of the service sector is noticeable. As it is shown on Figure 1, the value
added in the service sector6 has reached about 2
3 of the total value added in several
industrialized countries representative of the OECD members. These statistics alone
justify our interest in further investigating issues peculiar to services.
5For an extensive discussion and reference list see Illeris (1996).
6The data combines the ﬁgures for value added in transport, trade, hotels and restaurants, for value
added in banks, insurance, real estate and other business services, and value added in Government,
health, education and other personal services as a percentage of total value added for each country.4 INTRODUCTION
The issues studied in the essays that make up this thesis are multifaceted. The
main themes of stability, governance, and eﬀectiveness are recurrent in diﬀerent con-
texts: relational activities, group cooperation, country-level management and a very
speciﬁc case of health care provision. The methodological tools employed are varied,
too. In the theoretical essays contributions are made to the literature on network and
endogenous coalition formation. The empirical essays employ linear and non-linear
regression models and use aggregate as well as micro-level data.
Diﬀerent deﬁnitions pertain to the notion of stability in the essays. The underlying
concept, however, is the same: it is an expression of equilibrium that allows us to make
theoretical predictions with respect to emerging outcomes. Another unifying feature
is that we are studying stable outcomes against one-player deviations (as opposed to
groups deviations).
Governanceisacomplexnotion initself. Ruys(2006)deﬁnesthetermgovernance
of an organization as
[...] the distribution and exercise of authority of bodies and institutions
within and outside an organization, aiming at realizing the mission of
the organization and its related values and services. This includes the
transactions between the competent parties and the way the exercise of
power is balanced and monitored by these parties.
Governance thus signiﬁes the various rules governing the value generation processes
discussed in the essays. In Chapter 1 labor specialization, that is the dichotomy in
roles, and in Chapter 2 authority emerge as necessary components of governance for
the existence of stable productive activities. In Chapter 3, governance takes the form
of contractual arrangements and in Chapter 4 this is a bargaining process. In Chapter 5
we use the deﬁnition of governance of the World Bank which more speciﬁcally refers
to the quality of institutions at a national level, to investigate the governance eﬀect on
life expectancy.
Eﬀectiveness, on the other hand is a concept that is relevant only for the last two
empirical essays in the thesis. In the measure of governance used in Chapter 5, the
notion of eﬀectiveness in the functioning of institutions is crucial. In Chapter 6 the
speciﬁc case of treatment of patients with acid-suppressing drugs is studied. There,
eﬀectiveness refers to the ability of the health care system to bring about high healing
rates at minimal costs.
The thesis is organized in three parts. The ﬁrst part, entitled “Stability and Social
Recognition” was inspired by the desire to explore the possibilities of a methodolo-
gical framework in which “relational activities” can be studied taking into accountINTRODUCTION 5
that each activity is peculiar to the economic agents participating in it. Conceptu-
ally, our stepping stone is the research program of Professor Xiaokai Yang, which
was seminally developed in Yang (1988) and subsequently brought to fruition in nu-
merous research papers.7 The core of this research program is the application of an
inframarginal analysis to the decision model underlying a consumer-producer, within
a system of perfectly competitive market. In turn, this approach is used to model
the Smith-Young approach to the relationship of specialization, the social division of
labor, and increasing returns to scale, Smith (1776), Young (1928), and Stigler (1951),
and collective production, Yang (2003). We study relational activities in general —
and consumer-producer entities in particular — in a pre-market setting. In doing so,
we are able to show that the emergence of labor specialization and socially recog-
nized authority is not contingent on the functioning of competitive markets and an
existing price mechanism. These phenomena, instead, are linked to the viability of
productive systems. It should be noted that the general framework is designed to in-
vestigate economic services as relational activities. The applications we develop are
based on commodity exchange and production. Since these activities are investigated
in a pre-market setting, however, we are able to capture their relational aspects. Fur-
thermore, in Chapter 1, we are able to outline the transition from subjective exchange
to objective trade that paves the path to the emergence of markets.
In Chapter 1, we study production processes carried out by matchings, i.e., a re-
lational activity between two individuals. Within this non-market environment, we
discuss the emergence of economic specialization and ultimately of economic trade
and a social division of labor. We base our approach on three stages in organizational
development: the presence of a stable relational structure; the presence of relational
trust and subjective specialization; and, ﬁnally, the emergence of objective specializa-
tion through the social recognition of subjectively deﬁned economic roles.
In Chapter 2, we extend our notion of production processes to include such car-
ried out by teams, i.e., relational activities between several individuals, organized in a
primitive ﬁrm. We show that the presence of a socially recognized authority ensures
the formation of productive teams.
In terms of the methodological tools, these chapters build upon the fast growing
network formation literature.8 The approach used here is one of non-cooperative link
formation. In Chapter 1 we use the pairwise stability concept developed by Jackson
7We refer to Yang (2001, 2003) and Cheng and Yang (2004) for a comprehensive review of the work
that has been accomplished in this research program.
8See Dutta and Jackson (2003) fora collection of essays inwide ranging topics applying cooperative
and non-cooperative approaches.6 INTRODUCTION
and Wolinsky (1996) to conduct the analysis. In Chapter 2, we modify their stability
concept to allow for greater deviational possibilities of star central players. The com-
mon underlying question that is investigated is under what conditions on the potential
network structure, there emerges a stable network of particular form: in Chapter 1,
this is a network of pairs and in Chapter 2, this is a network of stars. Technically, the
question is reminiscent to the one studied by Pápai (2004). Pápai (2004) identiﬁes
necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the permissible coalition structure in a hedonic
coalition formation model that ensure existence of stable coalition structures for any
preference proﬁle. Our work diﬀers from hers in two respects. First, our analysis is
based on networks. Second, we are investigating stability of particular network pat-
terns, as discussed above. This allows us to relax some of the conditions identiﬁed by
Pápai (2004) that ensure stability of the network of pairs in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2,
the fact that we employ a network approach, allows us to study patterns that do not
have a direct analogue in coalition formation models, since coalition formation mod-
els cannot discriminate between a coalition of, say, three players in which all three
players are connected and such in which one player acts an intermediary for the other
two who are not connected.
The second part, “Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation” consists of two
game theoretical essays, in which we develop new stability concepts relevant to en-
vironments of cooperation. Indeed, cooperative game theory is another fruitful frame-
work to study services, as it allows the analysis of the service output as a value pro-
ducedbythecooperation amongtheparticipating economicunits, i.e., toputinto prac-
tice the “uno actu principle” discussed earlier. In these two essays, there is a common
underlying question: when a set of individuals are faced with a cooperative situation,
which groups will form, and how will members of the group split the proceeds. Au-
mann and Dreze (1974) brought up this question, recognizing that answering it would
be equivalent to performing a general equilibrium type of analysis in a game theoret-
ical framework. Almost 20 years later, Maschler (1992) claimed that in his opinion
this question had not been answered satisfactory in the literature. Instead, researchers
have performed either one of two types of partial equilibrium analysis: given a ﬁxed
preference proﬁle, they study the formation of coalitions, i.e., the recent hedonic co-
alition formation literature, e.g. Banerjee, Konishi and Sonmez (2001), Bogomolnaia
and Jackson (2004), Pápai (2004); or given a ﬁxed organization structure, they study
the way total coalition value is allocated among the members, i.e., cooperative game
theory literature. In the two essays, new solution concepts are introduced that are
capable of answering the simultaneous question.INTRODUCTION 7
In Chapter 3, we revisit the work of Dreze and Greenberg (1980) in which endo-
genous coalition formation problems are studied based on three stability notions that
reﬂect three diﬀerent contractual arrangements with respect to one-person deviations.
In particular we modify these deﬁnitions in such a way that individual rationality is
implied by individual stability. Contrary to Dreze and Greenberg’s (1980) claim, we
show that contractually stable outcomes exist in any coalitional game. We, further-
more, show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contrac-
tually and compensation stable. Applying the general framework to an example of
mutual insurance in agricultural production, we ﬁnd that, in each type of contractual
setting, there are stable individually rational pooling outcomes while, on the contrary,
individually rational separating outcomes are not stable.
In Chapter 4, we discuss stability notions based on bargaining. This analysis is
applicable to situations in which no binding contracts are possible such as when either
the eﬀort of an individual, or the outcome of cooperation is not observable and veri-
ﬁable. Here, we oﬀer a new solution concept and we discuss its relation with exist-
ing bargaining sets such as the Maschler bargaining set, developed by Aumann and
Maschler (1964) and the Zhou bargaining set, developed by Zhou (1994). The novelty
in our solution concepts is that it explicitly takes into account diﬀerences of deviation
possibilities within an already formed group and outside the group. Such distinction
is necessitated by existing legal restrictions, physical restrictions, asymmetric inform-
ation availability, and other phenomena that give rise to diﬀerent transaction costs
within and outside an organization entity. We illustrate these concepts by applying
them to weighted majority games, used in modeling voting situations, and to a new
class of coalitional games called cooperation games applicable to discussions of or-
ganization of services producing units such as medical centers, research teams, etc.
The third part, “Governance and Eﬀectiveness”, consists of two empirical works,
which aim at gathering evidence on the functioning of services and its real life implic-
ations.
In Chapter 5, we use a cross-country comparison to investigate the impact of
national-level governance on socio-economic development. As a measure of socio-
economic development we take life expectancy, which as argued by Amartya Sen is
a variable that better reﬂects social welfare, compared to monetary variables such as
Gross Domestic Product.9 The point of departure of the econometric analysis is the
seminal work of Rodgers (1979) on the absolute and relative income hypotheses. We
ﬁnd that substituting the governance index for the Gini index of income inequality
9See Sen (1981), Sen (1987).8 INTRODUCTION
is statistically the preferred regression model. Our ﬁndings lend support to the argu-
ment that governance matters. Further investigation provides evidence for two types
of threshold eﬀects: in terms of both absolute income and governance. For those
countries below a threshold, absolute income is the most signiﬁcant determinant of
life expectancy, while for those above it, governance matters the most. The regression
analyses are conducted on a sample of 112 states, which is representative of a wide
range of absolute income and governance levels. It employs Ordinary Least Squares
methods.
In Chapter 6, the focus is on a speciﬁc case in health care provision, that is the
eﬀective treatment of patients with acid-suppressing drugs. Stomach related dis-
eases, such as Gastroesophageal Reﬂux Disease, H. Pylori, and Non-Steroidal Anti-
Inﬂammatory Drugs-induced gastropathy are usually treated with acid-suppressing
drugs. These diseases can be treated while being in acute form, or, if not detected on
time, in their chronic form. Chronic illnesses, however, have higher burden on the
health care system and lead to reduced quality in life for the patients. There are two
types of prescription acid-suppressing drugs: H2 blockers (H2B) and Proton Pump
Inhibitors (PPI) and we investigate their usage in the health care system. Clinical tri-
als suggest that PPI are more eﬀective in both healing and reducing the symptomatic
levels.10 However, in practice H2B’ are also widely used due to its lower costs. For
our analysis, we use administrative data provided by a Dutch health insurance group.
The Dutch case is interesting to study because General Practitioners (GP) are encour-
aged to prescribe H2B to patients with ﬁrst-time complaints. However, this may not
be a cost-eﬀective treatment in practice because the GP have imperfect knowledge of
the symptomatic history of the patient, hence, might treat patient with the cheaper but
less eﬀective drug while the more eﬀective drug could have prevented the transition to
a chronic disease.
Methodologically, we employ a binary choice model for the probability that a
patient a hospital and a duration model with time varying regressors to analyse the
time before a patient enters the hospital. The estimates show that there are patients
who had they been treated with PPI drug they would have had a lower probability of
hospitalization. The interpretation of these estimates heavily rely on the validity of
the assumptions of the regression models.
10AsreportedbySridhar, Huang, O’BrienandHunt(1996), Briggs, Goeree, BlackhouseandO’Brien
(2002), Vanderhoﬀ and Tahbour (2002), van Pinxteren, Numans, Bonis and Lau (2004).Part I
Stability and Social Recognition
9CHAPTER
ONE
Stability, Specialization and Social Recognition:
Exchange in a Pre-Market Setting∗
1.1 On Specialization, Institutions and Social Organ-
ization
Smith (1776) argued in his seminal work Wealth of Nations that the social division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market so that the beneﬁts of specialization
to an individual are determined largely by the existing social division of labor in the
economy. (This is also known as the Smithian Theorem.) Young (1928) extended this
into a synergetic argument that the extent of the market also depends upon the level
of social division of labor. Thus, the presence of increasing returns to scale leads
to specialization and further social division of labor. In turn, a high level of social
division of labor leads to increasing economies of specialization that form further
incentives to specialize and deepen the social division of labor.
In the present chapter we intend to sketch an argument that extends the Smithian
theorem beyond the setting of a competitive market economy based on a system of
perfectly competitive markets. Our argument is that the Smith-Young mechanism also
applies to social organizations and institutional settings other than that of a system of
perfectly competitive markets.
Indeed, we argue that the process of specialization occurs at diﬀerent levels of em-
beddedness of the individual consumer-producer and that only at its most advanced
state—namely that of objective specialization—this process results into a social di-
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Gilles, Lazarova and Ruys (2006).
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vision of labor. Thus, a social division of labor can indeed exist and generate eco-
nomic development and growth in the context of more primitive economic institutions
and systems of imperfectly competitive markets. This development mechanism is not
based on the endogenous selection of a specialization by an individual based on the
prevailing market prices; instead, each individual selects from a given set of comple-
mentary social economic roles, each corresponding to some specialism. Each of these
social economic roles is collectively recognized as such and, regarding each of these
social roles, there is a common knowledge.
Yang and Borland (1991) already showed that the Smith-Young mechanism functions
asadetermining factorin economic growth. Indeed, the mechanismofever-deepening
economic specialization and the accompanying development of the social division
of labor leads to signiﬁcant growth. In economic history and the new institutional
economics this has been accepted as the main engine behind the rise of the western
economies. (North and Thomas 1973, North 1990, Greif 1994, North 2005)
Recently, Ogilvie (2004), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) and Greif
(2006) have extended this argument and pointed to economic organizations other than
the perfectly competitive market in which the Smith-Young mechanism causes eco-
nomic development and growth. Acemoglu et al. (2005) mainly point to the develop-
ment of property rights and the underlying political institutions as causes of economic
growth. Empirical evidence of past performance of western economies back up these
arguments.
Our focus is on a rather primitive economy: economic agents directly interact with
each other without reference to a central organization such as a system of competit-
ive markets. Instead, individual economic agents engage in binary, value-generating
relationships—to which we refer as matchings. Matchings have to be understood as
binary productive engagements, which are not necessarily trade relationships. It is
assumed in this very primitive economy that every individual activates exactly one
value-generating matching.
Our theory is developed along two diﬀerent lines of thought. The ﬁrst line is
that of a formal theory in which we develop precise mathematical deﬁnitions and
show two main theorems. Our notion of equilibrium uses pair-wise stability developed
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The ﬁrst theorem gives conditions under which
equilibrium in a speciﬁc matching economy can be sustained; the second theorem
gives a generic existence result that supports the emergence of a social division of
labor. The result in the second theorem is closely related to the result obtained by
Pápai (2004), however, the conditions that we provide are less restrictive since theCHAPTER 1 13
focus of attention is coalitions of two players1 and not coalitions of arbitrary number
of players.
The second line of thought develops an application of our theory to a speciﬁc case
to illustrate the notions of subjective and objective specialization. Our main argument
is that there are two diﬀerent types of stability possible within a matching economy.
Subjective stability: Individualsengageinbinaryvalue-generatingrelationships, and
stability is attained if individuals are not willing to become autarkic or switch
partners for higher beneﬁts. The presence of stability is thus “subjective” in the
sense that it is completely based on the properties of the productive abilities and
utility functions of the individuals in the economy.
If a state of subjective stability is attained in the economy, the individuals might
develop mutually beneﬁcial trade within the relationship that they are engaged
in. Moreover, individuals might specialize their productive activities within the
(subjective) setting of the matching that they are engaged in. This is called sub-
jective specialization since it is founded on the speciﬁc properties of the match-
ing in which they generate their utilities.
We emphasize that subjective specialization does not induce a social division of
labor since individuals are not engaged at a higher social plane; their economic
interaction is explicitly limited to be within their matchings only. In that regard
the organization of the economy remains scattered and there are no widespread
gains from trade.
Generic stability: Only if generic stability is possible, economic agents can truly
specialize in an objective fashion and there emerges a social division of labor.
A matching economy attains generic stability if for every proﬁle of utility func-
tions and production sets, there exists a stable matching pattern. Our main the-
orem states that such generic stability is attained if there is a social organization
of the economy based on at least two socially recognized roles. Hence, there ex-
ist at least two complementary socio-economic roles such that value-generating
relationships solely exist between individuals with diﬀerent social roles. Hence,
only after complementary social roles are established, a true endogenous social
division of labor can emerge in which individuals specialize in these roles.
Our main existence theorem on generic stability thus identiﬁes that a binary so-
cial division of labor is a pre-requisite for stability. This amends the Smithian
theorem in the sense that there has to exist a ﬁnite set of socio-economic roles
1A matching can be treated as coalition structure that contains coalitions of two members.14 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
into which individuals can specialize, to establish stability in the social organ-
ization of the economy. The emergence of a set of socially recognized roles is,
thus, a necessary condition for stability in the economy.
Although our model of a matching economy describes a very primitive society, we
believe that it makes possible some deep conclusions. Our approach also resolves
the indeterminacy problem identiﬁed by Gilles and Diamantaras (2005). They argued
that the theory of the Smith-Young development mechanism is founded on a circu-
lar argument: prices of traded goods determine individuals’ specialization and, thus,
prices determine the social division of labor. This, in turn, determines which goods
are produced and traded, thus determining the extent of the market. This brings up
the question who or what ultimately determines which goods are traded and how eco-
nomic development is accomplished.
In our current model we put this determinacy problem at the center of our analysis.
Indeed, our main result states that generic stability requires the existence of a certain
set of established social roles from which individuals can choose when they specialize.
Each social role stands for a certain social-economic specialization and in equilibrium
the number of agents of each role is balanced. Only then an eﬀective social division
of labor emerges and the society can engage into an eﬀective process of economic
development and growth. Ultimately this development is founded on the enhancement
and extension of the commonly known set of economic roles.
Ultimately we conclude that economic development and growth is caused by or-
ganizational and institutional change (Acemoglu et al. 2005), rather than technical
change only (Romer 1986, Romer 1990). We believe that technical change is a con-
sequenceandexpressionoftheeﬀectivenessofthesocialorganizationoftheeconomy.
In Section 2 we provide some technical deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we present our frame-
work of a matching economy based on binary value-generating activities among eco-
nomic agents, we deﬁne stability as our main equilibrium notion and develop the
application to a primitive hunter-gatherer economy. Section 4 discusses the existence
of stable matching patterns and the emergence of subjective specialization. In Section
5 we introduce generic stability and the possibility of objective specialization. This in
turn implies the emergence of a social division of labor in such a matching economy.
We summarize our main line of thought in Section 6.CHAPTER 1 15
1.2 Technical Preliminaries
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of individuals. At this stage we do not make any
assumptions about these individuals regarding their individual abilities. Hence, in
this general model we do not explicitly assume that these individuals are consumer-
producers or that they are even able to specialize in any form.
Instead we endow these individuals with the abilities to engage into relational
economic activities that generate economic values or wealth.2 Therefore, these in-
dividuals are assumed to have relational abilities. (These relational abilities have to
be understood as special forms of more generalized social-economic abilities.) These
relational abilities in turn might be based on individualistic abilities; this approach is
explored in some examples throughout this chapter. Note that we do not assume or
impose that these relational activities take place in the context of a market. Instead we
assume that these relational abilities describe the economy itself.
Formally, we let the set Γ ⊂ {ij | i, j ∈ N} be a set of potential relational activities
between the individuals in N. Here, for two distinct individuals i ∈ N and j ∈ N with
i , j we deﬁne by ij ∈ Γ that these individuals i and j are able to engage in a “value-
generating relational activity”. We indicate this potential relational engagement ij ∈ Γ
as a potential matching of i and j. This is formalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.2.1 A set of potential matchings on the set of individuals N is given as
Γ ⊂ {ij | i, j ∈ N} such that
(i) for every individual i ∈ N: ii ∈ Γ and
(ii) for every individual i ∈ N there exists some j ∈ N with j , i and ij ∈ Γ.
Every relationship ij in the set Γ on N is denoted as a set of potential matchings.
We emphasize that any potential matching is symmetric in the sense that a matching
between individuals i and j is exactly the same matching as the one between individu-
als j and i. On the other hand, individuals i and j need not have the same utility from
this potential matching, as it will become evident later.
It is also possible that an individual i ∈ N does not engage in an economic activity
with any of the other economic individuals. In this regard i attains a relationally
2The most primitive form of a matching is that of cooperation in some production activities. More
advanced forms include the simple exchange or trade of two commodities. The gains from trade then
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autarkic position.3 Mathematically this is represented by the pairing of i with himself,
i.e., by the matching ii. The deﬁnition of the set of potential matchings Γ assumes that
each player i ∈ N has the possibility to exclude himself from the relational activities
in this economy and assume a relationally autarkic position, indicated by ii ∈ Γ. We
deﬁne
Γ0 = {ii | i ∈ N} ⊂ Γ
as the collection of relationally autarkic positions.
Another interpretation is that the set of potential matchings Γ represents the social
capital that is present within the population N. It describes what is the potential set of
matching partners for each individual, i.e., the complete description of her potential
social interactions. Some of these potential interactions may generate positive utilities
and others negative. Most importantly, it is assumed that no two individuals i and j
with ij < Γ can even engage in an economic value-generating relation. This indeed
corresponds to the notion of social capital as used in the social sciences. (Portes 1998,
Putnam 2000, Dasgupta 2005)
The relative position of an individual in Γ deﬁnes his matching possibility set as
it will become clear in the analysis. The set of connected players in a set of potential
matchings Γ is given by N(Γ) = {i ∈ N | there exists j ∈ N with j , i such that ij ∈
Γ}. By deﬁnition since Γ is a set of potential matchings N(Γ) = N. For every indi-
vidual i ∈ N, we introduce i’s neighborhood in Γ as the set of individuals who can be
partners of player i in potential matchings, i.e.,
Ni(Γ) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ Γ with i , j}.
The set of potential matchings that individual i can engage in, can now be formulated
as
Li(Γ) = {ij ∈ Γ | j ∈ Ni(Γ)}.
Let m ∈ N. A path between individuals i and j in the set of potential matchings Γ is a
sequence of distinct individuals P(ij) = (i1,i2,...,im) such that i1 = i, im = j, ik ∈ N
and ikik+1 ∈ Γ for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. The length of the path P(ij) is said to be the
number of links m − 1 that make up this path.
A cycle in the structure Γ is a sequence of distinct players C = {i1,i2,...,im} with
m > 4 such that i1 = im, ik ∈ N and ikik+1 ∈ Γ for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. Now the
length of the cycle C is given as m − 1. Thus, a cycle is a path from an individual to
3Throughout the chapter we distinguish two types of autarky: relational autarky and exchange aut-
arky. Relational autarky refers to the state of isolation of a player within the set of potential matchings
Γ, while exchange autarky refers to a state of nonparticipation in any of the exchange processes in the
economy. Obviously, relational autarky implies exchange autarky.CHAPTER 1 17
herself, which consists of at least three distinct players. We emphasize that each cycle
has length of at least three, i.e., a cycle consists of at least three distinct relations.
Deﬁnition 1.2.2 We say that a sub-structure   ⊂ Γ of the set of potential matchings
Γ on N is odd acyclic if   does not contain any cycle C of length ℓ > 3 such that ℓ is
an odd integer.
Odd acyclicity turns out to be a crucial property in the further development of our
theory.
1.3 A Matching Economy
The focus of our work is on relation activities in which each individual activates ex-
actly one of her potential matchings. This fundamental hypothesis is founded on the
fact that we model a very primitive economy without the presence of advanced eco-
nomic or social institutions. In such a primitive economy it is natural to assume that
individuals only interact with a single other individual at a time and that more com-
plex interactions require more advanced social institutions than assumed within our
context.
Such relational activities give rise to patterns of activated links in which each
player activates only one link out of all her potential links. Such value generating
activities, we call matching patterns.
Deﬁnition 1.3.1 A matching pattern is a subset of the set of potential matchings
π ⊂ Γ such that every individual is either paired with exactly one other individual
or remains relationally autarkic, i.e., π ⊂ Γ is such that |Li(π)| = |Ni(π)| = 14, for all
i ∈ N(π).
We denote by Π(Γ) = Π the class of all potential matching patterns within Γ.
To complete our model we assume that every individual i ∈ N is endowed with
complete and transitive preferences over the possible matching patterns π ∈ Π(Γ) in
which she can engage. Thus, by ﬁniteness of Γ, these preferences can be represented
by a hedonic utility function given by ui: Li(Γ) ∪ {i,i} → R. Let u = (u1,...,un)
denote a proﬁle of utility functions for every player i ∈ N and let U be the set of all
permissible proﬁles of hedonic utility functions representing complete and transitive
preferences.
4The convention in the network formation literature is to assume that the cardinality of the neigh-
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Deﬁnition 1.3.2 A matching economy is deﬁned to be a triple E = (N,Γ,u) in which
N is a ﬁnite set of individuals, Γ is a set of potential matchings on N, and u ∈ U is a
proﬁle of hedonic utility functions on Γ.
The pair (N,Γ) is also called the matching structure of the matching economy E =
(N,Γ,u).
A matching economy essentially is based on potential binary activities that gener-
ate economic values. For example, a trade economy can be represented as a matching
economy between buyers and sellers who can trade physical goods to generate gains
from trade. We emphasize here that a trade economy with two commodities—one
desirable and money—imposes that the potential matching structure Γ is bipartite and
that there are in fact two social types of individuals, namely buyers of the desirable
and sellers of the desirable. This in turn implies that Γ is odd-acyclic. This imposes
very strong properties on the matching economy as we explore in subsequent sections
of this chapter.
In a matching pattern one and only one matching is selected and executed by each
individual. For ease of notation we denote the indirect utility an individual i has when
participating in a matching pattern π with ij ∈ π for some j ∈ N as ui(π), i.e., ui(π) ≡
ui(ij), for all i ∈ N. For a given matching pattern, the indirect utility level for players
are given in a utility proﬁle u(π) = (u1(π),...,un(π). 5
With the tools developed so far we are able to introduce two relational stability
concepts. Again we let the matching economy E = (N,Γ,u) be given throughout. For
matching pattern π ∈ Π, a potential matching ij ∈ Γ \ π is a blocking matching if
ui(ij) > ui(π) as well as uj(ij) > uj(π).
Having deﬁned a blocking matching as a strict binary Pareto improvement, we
follow the concepts used in the literature on matching (Roth and Sotomayor 1990).
We point out that our notion of stability is closely related to that of stability in network
formation (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). With this concept we can deﬁne our stability
property of a matching pattern.
Deﬁnition 1.3.3 Let (N,Γ,u) be a matching economy. A matching pattern π ∈ Π is
stable if all matchings in π satisfy the individual rationality (IR) and no blocking (NB)
conditions:
IR ui(π) > ui(ii) for all i ∈ N, and
5We emphasize that the hedonic utility proﬁle considered here allows an individual to consider only
one matching at a time, since we do not allow an individual to engage in multiple matchings at the same
time.CHAPTER 1 19
























NB there is no blocking matching with regard to π, i.e., for all i, j ∈ N, i , j, with
ij ∈ Γ \ π:
ui(ij) > ui(π) implies that uj(ij) 6 uj(π). (1.1)
Stable matching patterns in E are denoted by π ∈ Π⋆(N,Γ,u).
Condition (IR) is an individual rationality requirement, that states that an individual
cannot be matched with another individual without her consent, i.e., if an individual is
better-oﬀ under relational autarky, she will pursue that.
In (NB) stands for a non-blocking condition requiring that a blocking matching
does not exist with respect to matching pattern π ∈ Π. Under (NB) if an individual
prefers to be matched with an alternative individual than the one with whom she is
matched under matching pattern π, then that alternative individual does not agree to
engage with her. This condition is closely related to the condition of link addition
proofness in network formation. Link addition proofness is at the foundation of the
notion of pairwise stability in network formation, seminally introduced by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996).
To illustrate our deﬁnition of stability, we discuss an abstract example.
Example 1.3.4 Consider an economy E1 = (N,Γ,u) with N = {1,2,3,4}, set of po-
tentialmatchingsΓ = {12,23,13,14,11,22,33,44}, andtheproﬁleofutilityfunctions
u given in the table below.6
j = 1 2 3 4
u1(1j) 0 1 2 3
u2(2j) 1 0 2 –
u3(3j) 2 -1 0 –
u4(4j) 0 – – 1
Given Γ we now derive the collection of all possible matching patterns, which is given
by
Π = {{11,22,33,44}; {11,23,44}; {12,33,44}; {13,22,44}; {23,14}}.
6In this table a dash in a cell indicates that no potential matching between individuals i and j exists.20 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
We now identify the stable matching patterns in this example. Let us start the discus-
sion with individual 1. She prefers to be matched to individual 4 since her utility in
this matching is the highest. However, individual 4 prefers to be by herself rather than
to be matched with 1 (u4(14) < u4(44)). Hence a matching between individuals 1 and
4 violates the individual rationality condition for individual 4.
Excluding link 14, individual 1 prefers to be matched with individual 3. Since indi-
vidual 1 is also individual 3’s most preferred partner, a matching between them cannot
be blocked by individual 2. Finally, individuals 2 and 4 do not have a potential match-
ing, hence in the matching pattern they should be in a state of relational autarky.
Therefore, the unique stable matching pattern is given by π∗ = {13,22,44}. ￿
Our main application of the general relational framework developed is that of a re-
lational economy of consumer-producers. We follow the new classical framework
developed in Yang (2001) and Yang (2003). The new classical approach is ﬁrmly
founded on the premise that consumer-producers specialize within a social context of
a structure of (market) interactions and, thus, attain higher welfare levels.
Here we start at an even more primitive level of reasoning. Before there is actual
specialization, there are consumer-producers with simple skills on which these spe-
cializations can be based. We recognize that skills, unlike commodities, are intrinsic
to a consumer-producer and cannot be exchanged. They can, however, be shared.
Sharing one’s skills with another individual is a process that does not make the giver
any poorer in the skill.7 As established by Yang and Borland (1991) and Yang (2003),
learning-by-doing is an important mechanism in the process of growth. However, in
Yang’s framework this process is individual-speciﬁc, i.e., economic individuals are
not allowed to learn from each other. In our framework, we go beyond this restric-
tion by allowing limited learning between individuals. When two individuals engage
in a relational activity, they do not actually exchange consumption goods, as in the
case of Yang; instead their learning externalities increase their productivity through
the (limited) sharing of the skills accumulated by their partners.
TheseideasareillustratedinExample1.3.5below. Thereisaﬁnitesetofconsumer-
producers. Each individual is endowed with one unit of productive time. There are
two types of skills, hunting (H) and gathering (G), complementing the production of
two types of consumption goods, meat and vegetables. When individuals are engaged
in a matching they acquire also some of the skills acquired by their partner. Thus,
there are relational externalities in the acquisition of skills.
7A commodity, in comparison, if shared makes the giver poorer in the possession of that commodity.
This is to say that while commodities are pure private goods, skills are non-rival in nature.CHAPTER 1 21
Individuals principally engage in the individual accumulation of hunting and gath-
ering skills. We also implement that they can decide to match with another individual
and enjoy the relational externalities in the acquisition of skills with this other in-
dividual; skills are actually shared. This sharing is based on some learning process
between the matched individuals. Within such a “sharing” matching, each individual
produces meat and vegetables by hunting and gathering, respectively. Before making
a decision to match, each individual can calculate the potential production output and
the level of utility attainable in each potential matching.
At this point in the development of a society, it is not assumed that matched indi-
viduals actually engage in the exchange of the produced goods if this is beneﬁcial for
both parties. Instead they remain exchange autarkic8 and only share their skills in the
way described above.
Example 1.3.5 (A relational economy with consumer-producers)
Let N = {1,2,3} be the set of three individuals. Each individual is endowed with
one unit of time which she can use to acquire some amount of gathering skills Gi and
some amount of hunting skills Hi. Skill acquisition is linear in time, i.e., Gi = li and
Hi = 1 − li where li ∈ [0,1] is the labor time used by individual i in acquiring gather-
ing skills Gi. Each individual i is therefore endowed with a technology to produce two
types of consumption goods: vegetables ( the amount of vegetables is denoted by v)
and meat (the amount of meat is denoted by m) by using some amounts of gathering
skills Gi and hunting skills Hi, respectively.
Furthermore, the interaction between these individuals is introduced as a complement-
arity in skill acquisition; individuals can acquire some of the skills of their matching
partner. This is described by two learning parameters αi
ij,βi
ij ∈ [0,1], which are in-
dividual and pair speciﬁc. The parameters α (respectively β) describe the transfer
of gathering (respectively hunting) skills from an individual’s partner to that indi-
vidual. The corresponding production functions in a matching between two individu-
als i, j ∈ N are now introduced as




hi(ij) = (Hi(1 + β
i
ijHj))
2, for all i, j = 1,2,3.
In this example we assume that the learning parameters are given in the following
table:
8As introduced before, we use the term “exchange autarkic” to express that an individual is self-








11 0 0 — —
12 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
13 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.3
22 0 0 — —
23 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.5
33 0 0 — —
Individuals are endowed with homothetic preferences over the consumption of meat




where vi denotes the consumption of vegetables by individual i and mi denotes the
consumption of meat by individual i.
The optimal acquisition of skills
The optimal investment in hunting and gathering skill of each individual depends on
the specialization decisions made by other individuals. First, we consider the case
in which individuals maximize their utility in the relationally autarkic case.9 The











mi = hi(ii) = (Hi)
2 = (1 − li)
2.
The solution yields li = 1
2 for all individuals i = 1,2,3. Hence, they invest equally
in acquiring gathering and hunting skills, i.e., Gi = Hi = 1
2.
Second, given the externality parameters α and β, we can calculate the optimal invest-
ment of an individual in acquiring hunting and gathering skills given the skill levels of
her partner. To take a generic case, let the partner j of individual i have acquired skill

















9This captures the extremely pessimistic case in which individuals believe that they cannot match
to any other individual. This can also be considered to be the outcome of the maximization problem of
extremely risk-averse individuals, or individuals who have very low degree of trust in the abilities of
the other individuals.CHAPTER 1 23
Irrespective of the parameter values αi
ij and βi
ij and of the levels Hj and Gj, this re-
duces to the same optimization problem as under relational autarky. Thus, individuals
remain exchange autarkic irrespective of the complementarities in the relationships
with their partners. So, again the optimal investment in acquisition of skills is given
by li = 1
2 implying that Hi = Gi = 1
2.
The resulting matching economy
Given the optimal acquisition of skills, we ﬁrst compute the optimal production out-
puts for vegetables and meat for all potential relationships. Subsequently, we determ-
ine the resulting potential utility values.
In fact, given Hi = Gi = 1
2 for all individuals i ∈ N, the potential production levels of
meat and vegetables by each individual in each potential matching are now given by
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
11 0.25 0.25 — —
12 0.3306 0.3306 0.4225 0.4225
13 0.3906 0.49 0.3306 0.3306
22 0.25 0.25 — —
23 0.3306 0.3306 0.49 0.3906
33 0.25 0.25 — —
We emphasize again that, since all individuals remain exchange autarkic, no trade
will ensue. Moreover, note that there is no mutually beneﬁcial trade between any two
individuals because in any pair one of the individuals has bigger quantities of both
goods. In fact, we assume that all individuals believe that they will not engage in
trade after creating a relationship with another individual.10 Hence, we can derive the
hedonic utility function based on the utility of consumption in a straightforward way,
e.g., u1(13) = φ1(13) =
 
g1(13)   h1(13) =
√
0.3906 × 0.49 = 0.4375. Similarly,
the remainder of all utility levels are computed and presented in the table below.
j 1 2 3
u1(1j) 0.25 0.3306 0.4375
u2(2j) 0.4225 0.25 0.3306
u3(3j) 0.3306 0.4375 0.25
.
The absence of stability
We claim that in the resulting matching economy, there does not exist a stable match-
ing pattern. Hence, in this economy based on the acquisition of complementing skills,
10As argued in the introduction, trade can only emerge within stable relations. Thus, only within a
stable matching pattern such trade can evolve. We also refer to Examples 1.4.7 and 1.4.8 for further
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there does not exist a stable matching.
As the utility levels show, individual 1 prefers to be matched with individual 3 rather
than with individual 2. Individual 2 prefers to be matched with individual 1 rather than
with individual 3. Individual 3 prefers to be matched with individual 2 rather than with
individual 1. Finally, all individuals prefer to be matched with a partner rather than to
stay relationally autarkic. Hence, we conclude that there is no stable matching pattern.
￿
1.4 ExistenceofStabilityandSubjectiveSpecialization
In our previous discussion, we have shown that in a primitive economy with lim-
ited specialization, there might be no equilibrium emerging in the form of a stable
matching pattern. Here we investigate suﬃcient conditions for the existence of stable
matching patterns. We also discuss the implications of our ﬁndings with regard to
specialization in a relational economy.
Belowwedeﬁneaspeciﬁcsubclassofmatchingpatterns. Asimilarclassofmatch-
ings has been deﬁned by Sotomayor (1996) in her proof of existence of stable match-
ing patterns in a bipartite matching economy. (Sotomayor refers to these patterns as
“simple”; we do not adopt this terminology.)
Deﬁnition 1.4.1 A matching pattern π ∈ Π is weakly stable in E = (N,Γ,u) if for all
individuals the Individually Rationality (IR) condition holds and whenever a blocking
matching ij ∈ Γ \ π exists, at least one of the partners in ij is relationally autarkic
under π, i.e.,
ui(ij) > ui(π) and uj(ij) > uj(π) imply that {ii, jj} ∩ π , ∅. (1.4)
We denote this as π ∈ Πw(N,Γ,u) = Πw ⊂ Π.
In a weakly stable matching pattern at least one of the partners in a blocking matching
is autarkic, hence if we are to delete all the relationally autarkic individuals from such
a pattern the remaining matchings will be stable. Further, note that the set of weakly
stable matching patterns Πw is non-empty as it contains at least the autarkic matching
pattern Γ0 = {ii | i ∈ N} ⊂ Γ. We use these properties of Πw to show the existence of
stable matching patterns.
We ﬁrst establish the following trivial insight, which follows immediately from
Deﬁnitions 1.3.3 and 1.4.1.
Lemma 1.4.2 Every stable matching pattern is also weakly stable.CHAPTER 1 25
Our analysis requires the introduction of some auxiliary notions. We deﬁne for any
sub-collection of matching patterns Θ ⊂ Π its cover by
Θ =






      \ Γ0. (1.5)
where Γ0 = {ii | i ∈ N } ⊂ Γ denotes the set of relationally autarkic positions. Now
(1.5) deﬁnes the cover of Πw(N,Γ,u) to be
Πw =

      






       \ Γ0

       ⊂ Γ. (1.6)
Similartotheoddacyclicitypropertyofthestructureofpotentialmatchings, wedeﬁne
odd acyclicity property of a matching economy:
Deﬁnition 1.4.3 A matching economy E = (N,Γ,u) is odd acyclic if for the class of
weakly stable matching patterns Πw(N,Γ,u) it holds that its cover Πw ⊂ Γ deﬁned in
equation (1.6) is odd acyclic.
We ﬁrst show that it is possible that the class of all possible matching patterns Π is
not odd acyclic—and, thus, Π ≡ ∪π∈Π (π \ Γ0 ) = Γ \ Γ0 contains an odd length
cycle—while the economy E itself is odd acyclic.
Example 1.4.4 Consider the matching economy E1 given in Example 1.3.4. Now, the
cover Π of the collection of possible matching patterns contains an odd length cycle
between individuals 1, 2, and 3. Indeed, {12,23,31} ⊂ Π = {12,13,14,23}.
On the otherhand, given the utility proﬁle u, the set ofweakly stable matching patterns
Πw is given by
Πw = {{11,22,33,44}; {12,33,44}; {13,22,44}}.
Now Πw = {12,13} and therefore it does not contain a cycle. Thus, the matching
economy E1 is odd acyclic. ￿
Our main existence theorem states that stable matching patterns exist if the collection
of weakly stable matching patterns satisfy the odd acyclicity condition. We refer to
Chung (2000, Theorem 1) for a similar result for the case of a pure matching prob-
lem.11
11In his stability result Chung (2000) imposes the odd-acyclicity condition on the preference proﬁle
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Theorem 1.4.5 If a matching economy E = (N,Γ,u) is odd acyclic, then it holds that
Π
⋆(N,Γ,u) , ∅.
Proof. First, we consider the case that the cover of the collection of weakly stable
matching patterns Πw does not contain any cycle. Subsequently, we investigate the
case that Πw only contains cycles that have an even number of links.
A: Πw is acyclic.
Assume that Πw does not contain any cycle, and suppose that no stable matching pat-
tern exists. Then for any weakly stable matching pattern π ∈ Πw there is a blocking
matching. By the deﬁnition of a weakly stable matching pattern, in such a block-
ing matching at least one of the individuals is relationally autarkic under π. Hence,
without loss of generality, we can take a weakly stable pattern π ∈ Πw for which ij is
a blocking matching, ii, jk ∈ π, and there is a match of i with j leaving k alone and
keeping all other matchings the same. Matching pattern π′, obtained in this way, must
be weakly stable, i.e., π′ ∈ Πw since there can be only one new blocking matching and
it contains individual k, who is relationally autarkic under π′.
Since π′ is not stable, individual k can form a blocking matching with another indi-
vidual, say l, such that lk < π′. By forming the pair kl, a new matching pattern is
formed π′′ = π′ ∪ {kl} ∈ Πw. Note that l , i since Πw does not contain a cycle. Now
the matching pattern π′′ can in turn be blocked by a matching ps where ps < π′′. Thus,
a new matching pattern π′′′ = π′′∪{ps} ∈ Πw is generated where p , j, since Πw does
not contain a cycle.
Iterating a sequence of matching patterns π(k) with k ∈ N according to the construction
outlined above, we reach a contradiction to the acyclicity due to the ﬁniteness of the
number of individuals.
B: Πw is cyclic as well as odd acyclic.
Next we assume that Πw is odd acyclic. Let Πw consist of a single cycle, i.e., Πw =
(i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik) such that ik = i1, k > 3, and k − 1 is an even integer.
We consider two cases, distinguished by the preference proﬁle of the individuals rep-
resented by the utility function. In the ﬁrst case the proof of the existence of a stable
matching pattern is reduced to the analysis of an acyclic cover of the collection of
weakly stable matching patterns. In the second case we propose an algorithm and
prove that it leads to identifying a stable matching pattern.
Case I: Πw = {i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik}, ik = i1, k > 3, and k − 1 is an even integer and let
there be at least one pair ij ∈ Πw, such that individual i is in the set of most preferred
partners of individual j and individual j is in the set of most preferred partners of in-CHAPTER 1 27
dividual i, i.e., j ∈ Bi(Γ) ≡ {k ∈ Ni(Γ) ∪ {i} | ui(ik) > ui(ih) for all h ∈ Ni(Γ) ∪ {i}}
and i ∈ Bj(Γ). Note that individual i is not necessarily diﬀerent from individual j.
However, if i = j, then the set of individual i’s most preferred partner must contain
also his two neighbors along a cycle.
Then it follows that ij is an element of any stable matching pattern, otherwise it will
form a blocking matching. Next consider the set of weakly stable matching patterns
which does not contain the pair ij. Thus truncated, the cover of the class of weakly
stable matching patterns, Πw \ ij, is acyclic and the existence of a stable matching
pattern, π⋆, follows from the discussion of the ﬁrst part of the proof.
CaseII:AssumethatΠw = {i1i2,i2i3,...,ik−1ik}, ik = i1, suchthatthereisnomatching
ij for which j ∈ Bi(Γ) and i ∈ Bj(Γ). Note that this precludes any of the individuals
from having relational autarky as the most preferred state.
Without loss of generality, consider a a proﬁle of utility functions u = (ui1,...,uik−1)
such that uis(isis+1) > uis(is−1is), for all s = 1,...,k−1 where i0 = ik−1. Consider the
following algorithm for selecting a matching pattern:
Take any individual is ∈ {1,...,k − 1} and match her with her most pre-
ferred partner, Bis = is+1, hence isis+1 ∈ π;
Then consider the most preferred partner of individual is+1 and match her
with her most preferred partner, i.e., Bis+1 is is+2, and Bis+2 = is+3, there-
fore is+2is+3 ∈ π;
Continue until all individuals are matched in π. Note that all individuals
in π are in a matching with another individual, thus, π ∈ Πw if and only if
π is stable.
Now, suppose that π is not a stable matching pattern. Then there exists a blocking
matching isis+1 for s = 1,...,k − 1 such that uis(isis+1) > uis(π) and uis+1(isis+1) >
uis+1(π), which contradicts the construction of π in which one of every two consecutive
individuals is matched with her most preferred partner in π. Thus, π ∈ Πw is a stable
matching pattern.
In fact in the last case of the proof of Theorem 1.4.5 there are two distinct stable
matching patterns. One is selected if the starting individual in the algorithm has an
odd index on the cyclical path. The other stable matching pattern is selected if the
starting individual in the algorithm has an even index on the cyclical path
The converse of Theorem 1.4.5 is not necessarily true, i.e., if a stable matching
pattern exists with respect to some Γ ⊂ ΓN then it might be that Πw contains a cycle
of odd length. This is illustrated in the following example.28 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
Example 1.4.6 Consider again the matching economy E1 as discussed in Example
1.3.4 with the potential matching structure depicted in Figure 1.1. Now we modify the
proﬁle of utility functions over potential matchings as follows:
j 1 2 3 4
u1(1j) 0 1 2 3
u2(2j) 1 0 2 –
u3(3j) 2 1 0 –
u4(4j) 0 – – 1
In this modiﬁed matching economy E2 there exists a unique stable matching pattern
π⋆ = {13,22,44}.12 However, the cover of the set of simple matching patterns, Πw,
generates a cycle. Indeed,
Πw = {{11,22,33,44}; {13,22,44}; {11,23,44}; {12,33,44}}; (1.7)
and therefore Πw = {12,13,23} gives rise to an odd cycle itself. ￿
1.4.1 Basis for Exchange
In Example 1.3.5 we showed that there might not exist stable matching patterns in
relational settings with complementarities in skill acquisition. In such a matching
economy, all individuals could establish mutually beneﬁcial relationships with another
individual based on relational complementarities in the acquisition of skills. However,
in that example, the lack of mutual consent of most preferred partners precludes them
fromestablishingtheserelationships. Theabsenceofastablematchingpatternimplies
that there is essentially a state of chaos in such a society.
The next example extends the discussion in Example 1.3.5 and shows that in many
cases there might emerge stable matching patterns within such situations. It develops
a case of an economy in which the learning parameters allow the formation of a stable
matching pattern consisting of mutually beneﬁcial relationships.
Example 1.4.7 ( Existence of stable matching patterns)
Consider the matching economy that has been developed in Example 1.3.5. We
modify this example to allow the existence of a stable matching pattern. For this
we modify the learning parameters as given in the table below:








11 0 0 — —
12 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6
13 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.5
22 0 0 — —
23 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
33 0 0 — —
As in Example 1.3.5 individuals remain exchange autarkic under the given circum-
stances and have an optimal investment in the acquisition of skills given by li = 1
2.
Hence, all individuals i ∈ {1,2,3} attain skill levels Gi = Hi = 1
2. This results into the
following production levels:
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
11 0.25 0.25 — —
12 0.3306 0.3306 0.4225 0.4225
13 0.3906 0.49 0.49 0.3906
22 0.25 0.25 — —
23 0.3306 0.3306 0.3306 0.3306
33 0.25 0.25 — —
These production levels now result into the following potential consumption utility
levels:
j 1 2 3
φ1(1j) 0.25 0.3306 0.4375
φ2(2j) 0.4225 0.25 0.3306
φ3(3j) 0.4375 0.3306 0.25
.
It is clear that given the set of potential matchings and a proﬁle of hedonic utility
functions such that ui(ij) = φi(ij) for a player i ∈ N and a potential matching ij ∈ Γ,
there exists a stable matching pattern. Indeed, the pattern π∗ = {13,22} is stable.
This stable matching pattern results into utility levels given by u∗
1 = u∗
3 = 0.4375 and
u∗
2 = 0.25. ￿
Only after stable matchings have been formed, individuals can engage in mutually
beneﬁcial exchange within such relationships. Without the support of a stable rela-
tionship, there would neither exist nor emerge any trust among the individuals and
therefore there would be no institutional basis for exchange.30 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
However, within a stable matching, trade is founded on a moderate level of trust
and both individuals can be assumed to engage in exchange. This is the subject of the
next extension of Example 1.4.7:
Example 1.4.8 (Justiﬁcation of limited exchange)
Consider the matching economy discussed in Example 1.4.7. This matching economy
admits a stable matching pattern π∗ = {13,22}. The only relevant stable matching
that emerges within this pattern is 13. Both individuals 1 and 3 can indeed engage in
mutually beneﬁcial exchange within this relationship.
Note that within 13, g1 = 0.3906, h1 = 0.49, g3 = 0.49, and h3 = 0.3906. It is
clear that the exchange resulting within the relationship 13 ultimately leads to ﬁnal
consumption levels given by
v1 = v3 = 1
2 (g1(13) + g3(13)) = 0.4403, and
m1 = m3 = 1
2 (h1(13) + h3(13)) = 0.4403.
Thisinturnleadstoafter-exchangehedonicutilitylevelsgivenby ^ u1 = ^ u3 = 0.4403 >
0.4375 = u∗
1 = u∗
3. Hence, there are mutual gains from exchange within the stable
relationship between individuals 1 and 3. ￿
1.4.2 The Emergence of Subjective Specialization
Example 1.4.8 indicates that within a stable matching, there naturally emerges a mod-
erate level of trust and, consequently, the possibility of mutually beneﬁcial exchange.
If such a stable matching is sustained, individuals will identify that specialization of
their skills leads to further deepening of the gains from exchange. Indeed, after both
parties engage in exchange, individual 1 will identify that increasing his skill level in
hunting will increase his meat production further. Similarly, individual 3 will identify
the complementary eﬀect of increasing her gathering skills to increase her vegetable
production.
This implies that further deepening of the stable trade relationship between indi-
viduals 1 and 3 results into mutual specialization. We emphasize that this special-
ization is induced at the most primitive level by the nature of the complementarities
between these individuals. Indeed, that individual 1 specializes in hunting is a con-
sequence of α1
13 < β1
13. Hence, there are social foundations to this specialization; spe-
cialization is still founded on the speciﬁc interaction within the relationship between
1 and 3. In this regard this type of specialization is completely subjective; this spe-
cialization only occurs within the context of the matching 13 and has no consequences
beyond that relationship.CHAPTER 1 31
Another motivation for the foundation of such subjective specialization is to say
that there are Ricardian comparative advantages for individual 1 to specialize in hunt-
ing only within the context of the relationship between 1 and 3.13
Example 1.4.9 (Subjective specialization)
Consider the matching economy developed in Examples 1.4.7 and 1.4.8. Within the
matching 13 both individuals now develop a deepening of their economic relationship.
As described in our previous discussion this ultimately leads to a moderate level of
trustandthedevelopmentofsubjectivespecialization; bothindividualsspecializetheir
production based on the environment of the matching 13 only.
Endogenous specialization under limited exchange
Individual 1 considers the exchange opportunities with individual 3 and consequently
optimizes her investment in the acquisition of gathering and hunting skills. Hence,
given the investment of individual 3 in the acquisition of gathering skills l3, individual



































This optimization problem is based on the exchange opportunities emerging within14
the matching 13. It is assumed that both individuals equally divide the gains from
exchange.




































13For a comprehensive discussion we also refer, e.g., to Yang (2003, Chapter 3.2).
14Since exchange may occur only within the matching, there is no reason to assume other than
equal bargaining power between the individuals. This will not be the case in Example 1.5.5 in which
objective specialization leads to potential exchange outside a given matching, the is trade. In that case,
the solution to the maximization problem will be given by the Walrasian allocation.32 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
Figure 1.2: The reaction curves in Example 1.4.9.
 
0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1 






l  1 
Player 1  Player 3 
The reaction functions of players 1 and 3 for the values of the learning parameters
given in Example 1.4.7 are presented in Figure 1.2. The continuous line represents the
optimal investment in gathering skills by player 1 given the investment in gathering
skills by player 3 and similarly the dashed line represents the optimal investment in
gathering skills for player 3 given the investment of player 1.
This mutual optimization problem has three solutions, namely the two cases of full
specialization: one in which player 1 specializes in gathering and player 3 in hunting
and the other in which player 1 specializes in hunting and player 3 in gathering; and
an equilibrium of relative specialization in which player 1 specializes relatively more
in gathering and player 3 specializes relatively more in hunting.15 Any of these three
solutions indicates a certain level of subjective specialization.
In the two extreme solutions given by (l1,l3) = (1,0) and (l1,l3) = (0,1), in which
both individuals fully specialize either gathering or hunting the attained utility levels
are u1 = u3 = 0.5. In the solution of relative specialization given by (l1,l3) =
15Wecanreformulatethisingametheoreticterms. Indeed, individuals1and3engageinatwo-player
normal form game with strategies l1 and l3 respectively. The two optimization problems formulate a
Nash equilibrium in this game. Thus, we identify three Nash equilibria in pure strategies for this
interaction game.CHAPTER 1 33
(0.6,0.4) the attained utility levels are u1 = u3 = 0.4344. Clearly full specializa-
tion leads to a higher attainable utility level.
Optimal subjective specialization





v1   m1 +
√
v3   m3
subject to














m1 = m3 = 1
2
 












By substituting the given parameter values for α and β, there are two solutions namely
the solutions that correspond to full specialization identiﬁed by (l1,l3) = (1,0) and
(l1,l3) = (0,1). ￿
1.5 Objective Specialization
The previous discussion clariﬁes the emergence of stable matching patterns and of
subjective specialization. This emergence is essentially based on features within the
pattern of stable matchings. For an economy to have persistent access to gains from
specialization, the social structure of the economy has to generically admit stable
matchings. Hence, whatever capabilities and desires of the individuals—represented
by their utility functions and (possibly) other individualistic features—a stable match-
ing pattern has to exist in the matching economy.
Technically, this brings up the question under which conditions on (N,Γ) there
exists a stable matching pattern for every possible matching economy (N,Γ,u), where
u is an arbitrary utility proﬁle. This line of research follows the research agenda set
in the matching literature. Here we are able to invoke the main result of Pápai (2004)
obtained in hedonic coalition formation framework. However, ﬁrst we outline her
main framework, to facilitate comparison.
Pápai (2004) investigates the existence of a unique stable coalition structure in a
coalition formation model where a coalition structure is a partition of the player set
into pairwise disjoint sets such that each set is an element of a given set of permissible
coalitions, and a coalition formation model is deﬁned as a collection of permissible
coalitions that a given ﬁnite set ofplayers may form. Players have strict, complete, and
transitive preferences over the set of coalitions in the collection of permissible coali-
tions in which they are members. A pair of coalition formation model and a preference34 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
proﬁle deﬁne a coalition formation problem. Pápai (2004) takes a coalition formation
model to be stable if there is a stable coalition structure for all all coalition formation
problems. A coalition structure is stable for a given coalition formation problem if
given a preference proﬁle, there is no coalition such that all players in this coalition
strictly prefer to be its members than to be part of the coalition whose members they
are in the given coalition structure. The necessary and suﬃcient condition that she
identiﬁes is called single-lapping property. Its implication to the network framework
is that the set of potential matchings does not contain a cycle.
Our notion of generic stability is clearly related to the notion of stable coalition
formation model discussed by Pápai (2004). As deﬁned below, generic stability is a
property of the matching structure. Since our analysis is focused on matching pat-
terns,that in hedonic coalition terms represent a set of permissible coalitions that con-
tains coalitions of no more than two players, we are able to provide less stringent
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for stability relative to Pápai (2004).
Formally we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1.5.1 A matching structure (N,Γ) is generically stable if for every utility
proﬁle u ∈ U it holds that Π⋆(N,Γ,u) , ∅.
Our main existence theorem can now be stated as follows:
Theorem 1.5.2 The matching structure (N,Γ) is generically stable if and only if the
set of potential matchings Γ is odd acyclic.
Proof.
If: From Deﬁnition 1.4.1 it follows that if Γ is odd acyclic, then Πw is odd acyclic too.
The suﬃciency of odd acyclicity condition on the set of simple matching patterns for
the existence of a stable matching pattern follows from Theorem 1.4.5 directly applied
to Deﬁnition 1.5.1. This implies that odd acyclicity of Γ is a suﬃcient condition for
the existence of a stable matching pattern for any utility proﬁle u ∈ U.
Only if: Suppose that there exists a stable matching pattern for all utility proﬁles
u ∈ U. Next suppose to the contrary that the potential matching structure Γ is not odd
acyclic. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Γ contains a single odd cycle
C = {i1,i2,...,ik} such that i1 = ik and k − 1 is an odd integer.
Take the utility proﬁle u ∈ U such that uis(isis+1) > uis(is−1is) > uis(isis), for all
s = 1,...,k − 1 where i0 = ik−1. In every weakly stable matching pattern π ∈ Πw(u)
withrespecttotheutilityproﬁleuthereisatleastoneindividual, is for s = 1,...,k−1,
on the cycle Γ who is relationally autarkic since there are odd number of individuals in
the cycle. Thus individual is can form a blocking matching with individual is−1 sinceCHAPTER 1 35
uis(is−1is) > uis(π), i.e., every individual prefers to be matched with another individual
rather than be relationally autarkic, and uis−1(is−1is) > uIs−1(π) since individual is is
the most preferred partner of individual is−1 given preference proﬁle u. Thus, no stable
matching pattern exists in Γ with respect to the given preference proﬁle u.
We now conclude that (N,Γ) cannot be generically stable, which establishes a contra-
diction. Hence, we have shown the assertion.
Theorem 1.5.2 provides a complete characterization of generically stable matching
structures. This is a very strong result with some deep consequences. Before discuss-
ing the consequences of this insight to the discussion of specialization, we turn to the
interpretation of the odd acyclicity property.
Theorem 1.5.3 Let Γ be a set of potential matchings on N. A sub-structure Θ ⊂ Γ is
odd acyclic if and only if (N,Θ) is bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning
{N1,N2} of N such that
Θ \ Γ0 ⊂ N1 ⊗ N2 = {ij | i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2 }. (1.10)
Proof. It is obvious that every bipartite structure Θ on N is odd acyclic, since all cycles
have to be of even length. So, we only have to show the converse.
Let Θ be odd acyclic on N. Without loss of generality we may assume that Θ , ∅,
Θ ∩ Γ0 = ∅, and that Θ is completely connected in the sense that for all i, j ∈ N with
i , j there is a path P(ij) ⊂ Θ between i and j.
Select some i0 ∈ N. Assume that j ∈ N is such that there exist two distinct paths
Pa = Pa(i0j) and Pb = Pb(i0j) between i0 and j. We now claim that the length of
both Pa as well as Pb are either odd or even. Indeed, if the length of Pa is odd and the
length of Pb is even, then Pa ∪ Pb ⊂ Θ deﬁnes a cycle from i0 to i0 that has an odd
length. This violates odd acyclicity of Θ.
Now deﬁne N1 ⊂ N as follows: For every j ∈ N we let j ∈ N1 if and only if the unique
length of a path P(i0j) is odd. Subsequently we deﬁne N2 = N \ N1, consisting of all
individuals that have paths of even length with i0.
Finally, we claim that for any ij ∈ Θ it holds that either i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2 or j ∈ N1
and i ∈ N2. This follows immediately from the observation that for all i, j ∈ N1 a path
P(ij) between them has to have even length. (Otherwise, there would be an even- as
well as an odd-length path between i0 and i.) Similarly, for all i, j ∈ N2 a path P(ij)
between them has to have even length.
Theorem1.5.3statesthatoddacyclicityofasub-structureofthesetofpotentialmatch-
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structures in matching theory (Roth and Sotomayor 1990) and imposes that relations
are only possible between individuals of a diﬀerent, distinct “type”. We develop an
interpretation of this requirement in the next sections of this chapter.
Our main insight provided in Theorem 1.5.2 can now be re-stated using the char-
acterization in Theorem 1.5.3:
Corollary 1.5.4 The matching structure (N,Γ) is generically stable if and only if
(N,Γ) is bipartite in the sense that there exists a partitioning {N1,N2} of N such that
Γ \ Γ0 ⊂ N1 ⊗ N2 = {ij | i ∈ N1 and j ∈ N2 }. (1.11)
We now turn to the discussion of the application of this insight to the economies with
skill complementarities developed in Examples 1.3.5, 1.4.7, 1.4.8 and 1.4.9.
As stated before, certain sets of skill complementarities might result into the emer-
gence of stable matching patterns. These stable matching patterns in turn give rise to
subjective specialization and mutually beneﬁcial exchange. This does not mean that
there result widespread gains from exchange. For such enhanced economic develop-
ment it is necessary that there emerges an objective or socially recognized division of
labor.
In particular, we argue that the deepening of the stable matching patterns through
subjective specialization in turn leads to the emergence of odd acyclic structures of
potential matchings. This emergence is based on the social recognition of the roles
that are based on the subjective specialization of individuals in such stable matching
patterns. This is discussed next. The economic activities are thus recognized as trade.
Example 1.5.5 (Objective specialization)
Consider the stable matching pattern π∗ = {13,22} discussed extensively in Examples
1.4.7, 1.4.8 and 1.4.9 as the unique stable matching pattern. Within this stable match-
ing pattern, the matching 13 is the only binary, value-generating relationship. In Ex-
ample 1.4.8 it was sketched that within this relationship there would result mutually
beneﬁcial exchange opportunities if suﬃcient trust among the individuals 1 and 3 was
established. Also, within this matching, individual 1 generated a higher output of
meat (h1(13) = 0.49) than of vegetables (g1(13) = 0.39) and individual 3 generated a
higher output of vegetables (g3(13) = 0.49) than of meat (h3(13) = 0.39) due to the
actual values of the complementarity parameters α and β.
Subsequently, in Example 1.4.9 we discussed the emergence of subjective specializ-
ation within the matching 13. We identiﬁed three diﬀerent subjective specialization
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trust and the presence of a trade relation between individuals 1 and 3.
At present we argue that further deepening of the eﬃciency in this economy is only
possible through the establishment of a true social division of labor. Given the initial
output levels, the subjective specialization will develop into the direction as indicated
through these output levels. Hence, individual 1 probably specializes subjectively on
hunting only, while individual 3 specializes subjectively on gathering only. If these
subjective specializations are recognized socially, individual 1 becomes a “hunter”
and individual 3 becomes a “gatherer”. Being a hunter now becomes a socially recog-
nized economic role, as does being a gatherer. Only after the establishment of such
complementary social roles there emerges a social division of labor.16
In the application, players 1 and 3 can achieve social recognition as a gatherer and a
hunter and re-evaluate their potential utility level from a matching with another player.
Now, let player 1 assume the role of a gatherer and player 3 the role of a hunter. Hence,
there emerge three social roles within this simple economy: H stands for a hunter, G
stands for a gatherer, and A stands for an individual in a position of autarky. The
assumed skill acquisition of each role is respectively GG = HH = 1, HG = GH = 0,
and GA = HA = 1
2. The production level of each potential matching is then given by:
ij gi(ij) hi(ij) gj(ij) hj(ij)
GG 1 0 — —
GA 1.3225 0 0.64 0.25
GH 1 0 0 1
AA 0.25 0.25 — —
AH 0.25 0.64 0 1.3225
HH 0 1 — —
Inobjectivespecializationeachindividualnowexpectstobetradingwhensheengages
in a matching. Also, under objective specialization, unlike under subjective specializ-
ation, the level of trust expands to the whole set of players, i.e., to the whole economy.
This is why an individual believes fully that she can be matched with another player
with whom trade is beneﬁcial in a stable matching. In fact, there is common know-
ledge that gatherers and hunters can be matched in highly productive social (trade)
relationships. Individuals who assume social roles, have socially justiﬁed beliefs that
a stable matching pattern exists.
In our example, after objective specialization and the establishment of a social division
16We emphasize here that the establishment of a social role requires the the social recognition of
each role and the separation of the related specialism from each individual. Thus, the social recognition
of an economic role induces a dichotomy of this role and other aspects of her life for every individual
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of labor, there emerge three types of individuals: hunters, gatherers and individuals in
autarky. A hunter (or gatherer) believe that they will trade half a unit of meat (veget-
ables) for half a unit of vegetables (meat) in a potential matching with a gatherer (or
hunter). The trade between a hunter (or gatherer) and an individual in autarky will
take the terms of 0.66125 units of vegetables (meat) for 0.084235 units of meat (ve-
getables). These are calculated to be the optimal trade patterns in the matchings AG
and AH, respectively.
It should be noted here that the emergence of trade between individuals with diﬀerent
social roles is fundamentally diﬀerent from commodity exchange between subject-
ively specialized individuals. Social recognition indeed alleviates the informational
burden and implements certain expectations.
These production levels now result into the following potential utility levels from con-
sumption after trade:
j H G A
φ(Hj) 0 0.5 0.2360
φ(Gj) 0.5 0 0.2360
φ(Aj) 0.4644 0.4644 0.25
.
Clearly, gatherers and hunters prefer to be engaged in matching with each other rather
than to be in relation with an individual in autarky. Hence, the unique stable matching
pattern can be identiﬁed as {GH,AA}, which corresponds to {13,22} in the original
setting.
Within the developed example, there now can emerge a market. If suﬃciently large
number of individuals assume the social roles of hunter and gatherer and other eco-
nomic institutions such as the protection of property rights, monetary instruments, and
the creation of actual market places are established, then there might emerge a market
at which hunters and gatherers can trade vegetables and meat for a well established
and unique market price. ￿
Objective specialization excludes relationships between individuals with the same so-
cial role as being potentially beneﬁcial economic matchings. This implicitly reduces
the set of potential matchings to an odd acyclic or bipartite structure in which only
matchings between individuals with two diﬀerent roles are recognized.
Finally, Theorem 1.5.2 does not guarantee the uniqueness of the stable matching
pattern. For uniqueness we need to impose two additional restrictions on the set of
potential matchings, namely that u ∈ Us with Us ⊂ U being the set of all utility
representations of strict preferences only and that the set of potential matchings Γ isCHAPTER 1 39
(fully) acyclic, i.e., also cycles with even number of links in the path are not allowed.
This result is a direct application of Pápai (2004) uniqueness theorem and, hence, the
proof is omitted here.
Proposition 1.5.6 Let Us ⊂ U be the class of utility functions of strict preferences.
The matching structure (N,Γ) is generically stable with |Π⋆(N,Γ,u)| = 1 for every
utility proﬁle u ∈ Us if and only if Γ is acyclic.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we introduced a four stage approach to the emergence of a social divi-
sion of labor based on the objective specialization of individuals. As a ﬁfth stage we
can add the emergence of market institutions themselves. This approach clariﬁes that
the presence of a social division of labor is in fact a prerequisite for the creation or
emergence of a functioning price mechanism. Summarizing these four stages are:
Stage I: Non-equilibrium. In a primitive relational economy without objective spe-
cialization, there are conditions that do not support an equilibrium. This leads
to a situation of indeterminancy to which we can refer as a permanent relational
chaos or indeterminancy. Individuals would like to beneﬁt from the learning ex-
ternalities and thus prefer to be matched with another individual than to be fully
self-reliant for the provision of necessities for survival and stay in exchange
autarky. However, there is a lack of double coincidence of a desired matching.
(Example 1.3.5)
Stage II: Primitive equilibrium. Within a primitive relational economy there might
exist conditions that allow the emergence of a stable social interaction pattern.
Such a stable pattern is only founded on subjective and personal features, not on
any objective or social conditions.
Within this stage we distinguish two sub-stages.
(II-A) At ﬁrst there only emerges a stable pattern in which interpersonal spill-
overs are exploited. This ﬁrst level of stable social interaction facilitates the
emergence of a moderate level of subjective trust among the matched individu-
als. (Example 1.4.7)
(II-B) Next, the emergence of suﬃcient subjective trust among the individuals
that are engaged with each other, supports the introduction of exchange among
those individuals; the exploitation of interpersonal spillovers is extended into40 STABILITY, SPECIALIZATION AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION
the exchange of economic commodities leading to even higher levels of utilit-
ies. The emergence of exchange is an important step into the development of an
economy. (Example 1.4.8)
Stage III: Subjective specialization. After exchange has been established there is
the possibility for a further deepening of interpersonal trust within the stable
relationships in the economy. This facilitates the emergence of subjective spe-
cialization in which individuals based on the demands of their interpersonal
relationships specialize their economic activities. Hence, within the context of
a stable exchange relationship with other individuals, an individual chooses a
production plan to optimize his utility level.
This process of subjective specialization is similar to the specialization process
based on inframarginal analysis developed by Yang, e.g., Yang (2001) and Yang
(2003),—as a formalization of the Smith-Young development mechanism—
within the context of a perfectly competitive price mechanism. However, sub-
jective specialization does not take place within the context of a functioning
price mechanism, but rather within the interpersonal relational setting of each
individual separately. (Example 1.4.9)
Stage IV: Objective specialization. The emergence of subjectively specialized indi-
viduals can lead to the recognition of social economic roles in the society at
large. Individuals who specialize on hunting skills in the context of their in-
dividual relationships, become socially recognized as “hunters”. Thus, hunters
are identiﬁed and appointed in the society as producers of meat. Subsequently,
there emerge social rules related to the social role of a hunter as a producer of
meat. The engagement of a “hunter” with a “gatherer” in an economically be-
neﬁcial (exchange) relationship may thus become the foundation for economic
development. Individuals subsequently specialize in an objective fashion: they
now select from a limited set of social roles and engage in an objective fashion
with other individuals in their respective social roles to generate mutual eco-
nomic beneﬁts. It is only within this context of objective specialization that
there emerges a social division of labor which further development acts as an
engine for economic growth—described in the context of a market by the Smith-
Young mechanism. (Example 1.5.5)
Stage V: Market emergence. We argue that only after the establishment of a social
division of labor based on the social recognition of certain economic roles, there
can emerge a functioning market or price mechanism. Besides the social divi-CHAPTER 1 41
sion of labor there have to be established other economic institutions. Only after
these other conditions are met, there might emerge a price mechanism through
which further economic growth and development is made possible in the form
of the Smith-Young mechanism based on the extent of the market.
In this chapter we only have developed the most basic principles of this descriptive
theory. The main conclusion is that economic development and growth is closely re-
lated to the development of the social roles in an economy. These social roles have a
public nature and as such are subject to a purely public economic theoretical analysis
or an evolutionary treatment. This is closely related to the conclusion in Gilles and
Diamantaras (2005). Further development of the abstract theory of matching econom-
ies is required before we can expect a full and working understanding of the ﬁve-stage
process of market development summarized above. This is left to future research.CHAPTER
TWO
Stability and Social Recognition of Authority:
Collective Production in a Pre-Market Setting∗
2.1 On Social Complexity and Productive Complexity
Complex economic organizations, such as multi-hierarchy ﬁrms are taken to be a com-
mon economic entity. Coase (1937) was the ﬁrst to question the origin of the ﬁrm and
by raising this question he started a substantial volume of literature that discusses the
organizational form of the ﬁrm as an alternative to the market organizations. How-
ever, complex productive organizations have emerged even before the establishment
of markets as institutions. While such pre-market organizations have been ignored in
the above works, they will be in the center of attention here. The current work devel-
ops along two dimensions. On one hand, we develop a general framework that allows
us to study the emergence of complex productive entities, and on the other hand, we
apply this framework to a speciﬁc collective production process, via which, according
to anthropologists, complexity emerged in primitive hunter-gatherer societies.
We develop a theoretical framework in which economic value is generated in the
interaction between people. An individual has a restricted domain of activities in
which she can engage. The restriction may be coming from exogenously given social
or production-speciﬁc rules. Given their potential domain, individuals are seeking to
activate those relations, that allow them to participate in a productive process. The
productive processes studied here may involve more than a pair of individuals, that is
why we refer to them as complex processes. What is essential is that these individuals
who engage in a productive process are organized in a speciﬁc way that follows from
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Lazarova, Gilles and Ruys (2006).
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our deﬁnition of complexity. Complexity in an organization is translated in graph-
theoretic terms as a directed network of star structures that we call a star pattern.
The direction of a productive link signiﬁes that one of the individuals has authority
over the other. The utility of an individual engaged in production depends on her
productive ability and on the abilities of the other players with whom she is connected
as well as her relative position in the star, i.e., whether she is located in the center or
on one of the leaves. In the general framework, however, we do not explicitly model
utility as a function of productivity abilities but use a hedonic team utility proﬁle as an
indirect utility measure. This makes our main theoretical results applicable to a wide
range of frameworks. The potential activities and the preferences of players over the
production teams in which they can engage deﬁne what we call a team economy.
Like in the preceding chapter, we study two types of stability: stability within a
speciﬁc team economy, and generic stability that renders stability to the structure of
potential activities. As in the previous chapter, generic stability implicitly requires
that a structure of potential activities is such that no matter how the productive abil-
ities are distributed among its individuals, there is a stable star (production) pattern.
The lack of a stable star pattern is interpreted as chaotic behavior and unpredictability
of the production outcome given a structure of potential activities and a distribution of
the productive abilities. In terms of the individual possibilities for deviation, stability
refers to the lack of pairs of players who prefer to deviate from the established pat-
tern. This notion of stability is largely based on the notion of pairwise stability ﬁrst
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and also used in the preceding chapter.
Here, however, the notion of stability is adapted to allow for greater possibilities for
deviation of these players who are located in the center of a star component. Such
players may add links, without severing existing links, unlike the rest of the players
who are located at the leaves of a star, because in doing do so they still preserve the
star structure of the activity pattern.
Our main theoretical results refer to two types of stability: economy-speciﬁc and
generic. The concept of generic stability used here is closely related to the generic
stability used in Chapter 1: it is a property of the potential structure that ensures
the existence of a stable pattern for any preference proﬁle. In Chapter 1, this is a
matching pattern and here this is a star pattern. We provide a suﬃcient condition
on the set of potential activities that ensures the existence of a stable star pattern in
a given economy. Furthermore, we provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on
the set of potential activities that ensure the existence of stable star patterns for any
team utility proﬁle, i.e., that ensure generic stability. These necessary and suﬃcient
conditions require that the set of potential links does not have a cycle with a number ofCHAPTER 2 45
players diﬀerent from a multiple of three, where the multiple is higher than one.1 The
implications of these conditions for the structure of potential activities is, that it may
be a tree or it may contain special cycles which connect some players whose number
is a multiple of three. Though related to the main theorem on existence of stable
coalition structures derived by Pápai (2004)2, our theoretical results are fundamentally
diﬀerent and can only be derived in a graph-theoretic framework. The graph-theoretic
framework allows us to distinguish between coalitions of, for example, three players
in which there are links between all three of them or in which there are links between
only two of them and the player in the middle acts as a star central player.
The relation between the establishment of a hierarchical social structure and pro-
ductive complexity via labor specialization has been documented in some anthropo-
logical works. This motivated us to develop an application of the general framework
closely related to the discussion of the emergence of complexity in primitive societies
carried out in some anthropological literature.
In some of anthropological works hierarchical organization is seen as an element
of complexity, e.g., in Arnold (1993) we read
I deﬁne chieﬂy complexity to include three recognizable organizational
characteristics: hereditary inequality, hierarchical organization (including
some political authority on a multicommunity scale), and the elite ability
to exercise partial control over domestic labor.
The hereditary property of the hierarchical organization implies that the hierarch-
icalorganizationisex-anteﬁxedonasetpotentialofactivities. Thatis, whenindividu-
als decide on the type of activities to do, they are limited by their relative position in
the socially recognized hierarchy. Note that here the hierarchical organization refers
to a social hierarchy, not necessarily induced by the productive capabilities of indi-
viduals. The third element in Arnold’s deﬁnition of complexity is what we deﬁne as a
complex value generating relation, i.e., the relation in which an individual has decision
power on the production units intrinsic to another individual.
The process via which complex relations have emerged has been attributed by
some anthropologists to the socially recognized specialization of labor. For an extens-
ive discussion of these theories we again refer to Arnold (1993):
1Theconditiononthenumberofplayersconnectedinacycleisatechnicalrestrictionthatisfounded
on the limited types of complex patterns, which we investigate. We will come back to this point in the
discussion in Section 2.7.
2See Chapter 1, Section 1.5 for an outline of the framework used by Pápai (2004).46 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
I suggest that the mechanism by which change occurs from egalitarian
to non-egalitarian relations involves the changing organization of human
labor, speciﬁcallytheinstitutionalizedseparationofsomelaborandproducts
from sole family or kin-group control into the hands of higher authority.
In a comparative case study of two hunter-gatherer societies in Papua New Guinea,
Bedamuni and Kubo, distinguished by the levels of social and productive complexity
(Bedamuni exhibit higher level of complexity and Kubo exhibit lower level of com-
plexity), Minnegal and Dwyer (1998) summarize their expectations as follows:
An increase in the investment of labor in particular tasks usually neces-
sitates a change in the allocation of time to those tasks and thus in the
organization of labor. We expected Bedamuni to be investing more in sub-
sistence tasks than Kubo but, more importantly, to be working in diﬀerent
ways. We expected to see a clearer division of labor among Bedamuni
than among Kubo, a sharper diﬀerentiation of roles between sexes and
age classes and work more often performed by specialised task groups
than by households. In short, we expected a rationalization of subsistence
tasks among Bedamuni, increased diﬀerentiation of roles within produc-
tion units.
When studying the process of the emergence of complex activities, one also needs
to answer the question what triggered this process. Again we base the discussion on
anthropological evidence. According to Arnold (1993), most anthropologists agree
that the emergence of more complex production activities was “a product of necessity
rather than choice”. Among the ultimate triggers according to Arnold are the high
population density and resource imbalances. This implies that even though individu-
als had the technology to engage in complex production, they did not do so, until it
was necessary for them to do it in order to survive. An explanation that we put for-
ward is that the engagement in complex collective production involves reliance on the
actions of other individuals and, hence, trust in the social responsibility that the other
engaged individuals will have to fulﬁll their duties in a situation in which there are no
established enforcement institutions.
Based on these anthropological insights, we analyse value generation processes
which take the form of collective production in a subsistence economy of consumers-
producers. We will introduce in more detail collective production in the following
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on the application conform to the insights present in the anthropological literature.
A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the presence of stable collective production
process is that the set of potential activities has to be void of components of directed
cycles in which the number of individuals connected is diﬀerent from a multiple of
three with a multiple higher than one. Since there is a speciﬁc relation between the
direction of the network and the team utility function, the condition is based on the
deﬁnition of a cycle that also takes into account the direction of the network, i.e., there
cannot be two individuals who have (indirect) authority over each other. This implies
that the set of potential activities must be of a hierarchical structure which indeed
implies the presence of a socially recognized authority.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the
notion of collective production and the presence of authority. Section 2.3 provides the
necessary graph-theoretic toolbox. Section 2.4 presents the general framework and
applies this framework to the application of complex production. Sections 2.5and 2.6
oﬀer our main theoretical results and illustrative examples. Section 2.7 concludes with
a discussion on the beneﬁts and limitations of this framework.
2.2 Collective Production and Authority
Collective production is a process in which producer-consumers individuals may en-
gage to generate value. Collective production is, thus, a form of an organization that
precedes the emergence of ﬁrms. A prominent reference for a discussion of ﬁrms
formed by consumers-producers is the works of Professor Xiaokai Yang. Yang (2003)
deﬁnes the ﬁrm to be “a structure of transactions based on the division of labor”. Yang
also recognizes that within a ﬁrm there is a clear distinction between two roles: the
role of an employer and the role of an employee such that the employer has a de-
cision power over the employee’s labor. We refer to the ability of one individual to
make a decision of the participation in the productive process by another individual
as authority. Collective production is modeled as a stable conﬁguration of agents
generating value based on the division of labor with a well-deﬁned ﬂow of authority.
The main diﬀerence between the organization of collective production and a ﬁrm as
deﬁned by Yang (2003) is that in our setting there are no markets. Hence there is no
external mechanism or, for that matter, an invisible hand that determines a rate of re-
muneration in return for one’s labor. Furthermore, the output produced by collective
eﬀort is consumed by the participants in the process rather than sold on an external
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Moreover, in Yang’s analysis of a ﬁrm based on producer-consumers there is a
uniformandpre-determinedrelationbetweenthelaborspecializationandtheauthority
rolesofan“employer”oran“employee”thatanindividualcanassume. Theallocation
of authority roles in our setting is idiosyncratic to each pair of individuals. So, it is
possible that one player has authority over another player, while a third player has
authority over the ﬁrst.
The relation between our framework of collective production and Yang’s analysis
of a ﬁrm, will become clearer in the discussion below. The collective production is
based on that of an economy of producer-consumers discussed by Yang (2003). In
Chapter 6 of his book Yang oﬀers a stylized framework in which there is a ﬁnite set
of individuals who consume a consumption good. To produce the consumption good
they need both labor and an intermediate good. To produce the intermediate good they
need only labor as an input. There is increasing returns to scale in the production of
both goods. Yang’s framework concerns the emergence of ﬁrms in a market setting
and as such it models players who maximize utility and proﬁts taking prices as given.
The objective here is to understand the emergence of complexity at a more primitive
level prior to the establishment of the market institutions. Players in our framework
maximize their free-time subject to sustaining some minimal consumption level called
subsistence level ¯ y.
Like Yang, in our application we assume that individuals are homogeneous in their
preferences and production possibility set.3 We denote the amount of the consumption
good that they produce by y ∈ R+. There is a minimum level of the consumption good
¯ y that individuals must consume, otherwise they perish. To produce the consumption
good individuals use as inputs their labor measured as time and some amount x ∈ R+
of an intermediate good . The production of the intermediate good involves only
labor, i.e., time. Formally the production functions for the intermediate good and
the consumption good are given as x = (lx)α and y = xly, where lx is the amount
of time spent in producing x and ly is the amount of time spent in producing y and
α > 1 captures the increasing returns to scale in production.4 All individuals have
preferences for leisure f ∈ [0,1] represented by a linear utility function φ(f) = f.
They have one unit of time available which they can allocate among having leisure,
producing the intermediate good, or producing the consumption good, i.e., f+lx+ly =
1. Note that the limited resource of time makes the utility function bounded from
3Since players are homogeneous in their preferences and in their production possibility set we will
avoid using individual speciﬁc index when no confusion arises.
4This production possibility set is analogous to the one discussed by Yang (2003) in the chapter
on the emergence of the ﬁrm. Yang’s formulation is more general, i.e., the production function of
consumption good is given by y = x(ly)β. Here we take β = 1 for ease of exposition.CHAPTER 2 49
below and from above, i.e., φ(0) ≤ φ(f) ≤ φ(1) for f ∈ [0,1]. We can interpret u(1)
as the bliss point of an individual and φ(0) the point of exhaustion.5
In situations in which individuals, acting alone, cannot achieve the subsistence
consumption level, by necessity, they need to engage in collective production. The
most primitive form of collective production is the one in which only pairs of indi-
viduals engage.6 We conjecture that more complex patterns, such as star production
patterns, emerge only after the establishment of stable matching patterns. As we have
already seen in Chapter 1, a bi-partite set of potential links is a suﬃcient and necessary
condition for the existence of stable matching patterns. Hence, here we take for gran-
ted that the economic agents will choose to specialize in one of two roles: a producer
of the intermediate good or a producer of the consumption good.
When two individuals, one specialized in the production of the intermediate good
and the other specialized in the production of the consumption good decide to engage
in collective production to produce two times the subsistence level, they need to re-
solve the following question: who works how many hours. On Figure 2.1 is given
the reaction functions of two players who need to collectively produce two times the
subsistence level, given their production possibility level as described above in a situ-
ation in which none of them can produce the subsistence level acting alone. As we
see, the two reaction functions completely coincide. Hence, there is a continuum of
points along which the two players can achieve the desired level of consumption.
The two end points represent two cases of particular interest: the one in the lower
right corner is the case when the producer of the intermediate good devotes all her
endowment of time in the production, and the one in the upper left corner is the com-
plementary case when the producer of the consumption good devotes all her time
endowment in the production. These cases correspond to the two types of ﬁrms ana-
lyzed by Yang (2003): the one in which the individual specialized in the production
of the consumption good acts as an “employer” and the individual specialized in the
production of the intermediate good acts as an “employee”; and the second one in
which the individual specialized in the production of the intermediate good acts as
an “employer” and the individual specialized in the production of the consumption
good acts as an “employee”. In a ﬁrm, the individual acting as an “employer” has
decision power over the amount of the production input of the “employee”. Hence,
5We have assumed that the utility function of free time is linear for analytical tractability. Alternat-
ively, we could have taken any function deﬁned on the interval [0,1]. For instance, we could have taken
a cumulative distribution function, which probability density function has thick tails. Such function is
ﬁts well with the prospect theory described by Kahneman and Thversky (1979).
6The activity patterns of pair has been the focus of the previous chapter. Recall that there our main
application was based on a framework of learning externalities.50 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
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an “employer” requires that an “employee” invests all her time endowment into the
production. The two possibilities that Yang (2003) discusses are that either all players
specialized in the production of the consumption good act as “employers” or players
specialized in the production of the intermediate good act as “employers”.
In our analysis we will concentrate on these two cases as well, however, unlike
Yang (2003) we will not assume a uniform relation between authority and labor spe-
cialization. That is, in our framework whether a person has authority over another
person would depend on some exogenous, person-speciﬁc characteristics and not on
her choice of labor specialization. In other words, it is not necessarily the case that
all individuals specialized in the production of, say, the consumption good, have au-
thority over the individuals specialized in the production of the intermediate good. In
our framework, it is assumed that one of the individuals has authority over the other
in each pair of individuals engaged in collective production, and it is not important
what kind of labor specialization the individual has. So, anyone in a pair of players
can have authority, what is important is that one of them does.
Clearly, collective production is founded on trust between the participants. One
of the individuals has to submit to the authority of the other. Moreover, she has to
trust that she will be provided with the subsistence amount of consumption at the end
of the production process. The trust required in establishing collective production
explains why collective production is driven by necessity, as pointed out above. If a
risk averse individual can achieve the subsistence level acting alone, she will not trustCHAPTER 2 51
another individual with providing the necessary amount of the consumption good.
Under severe circumstances, such as the need to survive7, trust is a necessity, and
thus, collective production can be established.
Collective production may involve the cooperation between more than two indi-
viduals. In our framework, this more complex production process is modeled as a
collection of pairs of individuals who have a unique common member. The common
member is located in the center of the productive unit and has an additional role of
coordinating its activities. In this respect, again, our framework is more general than
the one developed by Yang (2003) as we do not assume that authority emanates from
the individual who has a coordinating role. Instead, we allow for an individual who
connects with many other individuals8 to be simultaneously under the authority of
some and to have authority over others.
2.3 Technical Preliminaries
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of economic agents or players. Players engage in
authoritarian relational activities represented by directed links between them, e.g.,
between two distinct players i, j ∈ N there may be a directed link (i, j) which in-
dicates that player i has authority over player j and player j does not have authority
over player i, i.e., (i, j) , (j,i). A directed link between two players refers to a
value generating activity between them such that one of the players has authority over
the other. In terms of our application, a directed link between two players refers to
collective production in which these two players are involved, and the direction runs
from the player who has decision power over the labor hours to the other player in
the pair. The set of all possible directed links among players in the set N is given as
LN = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N and i , j}. The relational activity represented by the link to
oneself we denote by {i,i} and we call autarkic. An autarkic link is not directed by
deﬁnition. The set of all autarkic positions is denoted by D0 = {{i,i} | i ∈ N}.9
Deﬁnition 2.3.1 A set of potential links on the set of individuals N is given as D ⊆
7The development of trust in this application is fundamentally diﬀerent than the development of
trust discussed in the previous chapter, where prolonged cooperation between pairs of individuals al-
lowed them to develop trust and hence subjective specialization, which then developed into objective
specialization.
8As in the previous chapter, here again only individuals with a diﬀerent labor specialization can be
linked. This is why the only individual in a group who has multiple links has a diﬀerent specialization
from the one of the players with whom she is linked.
9Despite the fact that we denote the set of autarkic pairs with the same letter as a set of directed
oriented links, we re-emphasize that the set of autarkic pairs is undirected.52 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
LN ∪ D0 such that
(i) D0   D;
(ii) for all i ∈ N there is a distinct player j ∈ N such that either (i, j) ∈ D or
(j,i) ∈ D;
(iii) (i, j) ∈ D implies (j,i) < D.
We deﬁne a set of potential links to be an exogenously given subset of the set of
all possible relations between the players in N such that no two players have direct
authority over each other and that, in addition, contains the autarkic positions for all
players. The set of potential links deﬁnes the potential activities that can be carried out
by players. Since it is a subset of the set of all possible links, it is designed to capture
physical, institutional, or any other restrictions that may prohibit the occurrence of
activities between certain players. A pair (N,D) is called a directed activity structure.
In terms of our application one can think of the pair (N,D) as a social structure.
Next we introduce some technical deﬁnitions from network theory, which will be
used later in deﬁning an economy and for deriving the main theoretical results.
Let (N,D) be a directed activity structure. For convenience, when the direction
of the link between two distinct players i, j ∈ N present in D is not important we
will use the underlying undirected network   corresponding to D, i.e., an undirected
link between two players i, j ∈ N is given by {i, j} ∈   if (i, j) ∈ D or (j,i) ∈ D
or i = j . Recall that since D is a set of potential links, it cannot be the case that
{(i, j),(j,i)} ⊆ D. As in the previous chapter we will use the shorthand notation ij for
the undirected link {i, j} ∈  .
The location of a player within a network is an important characteristic. Let N
be a ﬁnite set of players and let D ⊆ DN be a set of potential links and let   be the
corresponding undirected network of D. Let i ∈ N be a player such that there is a
distinct player j ∈ N with ij ∈  . The set of connected players in D is given by
N(D) = {i ∈ N | there exists j ∈ N with j , i such that ij ∈  }. By deﬁnition, since
D is a set of potential links N(D) = N. We deﬁne player i’s neighborhood in D as
Ni(D) = {j ∈ N | j , i and ij ∈  }.
We can also express the neighborhood of a player in terms of its link based analogue,
i.e.,
Li(D) = {(i, j) ∈ D and (k,i) ∈ D | j , i, j ∈ Ni(D) and k , i, k ∈ Ni(D)}.CHAPTER 2 53
We deﬁne a path between any two distinct players i ∈ N and j ∈ N in G as a sequence
of distinct players Pij(D) = (i1,i2,...,im) with i1 = i, im = j, ik ∈ N and ikik+1 ∈   for
all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. We call a cycle a path of a player from herself to herself which
contains at least two other distinct players, i.e., C(D) = (i1,i2,...,im) with i1 = i,
im = i, m ≥ 4, ik ∈ N, and ik,ik+1 ∈   for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. We also deﬁne paths
which follow the direction of the network, we call such paths directed paths, i.e., a
directed path between two distinct players i ∈ N and j ∈ N in D is a sequence of
distinct players Pd
ij(D) = (i1,i2,...,im) with i1 = i, im = j, ik ∈ N and (ik,ik+1) ∈ D
for all k ∈ {1,...,m−1}. Similarly, we deﬁne a directed cycle Cd(D) = (i1,i2,...,im)
with i1 = i, im = i, m ≥ 4, ik ∈ N and (ik,ik+1) ∈ D for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. We
emphasize that each (directed) cycle has length of at least three, i.e., a cycle consists
of at least three distinct links. Note that any directed cycle is a cycle, however, not
every cycle is a directed cycle.
Furthermore, there may be players in N between whom there is no path in a set of
potential links D; such players are located in diﬀerent components of D. A network
d ⊆ D is a component of D if for all i ∈ N(d) and j ∈ N(d) there is a path Pij(D)
connecting players i and j and for all i ∈ N(d) and j ∈ N(D), ij ∈   implies that ij ∈ δ
with δ being the undirected analogue of the component d. The set of all components
in a directed network D is denoted by c(D) = {d | d ⊆ D}. Note that D = ∪d∈c(D)d.
Last, we describe the preferences of players over her potential activities. Players
have complete and transitive preferences over the players in their neighborhood given
by the set of potential links D and over the autarkic relation. These preferences can be
represented by a hedonic utility function. The hedonic utility function is an indirect
utility function that captures the utility of the value generating activities. For instance,
in the application of collective production the hedonic utility function is an indirect
utility function that measures the utility of free time a player has when participating in
collective production with another player. Let (N,D) be a directed activity structure.
For every i ∈ N, there is a hedonic utility function ui: Li(D) ∪ {ii} → R.10 Let u be
a proﬁle of n hedonic utility functions. Let U be the set of permissible proﬁles of
hedonic utility functions.
Below we present an example of collective production as outlined in Section 2.2.
First we derive the hedonic utility proﬁle in the state of autarky and then we derive
individuals hedonic utility functions on the set of potential links. In the ﬁrst case,
10Note that we do not require that a player has a higher utility from a link in which she has the
authority than from a link in which another player has authority over her. Our goal is to keep the basic
framework as general as possible.54 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
autarky is a positive value generation state, hence, labor specialization and collective
production do not occur between two or more distinct individuals because there are
no conditions to develop social trust.
Example 2.3.2 The set of players is given by N = {1,2,3,4} individuals who en-
gage in subsistence activities. Consider the collective production process described in
Section 2.2.
Given the preference proﬁle and the production possibility set each individual




φ(f) = f = 1 − lx − ly
subject to





lx + ly ≤ 1.









xly = ¯ y,
lx + ly ≤ 1.
Assuming the existence of a solution, the solution to the problem under autarky is
givenbylx(ii) = (α ¯ y)
1
α+1 andly(ii) = (α−α ¯ y)
1











for all players i ∈ N.
Finally we set the hedonic utility in the state of autarky equal to the utility of free
time when a player is self-supplying both the intermediate and the consumption good.
So, ui(ii) = φ(ii) for all players i ∈ N.
Wedonotconsideranyotherpotentialactivitiesinthisexample, sinceasdiscussed
above any collective activity between two distinct players requires trust, which only
develops under extreme circumstances of necessity to survive. ￿CHAPTER 2 55
Example 2.3.2 describes the behavior of players who under autarky can sustain the
minimal subsistence level ¯ y. That is, it is assumed that the individual maximization
problem has an interior solution and thus every individual in a state of autarky is self-
suﬃcient. This assumption is violated when the minimal subsistence level cannot be
met by an individual producing alone, i.e., when ¯ y > αα
(α+1)α+1. Next we consider this
case when players need to engage in collective production, hence, specialize in order
to achieve the subsistence level.
Example 2.3.3 Consider the economy described in Example 2.3.2. Furthermore as-
sume ¯ y > αα
(α+1)α+1. Hence, playerscannotachievethesubsistencelevelofconsumption
¯ y in a state of autarky; however, two players producing together can obtain two times
the subsistence level ¯ y ≤ 1
2.11 In order to achieve the minimum required level of con-
sumption they need to exploit the increasing returns to scale in the production of the
intermediate goods by having some players specialize in the production of the inter-
mediate good while others in the production of consumption good. For convenience,
we will refer to player specialized in the production of the intermediate good as “he”
and those specialized in the production of the ﬁnal good as “she”. We assume that
players 1 and 3 specialize in the production of the intermediate good while players 2
and 4 specialize in the production of the consumption good.
Consider the set of potential links D = {(1,4),(4,3),(2,1),(3,2),iii∈N}. Note that
the set of potential links does not contain links between players who have the same
specialization in production, e.g., between two producer of the intermediate good,
because such links are not value generating. The direction of a link in the set of
potential links reﬂects “authority”. A player who has authority over another player has
decision power over that player’s productive time. In return for the labor hours, the
playerwho has authority over the other player provides heror him with the subsistence
level of consumption.
We can distinguish between two cases. The ﬁrst case is when a producer of the
ﬁnal consumption good has authority over a producer of an intermediate good. The
optimization problem for the producer of the consumption good in which she chooses
the amount of labor that the producer of the intermediate good should invests as well




φ(f) = f = 1 − ly
11Note that the maximum of the function lα
x(1 − lx) for lx ∈ [0,1] is obtained at the point lx = α
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subject to





Since the player producing the consumption good has preferences only over her
own free time and complete decision rights over the labor hours worked by the in-
termediate good producer, she will require the producer of the intermediate good to
allocate all his endowment of time in the production of the intermediate good lx = 1
and will herself contribute just as much as it is suﬃcient to produce the subsist-
ence level for both players, namely, ly = 2¯ y. This is the solution to the collective
production by potential links (2,1) and (4,3). Hence, lx,1(2,1) = lx,3(4,3) = 1
ly,2(2,1) = ly,4(4,3) = 2¯ y where lz,i denotes the amount of time player i ∈ N invests in
the production of the good z ∈ {x,y}. The utility levels from these links of each player
are thus φ1((2,1)) = φ3((4,3)) = 0 and φ2((2,1)) = φ4((4,3)) = 1 − 2¯ y.
The second case is when a producer of the intermediate good has a decision power
over the hours worked by the player specialized in the production of the consumption
good. In return for the labor hours worked by the producer of the consumption good,
the producer of the intermediate good provides her with an amount of the consumption
good equal to the subsistence level ¯ y. The optimization problem of the producer of the
intermediate good in which he chooses the amount of labor that the producer of the




φ(f) = f = 1 − lx
subject to





Since the player producing the intermediate good has preferences only over his
own free time and complete decision rights over the labor hours worked by the con-
sumption good producer, he will require from the producer of the consumption good
to allocate all her endowment of time into production, and he will himself contributeCHAPTER 2 57
just as much as it is suﬃcient to produce the subsistence level for both players, namely,
lx = (2¯ y)
1
α. This is the solution to the collective production by potential links (1,4)
and (3,2). Hence, lx,1(1,4) = lx,2(3,2) = (2¯ y)
1
α, ly,2(3,2) = ly,3(1,4) = 1. The utility
levels of each player from these links are thus φ1((1,4)) = φ3((3,2)) = 1−(2¯ y)
1
α and
φ2((3,2)) = φ4((1,4)) = 0.
Due to the increasing returns to scale in the production of the intermediate good,
it is easy to see that the ﬁrst case is Pareto dominating the second case for ¯ y < 1
2 and



























Given the assumed specialization and the direction of authority, one can derive the
hedonic utility function such that ui((i, j)) = φi((i, j)) and uj((i, j)) = φj((i, j)) for
any link (i, j) ∈ D and any two distinct players i, j ∈ N. Since in the state of autarky a
player cannot reach a subsistence level we will denote this state as −∞.
(i, j) iii∈N (1,4) (2,1) (3,2) (4,3)
u1((i, j)) −∞ 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α 0 – –
u2((i, j)) −∞ – 1 − 2¯ y 0 –
u3((i, j)) −∞ – – 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α 0
u4((i, j)) −∞ 0 – – 1 − 2¯ y
Note that the way we have constructed the example, player 1 prefers to engage
in production with player 4, player 2 prefers to engage in production with player 1,
player 3 prefers to engage in production with player 2, and player 4 prefers to engage
in production with player 3. ￿
In Example 2.3.3 we have derived the hedonic utility functions of players.12 Our
goal is to develop a framework in which collective production is carried out in teams
of two or more individuals. This framework is developed in the following section.
12Example 2.3.3 may be used as another application of the framework presented in the previous
chapter.58 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY




































































2.4 A Team Economy
The set of potential links and hedonic utility functions described in the previous sec-
tion are used as a basis for developing a framework where more complex activity
patterns can be studied. In particular, the complex activity patterns that we study are
represented by networks consisting of star components.
Deﬁnition 2.4.1 Let (N,D) be an activity structure. We say that the subset S ⋆ ⊆ D
has a star structure or that it is a star if there is at most one player i ∈ N(S ⋆) such
that |Ni(S ⋆)| > 1 and that for all j ∈ N(S ⋆) \ {i} it holds that Nj(S ⋆) = {i}.
Let (N,D) be an activity structure. We denote by S(D) the set of all subsets of D
that have a star structure, i.e., S(D) = {S ⋆ ⊆ D | S ⋆ is a star}. The deﬁnition of a star
includes subsets in which there are only two connected players, hence, {(i, j)}(i,j)∈D ⊆
S(D).
A graphical representation of a set of potential links which contains two compon-
ents with star structure is given in Figure 2.2. As shown, in the general framework, it
may be that the player in the star component who has multiple links has authority in
some links while other players have authority over her in other links. For example, in
the pattern {(1,3),(3,2),(3,4)} player 3 has multiple links and she has authority over
players 2 and 4, however, player 1 has authority over her.
Complex activities are represented by a subset of the set of potential links whose
components have a star structure. To such activities we refer as star patterns.
Deﬁnition 2.4.2 Let (N,D) be a directed activity structure. A star pattern H⋆ ⊆ D is
a subset of the set of potential links such that each player i ∈ N is either connected in
a component of a star strucutre of H⋆ or stays autarkic, i.e., c(H⋆) ⊆ S(D).CHAPTER 2 59
The class of all possible star patterns on D is denoted by H⋆(D) = {H⋆ | c(H⋆) ⊆
S(D)}.
Let (N,D) be an activity structure and let H⋆ be a star pattern. We deﬁne a star
central player to be a player i ∈ N(d⋆) for some d⋆ ∈ c(H⋆) such that |Ni(d⋆)| > 1 if
|N(d⋆)| > 2 and all players i ∈ N(d⋆) if |N(d⋆)| = 2. The set of star central players in
a star pattern H⋆ is denoted by N⋆(H⋆).
Last, we discuss the preferences of players deﬁned on the possible star patterns.
To do so, we use an indirect value function, which is based on a player’s hedonic
preferences over potential links represented by her indirect utility function ui for some
playeri ∈ N. Inastarpatternaplayercanbelinkedtoanotherplayereitherdirectly, by
activating their potential link, or indirectly via the star central player in the component.
This is reﬂected in the hedonic team utility function to which we will refer as team
utility function for brevity. Let Si(D) be the set of all possible subsets of the set of
potential links D in which player i is connected, then the team utility function of any
playeri ∈ N isgivenbyvi: Si(D)∪{ii} → RsuchthatforsomesubsetS i ∈ Si(D)∪{ii}:
vi(S i)

   
   
= ui(ii) if S i = ii;
= ui((i, j)) if (i, j) ∈ S i and |Ni(S i)| = 1;
= ui((j,i)) if (j,i) ∈ S i and |Ni(S i)| = 1;
≥
 
j: (i,j)∈S i ui((i, j)) +
 
j: (j,i)∈S i ui((j,i)) if |Ni(S i)| > 1.
The team utility function captures the value generating abilities of a player being
autarkic or being connected in a star component. The underlying value generation
process may take various forms. The collective production process analyzed in the
application is one example of such process. The team utility function as assumed
requires that a player has value only from links with players with whom she is linked
directly.13 Furthermore, it is allowed that a star central player receives some extra
value above the sum of her utility from the relations with players in her neighborhood.
Hence the value function satisﬁes a superadditivity property, ı.e., vi(S i∪Ti) ≥ vi(S i)+
13Alternatively, it may be that a player has utility from being linked to another player indirectly,
e.g., vi(H⋆) =
 
j∈N: j,i δt(ij)−1ui((i, j)) +
 
j∈N: j,i δt(ji)−1ui((j,i)) where δ ∈ (0,1) is the distance
discounting parameter and t(ij) is the geodesic distance between players i and j such that it equals
the number of links in the shortest path between the players. Given our deﬁnition of a star pattern the
distance between any two players can be maximum two links. If these players are not connected in the
set of potential links D the geodesic distance is set to inﬁnity. Such type of utility function has been
used by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in a undirected network setting when discussing the Connections
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vi(Ti) for all S i,Ti ∈ Si(D) with S i ∩ Ti = ∅. The superadditivity property reﬂects
synergies which are assumed to be allocated to the star central player who acts as a
coordinator in the value generation process.
The proﬁle of team utility functions for all players is denoted by v. The set of all
permissible proﬁles of team utility functions deﬁned on the activity structure (N,D)
is denoted by V(D). In a star pattern each player is engaged in a relational activity.
For ease of notation we deﬁne the indirect team utility level that a players obtains
when participating in a pattern H⋆ as vi(H⋆). For a given star pattern the indirect
team utility levels of all players are summarized in a team utility proﬁle v(H⋆) =
(v1(H⋆),...,vn(H⋆)).
Next, we deﬁne an economy in which activity patterns of a star structure are ana-
lyzed in terms of their stability properties.
Deﬁnition 2.4.3 A team economy is deﬁned to be a quadruple ET = (N,D,u,v) in
which (N,D) is a directed structure, u ∈ U(D) is a proﬁle of utility functions on D
and v ∈ V(D) is a proﬁle of team utility functions on D.
A team economy is deﬁned to be the set of potential actions and the potential
value that a player can obtain in activating one of her possible activity patterns. A
star pattern deﬁned on this economy represents a de facto activated activity pattern by
all individuals. We analyse a team economy in terms of the stability properties of the
possible activity patterns.
Deﬁnition 2.4.4 Let ET = (N,D,u,v) be a team economy. Let H⋆ ∈ H⋆(D). We say
that the star pattern H⋆ is stable for the economy (N,D,u,v) if it satisﬁes the indi-
vidual rationality [IR] and two no blocking [NB] and [NB*] conditions as speciﬁed
below:
IR for all i ∈ N it holds that vi(H⋆) > ui(ii);
NB for all i, j ∈ N with (i, j) ∈ D \ H⋆ and i, j < N⋆(H⋆) :
vi(H
⋆) < ui((i, j)) implies uj((i, j)) ≤ vj(H
⋆);
NB* for all distinct players i, j ∈ N with (i, j) ∈ D \ H⋆
(i) and j ∈ N⋆(H⋆):
vi(H
⋆) < ui((i, j)) implies max{vj(H
⋆ ∪{(i, j)}),uj((i, j))} ≤ vj(H
⋆);CHAPTER 2 61
(ii) or i ∈ N⋆(H⋆):
vj(H
⋆) < uj((i, j)) implies max{vi(H
⋆ ∪ {(i, j)}),ui((i, j))} ≤ vi(H
⋆).
The condition [IR] is a standard condition for stability that allows players to opt
out of an economic activity if she is better oﬀ being autarkic. The condition [NB]
rules out blocking out possibilities between two distinct players, none of whom is a
star central player in the pattern H⋆. It requires that there are no pairs of players who
prefer to be linked to each other rather than to the players with whom their are linked
in the pattern H⋆. The condition [NB*] rules out blocking possibilities between two
distinct players at least one of whom is a star central player in the pattern H⋆. Note
the greater deviational possibilities for star central players: such players can add a
links with another player with or without severing her current links. This condition
requires that there are no two distinct players at least one of whom is a star central
player who want to be linked to each other irrespective of whether (one of)14 the star
central player(s) keeps her existing links or not.
To illustrate the concepts here we provide an abstract example.
Example 2.4.5 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5}and D = {(1,2),(1,3),(2,3),(4,3),(5,4)}∪{ii |
i = 1,...,5} as shown on the ﬁgure below. Every player has utility of zero when she
is in a state of autarky. The hedonic utility functions over the set of potential links
between distinct players are given in the table below.
(i, j) (1,2) (1,3) (2,3) (4,3) (5,4)
u1((i, j)) 2 1 – – –
u2((i, j)) 1 – 2 – –
u3((i, j)) – 1 2 1 –
u4((i, j)) – – – 2 1







































14Recall that in a star pattern at most one player has more than one partner in each component.
Hence, it is not allowed in a star pattern to have two star central players deviating by keeping their
existing links and at the same time establishing a link between each other.62 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
Thus, the class of star patterns deﬁned on the set D is:
H





{(1,2),(2,3),(5,4)}; {(1,3),{2,2},(5,4)}; {(1,2),(4,3),{5,5}};and {ii}i∈N }.
For any team utility function satisfying the superadditivity property v ∈ V(D) based
on the hedonic utility function u as given above. There are two stable patterns:
{(1,2),(2,3),(5,4)}and{(1,3),(2,3),(4,3),{5,5}}. Withrespecttothepattern{(1,2),
(2,3),(5,4)}player4wouldprefertosevereherlinkwithplayer5andactivatethelink
(4,3), however, player 3 prefers her current activity in the component {(1,2),(2,3)}
to the link (4,3). Similarly in the pattern {(1,3),(2,3),(4,3),{5,5}} player 5 would
prefer to be linked with 4 in the component (5,4), however, player 4 prefers her cur-
rent link with player 3 to the one with player 5.
There are no other stable patterns. For instance, consider the star patterns in which
players 2 and 3 are not linked. Such patterns cannot be stable because player 2 prefers
to be linked to player 3 and player 3 prefers to be linked to player 2 more than to any
other player. Moreover, in all other patterns in which players 2 and 3 are linked but
patterns {(1,2),(2,3),(5,4)} and {(1,3),(2,3),(4,3),{5,5}}, the non-blocking condi-
tions are not satisﬁed. Consider, for example, the pattern H⋆ = {(1,3),(2,3),(5,4)}.
It is not stable because player 4 prefers to be linked to player 5 than to player 5,
v4(H⋆) = u4((5,4)) < u4((4,3)), and player 3 prefers to be a star central player in the
component {(1,3),(2,3),(4,3)} than in the star component {(1,3),(2,3)}, v3(H⋆) <
v3(H⋆) + u3((4,3)) ≤ v3({(1,3),(2,3),(4,3)}). ￿
Below, we proceed with a discussion of the team economy based on collective
production.
Example 2.4.6 Consider the economy described in Example 2.3.3. Next, we present
the production process when players are connected in a star pattern. First, we will
derive the team utility proﬁles with respect to all possible star patterns. Then, we
show that in this team economy, there are no stable star patterns.
First, consider the star component {(2,1),(3,2)}. Recall that the collective produc-
tion in the link (2,1) is governed by player 2 who is a producer of the consumptionCHAPTER 2 63
good and that the link (3,2) is governed by player 3 who is a producer of the inter-
mediate good. Furthermore, in the star component {(2,1),(3,2)} three units of the
subsistence level ¯ y must be produced. The team utility function of each player is set to
equal her/his utility from free time, i.e., vi(H⋆) = φi(di) for i ∈ N where di ⊆ H⋆ is the
component of the activity pattern H⋆ in which player i is linked i ∈ N(di). To keep the
utility levels of players 1 and 3 the same15 as in the links (2,1) and (3,2), it is assumed
that they contribute to the collective production process in {(2,1),(3,2)} the same time
as in the production processes of (2,1) and (3,2), respectively, i.e., player 1 contrib-
utes lx,1(2,1) = 1 and player 3 contributes lx,3(3,2) = (2¯ y)
1
α. Player 2 as a star central
player has to contribute the suﬃcient amount of labor necessary to produce three times
the subsistence level ¯ y given the amount of intermediate goods produced by players
1 and 3, which is ly,2({(2,1),(3,2)}) = 3¯ y
 




. The value levels of each
player in the star component {(2,1),(3,2)} can be calculated in straightforward man-
ner: v1({(2,1),(3,2)}) = u1((2,1)) = 0, v2({(2,1),(3,2)}) = φ2({(2,1),(3,2)}) =
1 − 3¯ y
 




and v3({(2,1),(3,2)}) = u3((3,2)) = 1 − (2¯ (y))
1
α. Simulations
show that v2({12,23}) > u2(12)+u2(23) = u2(12) for α ∈ [1,10] and ¯ y ∈ ( αα
(α+1)α+1, 1
2].
Next, consider the star component {(2,1),(1,4)} in which player 1 is a star central
player. Recall that players 2 and 4 are producers of the consumption good and player
1 is a producer of the intermediate good. Furthermore, players 1 and 4 contribute the
same amount of time in the collective production process of the pattern {(2,1),(1,4)}
astheydidinthecollectiveproductions(2,1)and(1,4), namely, ly,2({(2,1),(1,4)}) =
2¯ y and ly,4({(2,1),(1,4)}) = 1. The star central player, player 1, contributes the min-
imum amount of labor in the production of the intermediate good such that given
the amount of labor contributed by players 2 and 4, they can produce three times






in the production of the intermediate good. The team utility levels of players in






u2((2,1)) = 2¯ y and v4({(2,1),(1,4)}) = u4((1,4)) = 0. Note that for ¯ y > 1
4,
u1({(2,1),(1,4)}) > u1((2,1)) + u1((1,4)) = u1((1,4)).
Given the symmetry of the set of potential links, the allocation of labor in the
component{(3,2),(4,3)}willbeanalogoustotheoneinthecomponent{(2,1),(1,4)},
and the allocation of labor in the component {(1,4),(4,3)} will be analogous to the
one in the component {(2,1),(3,2)}.
The team utility proﬁles of the star patterns in which players are linked in pairs
15Recall that by the deﬁnition of the team utility function a player does not have utility from an
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Table 2.1: Team Utility Proﬁles in Example 2.4.6
H⋆ v1(H⋆) v2(H⋆) v3(H⋆) v4(H⋆)
iii∈N −∞ −∞ −∞ −∞
{(2,1),{3,3},{4,4}} 0 1 − 2¯ y −∞ −∞
{{1,1},{2,2},(4,3)} −∞ −∞ 0 1 − 2¯ y
{(2,1),(4,3)} 0 1 − 2¯ y 0 1 − 2¯ y
{(1,4),{2,2},{3,3}} 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α −∞ −∞ 0
{{1,1},(3,2),{4,4}} −∞ 0 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α −∞
{(1,4),(3,2)} 1 − (2¯ y)
1








α 1 − 2¯ y −∞ 0





α 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α −∞





α 1 − 2¯ y
{(1,4),{2,2},(4,3)} 1 − (2¯ y)
1






have been calculated in Example 2.3.3 as these in fact are based on the hedonic utility
functions. Note that in a star pattern H⋆ for a player i who is connected to exactly one
distinct player in H⋆, e.g., Ni(H⋆) = {j} with j ∈ N, it holds that vi(H⋆) = ui(ij). The
team utility proﬁles in all possible star patterns are summarized in Table 2.1.
We conjecture that in this example, there is no stable star pattern for a relevant
range of the parameter values. For ¯ y ∈ (1
4, 1
2) and α ∈ [1,10], we can show that the
NB conditions are not satisﬁed. To see why this is the case, ﬁrst note that for the
speciﬁed range of the parameters a player’s most preferred pattern is one in which she
or he is the only star central player. Furthermore, every player prefers to be linked
with another player over being autarkic. Next, consider the pattern {(2,1),(3,4)}.
It is not stable because for players 1 and 4 the no-blocking condition [NB*] is not
satisﬁed, i.e., v1{(1,4),(4,3)}) > v1((2,1)) and v4({(1,4),(4,3)}) > v4((4,3)). Fur-
thermore, consider the star pattern {(1,4),{2,2},(4,3)}. It is not stable because players
2 and 3 do not satisfy the no-blocking condition [NB], i.e., v2((2,3)) > v2({2,2}) and
v3((3,2)) > v3({(1,4),(4,3)}). Similarly, one can show that no other pattern is stable.
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2.5 Existence of Stable Patterns
In Example 2.4.6 we have illustrated a situation in which there is no stable star pattern.
This raises the question whether there is a suﬃcient restriction on the set of potential
links that ensures the existence of stable pattern in a given team economy. The an-
swer for the general case is given in the following theorem and for the application
concerning collective production it is given in Proposition 2.5.5.
Theorem 2.5.1 Let (N,D,u,v) be a a team economy. There exists a stable star pat-
tern in (N,D,u,v) if the set of potential activities D does not contain a cycle or if it
contains a cycle with a number of connected players m − 1 = 3s with s ∈ {2,3,...}.
Note that the suﬃcient condition of existence does not take into account the dir-
ection of the cycle, i.e., it requires the absence of any cycles; not only directed ones.
This is because in our general framework we have not assumed any relation between
the direction of a link and the hedonic utility that a player has from this link. As we
will see in Proposition 2.5.5 when we discuss the suﬃcient conditions for the exist-
ence of a stable pattern in our application, it is the presence of directed cycles that
matters. This is because in collective production there is a direct relation between the
direction of a link and the utility of the players connected by this link.
Before proceeding to the presentation of a constructive proof of Theorem 2.5.1,
we need a supplementary result. Let (N,D) be an activity structure and let u ∈ U be
a proﬁle of hedonic utility functions, we denote by Bi(N,D,u) = {j ∈ N with ij ∈
  | ui(ij) ≥ ui(ik) for all k ∈ N such that ik ∈  } the set of most preferred partners of
player i for all i ∈ N where   is the undirected network underlying the set of potential
links D.
Lemma 2.5.2 Let (N,D,u,v) be a team economy and let the set of potential links
D does not contain a cycle. Then there is a pair of players i, j ∈ N such that j ∈
Bi(N,D,u) and i ∈ Bj(N,D,u).
Proof. Suppose not. Hence, for all players i, j ∈ N such that i ∈ Bj(N,D,u) it holds
that j < Bi(N,D,u). Consider player i ∈ N and without loss of generality assume
Bi(N,D,u) = {j}, it must be that j , i. Next, consider the set of most preferred
partners of player j. Without loss of generality assume Bj(N,D,u) = {k}. It must be
that k < {i, j}. Next, consider the set of most preferred partners of player k. Without
loss of generality assume Bk(N,D,u) = {l}. It must be that l < {j,k}, moreover l , i
otherwise D contains a cycle. Hence, l < {i, j,k}. By continuing in a similar fashion,
given that the player set N is ﬁnite, we establish a contradiction.66 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
Proof of Theorem 2.5.1. Let ET = (N,D,u,v) be a team economy. We will consider
two cases. First we study sets of potential links that do not contain a cycle. Then we
study sets of potential links that contain cycles with a number of connected players
equal to 3s with s ∈ {2,3,...}. We will slightly abuse notation and we will use the
nondirect equivalent for a link in constructing the stable star pattern.
Case I Let the set of potential links D not contain a cycle. We will construct a star
pattern that satisﬁes the stability conditions.
Step I: Consider a set of mutually disjoint links {i, j} ∈ D such that i ∈ Bj(N,D,u) and
j ∈ Bj(N,D,u), and denote this set by H′ ⊆ D. Note that by Lemma 2.5.2 H′ , ∅.
Moreover, no players linked in H′ would want to delete their link to form a link with
another player. Let M′ = {i ∈ N | |Ni(H′)| = 1} be the set of all players who are
linked to another distinct player in H′. The player set M′ contains those players who
are linked in H′ and who may have in the future more than one link in a stable star
pattern.
StepII:Next, consideraplayeriwhoisnotlinkedin H′ suchthat Bi(N,D,u)∩M′ , ∅.
If there exists a player j ∈ Bi(N,D,u) ∩ M′ such that uj(ij) > 0, construct H′′ =
H′∪{ij} and M′′ = M′\Nj(H′). Note that since v satisﬁes the superadditivity property
for each player i, uj(ij) > 0 is suﬃcient to ensure that vj(H′ ∪ {ij}) > vj(H′). Players
linked in H′′ will not want to delete their links and players in M′′ may have more than
one link in a star pattern. If there is no player j ∈ Bi(N,D,u)∩M′ such that uj(ij) > 0,
choose another player k who is not linked in H such that Bk(N,D,u) ∩ M′ , ∅.
Continue in the same fashion until there is no player i who is not matched in Hν and
Bi(N,D,u) ∩Mν , ∅ and there exists a player j ∈ Bi(N,D,u)∩Mν such that uj(ij) > 0
where ν is the index of the preceding iterations. That is after the last iteration which is
a ﬁnite number since N is ﬁnite, the only players not linked in Hν are (1) these players
whose best partners are not linked in Hν and (2) these players some of whose best
partners are linked in Hν but the partners linked in Hν do not want to add a link with
them.
Step III: If there is no player i who is not linked by the last iteration in Hν and
Bi(N,D,u) ∩ Mν , ∅ and there is a player j ∈ Bi(N,D,u) ∩ Mν such that uj(ij) > 0,
consider all disjoint links {i, j} ∈ N \ (N(Hν) ∪ {{ii} | ii ∈ Hν}) who are not linked
in Hν such that player i ∈ Bj(N \ (N(Hν) ∪ {{ii} | ii ∈ Hν}),D,u) and player j ∈
Bi(N\(N(Hν) ∪ {{ii} | ii ∈ Hν}),D,u) and denote this set byG ⊆ D\Hν. Note that by
Lemma 2.5.2,G , ∅. Moreover, no players linked in ˜ H = Hν∪G would want to delete
a link or can form a blocking pair with another player. Let T = {i ∈ N | |Ni(G)| = 1}
bethesetofallplayerswhoarelinkedtoanotherdistinctplayerinG. Let ˜ M = Mν∪T.CHAPTER 2 67
The player set ˜ M contains those players who are linked in ˜ H who may have more than
one link in a stable star pattern.
Step IV: Set H′ = ˜ H and M′ = ˜ M. Go back to step II. Continue in the same fashion
until there are no more players in step III. The process is ﬁnite since the player set N
is ﬁnite.
Thus constructed the star pattern H is stable: players are linked to their most
preferred partners out of the set of players who are also willing to be linked with
them.
CaseII Letthesetofpotentiallinks DcontainacycleC = (i1,...,im)withik−1ik ∈
  where   is the nondirected equivalent of the set D and m ≥ 7 with m − 1 = 3s.
Depending on the proﬁle of team utility functions, we will distinguish two sub-cases.
Case II.1 First, consider a proﬁle of team utility functions v ∈ V(D), such that (i)
either there are two consecutive players along the cycle’s path ik−1,ik ∈ C for some
k = 1,...,m − 1 with i0 = im−1 such that ik−1 ∈ Bik(N,D,u) and ik ∈ Bik−1(N,D,u),
(ii) or there is a pair of players one of whom is on cycle path and the other other not,
i.e., ik ∈ C16 for some k = 1,...,m − 1 and j < C such that j ∈ Bik(N,D,u) and
ik ∈ Bj(N,D,u). Then, we can use the algorithm described in Case I for constructing
a stable star pattern since the proﬁle of team utility functions ensures that the sets H′
and G constructed in Step I and Step III, respectively, are not empty given the proﬁle
of team utility functions.
Case II.2 Last, consider a proﬁle of team utility functions v ∈ V(D) such that there
are no consecutive players along he cycle path ik−1,ik ∈ C for some k = 1,...,m − 1
with i0 = im−1 such that ik−1 ∈ Bik(N,D,u) and ik ∈ Bik−1(N,D,u), nor is there a pair
of players one of whom is on cycle path and the other other not, i.e., ik ∈ C for some
k = 1,...,m − 1 and j < C such that ij ∈ Bik(N,D,u) and ik ∈ Bj(N,D,u). Then,
without loss of generality17, we can assume that uik(ikik) ≤ uik(ik−1ik) < uik(ik,ik+1)
for all k = 1,...,m − 1 with i0 = im−1.
A star pattern H⋆ that contains s number of components of the following type
{{i1i2,i2i3}, {i4i5,i5i6},...{im−3im−2,im−2,im−1}} ⊆ H⋆ and all other players are linked
following the algorithm presented in Case I is stable. All players who are not linked to
their most preferred partner have their most preferred partner linked to her own most
preferred partner, hence, they will not sever their links, moreover, these players are not
star central players, hence, they cannot add a link without severing an existing link. ￿
16By slightly abusing notation here C denotes the set of players in the sequence of players connected
in the cycle.
17Alternatively, the proﬁle of team utility functions v ∈ V(D) must be such that uik({ik,ik}) ≤
uik({ik,ik+1}) < uik({ik−1,ik}) for all k = 1,...,m − 1 with i0 = im−1.68 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
Example 2.5.3 Consider the economy discussed in Examples 2.3.3 and 2.4.6. We
modify the economy described in these examples in such a way that a stable star
pattern exists. For this purpose we modify the direction of authority in the set of
potential links as D = {(1,4),(2,1),(2,3),(3,4)}.
In this setting the collective production processes in the matchings (2,1) and (2,3)
are symmetric where player 2 has a decision power over the hours worked by players
1 and 3, respectively, and so are the collective production processes in the links (1,4)
and (3,4), where, respectively, players 1 and 3 have decision power over the hours
worked by player 4. These problems have already been analyzed in Example 2.3.3,
hence, we know that lx,1(2,1) = lx,3(2,3) = ly,4(1,4) = ly,4(3,4) = 1, lx,1(1,4) =
lx,3(3,4) = (2¯ y)
1
α, and ly,2(2,1) = ly,2(2,3) = 2¯ y.
Next, we discuss the collective production processes in the possible star compon-
ents in which more than two players are linked. First consider the star component
{(2,1),(2,3)}. The team utility of players 1 and 3 should be the same as in the links
(2,1) and (2,3), hence, lx,1{(2,1),(2,3)} = lx,1(2,1) = 1 and lx,3{(2,1),(2,3)} =
lx,3(2,3) = 1. Since collectively these players have to produce three units of the sub-
sistence level ¯ y, player 2 spends the minimum hours in the production of the consump-
tion good such that given the amount of the intermediate good produced by players
1 and 3, they produce three times the subsistence level of the of the consumption
good. So, ly,2({(2,1),(2,3)}) = 2−α(3¯ y). The utility levels from free time can be
computed in a straightforward way φ1({(2,1),(2,3)}) = φ3({(2,1),(2,3)}) = 0 and
φ2({(2,1),(2,3)}) = 1 − 2−α(3¯ y).
Next, consider the star component {(1,4),(3,4)}, in which both producers of the
intermediate good have authority over the producer of the consumption good and a
star central player, player 4. We know from the analysis of collective production in
(1,4) and (3,4) that lx,1({(1,4),(3,4)}) = lx,1(1,4) = (2¯ y)
1
α and lx,3({(1,4),(3,4)}) =
lx,3(3,4) = (2¯ y)
1
α. Player 4 can utilize her position as a star central player in which she
acts as a coordinator of the collective production process, and she only works as much
as to produce three times the subsistence level given the amount of time contributed
by players 1 and 3, i.e., ly,4({(1,4),(3,4)}) =
3
2α+1. The utility levels from free time
can be computed in a straightforward way φ1({(1,4),(3,4)}) = φ3({(1,4),(3,4)}) =
1 − (2¯ y)
1
α and φ4({(1,4),(3,4)}) = 1 −
3
2α+1, which is higher than zero for all α ≥ 1.
Last, consider the star component {(1,4),(2,1)}. It has already been discussed
in Example 2.4.6. Recall that players 2 and 4, respectively, contribute the follow-
ing amounts of time l2y({(1,4),(2,1)}) = l2y(2,1) = 2¯ y and l4y({(1,4),(2,1)}) =CHAPTER 2 69
Table 2.2: Team Utility Proﬁles in Example 2.5.3
H⋆ v1(H⋆) v2(H⋆) v3(H⋆) v4(H⋆)
iii∈N −∞ −∞ −∞ −∞
{(2,1),{3,3},{4,4}} 0 1 − 2¯ y −∞ −∞
{{1,1},{2,2},(3,4)} −∞ −∞ 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α 0
{(2,1),(3,4)} 0 1 − 2¯ y 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α 0
{(1,4),{2,2},{3,3}} 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α −∞ −∞ 0
{{1,1},(2,3),{4,4}} −∞ 1 − 2¯ y 0 −∞
{(1,4),(2,3)} 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α 1 − 2¯ y 0 0
{(1,4),(2,1),{3,3}} 1 −
  3¯ y
1+2¯ y
  1
α 1 − 2¯ y −∞ 0
{(2,1),(2,3),{4,4}} 0 1 − 2−α(3¯ y) 0 −∞
{{1,1},(2,3),(3,4)} −∞ 1 − 2¯ y




{(1,4),{2,2},(3,4)} 1 − (2¯ y)
1





l4y(1,4) = 1. Player 1 contributes the minimum amount of time, so that given the






α. The collective production in the star component
{(2,3),(3,4)} yields an analogous allocation of labor.
Having derived the utility from free time in collective production, we can compute
the team utility proﬁle in each possible star pattern. These values are presented in
Table 2.2.
If ¯ y > 1







α, players 1 and 3 will prefer to be star central
players than to be linked only to player 4. For any α ≥ 1, 1−2¯ y < 1−2−α(3¯ y), hence
player 2 prefers to be a star central player than to be linked either to player 1 or to
player 3 alone. Since 0 < 1 −
3
2α+1 player 4 prefers to be a star central player than to
be linked either to player 1 or player 3 alone. Hence for ¯ y > 1
4, there are three stable
star patterns: {(1,4),(2,1),33}, {{1,1},(2,3),(3,4)}, and {(1,4),22,(3,4)}. Note that
in all of these patterns the player who is in a state of autarky prefers to be linked to
another player, however, no player with whom she has a potential link can increase
her own utility by being linked with that autarkic player compared to her utility in the
component in which she is linked. ￿
In Examples 2.4.6 and 2.5.3, we illustrated that depending on the direction of
the set of potential links there can be no stable star pattern or there can be multiple
stable star patterns despite that the set of potential links contains a cycle. In fact in this
specialsettingwecansharpenthesuﬃciencyrequirementsfortheexistenceofastable70 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
starpatternincomparisontoTheorem2.5.1. Themostimportantcharacteristicsofthis
settingarethatplayersarehomogeneousintermsoftheirpreferenceforfreetime; they
are homogenous within their production specialization, i.e., a player can specialize to
be either an intermediate good producer or a consumption good producers; any player
has a higher utility from a link in which she has authority, than from a link in which
another player has authority over her or him. A team economy that satisﬁes these
characteristics, we name a team economy based on collective production.
Deﬁnition 2.5.4 Let ET = (N,D,u,v) be a team economy. Let {A, B} be a set of
roles, let r: N → {A, B} be a role-assignment function such that there are a non-empty
set NA of players assigned to the role A and a non-empty set NB of players assigned
to the role B with NA ∪ NB = N and NA ∩ NB = ∅. A team economy based on
collective production ETC = (N,Dc,uc,vc) is a team economy such that the set of
potential links contains only links between players of diﬀerent role assignments and
the autarkic states Dc ⊆ {NA
 
NB} ∪ D0. All proﬁles of utility functions in the set
of permissible hedonic proﬁles of utility functions uc ∈ Uc(Dc) satisfy the following
properties: there is a set of real numbers {uA,uB,,uA,uB} such that for all players
i ∈ NA and j ∈ NB with (i, j) ∈ D, it holds that ui((i, j)) = uA and uj((i, j)) = uB; and
for all players i ∈ NA and j ∈ NB with (j,i) ∈ D, uj((j,i)) = uB and ui((j,i)) = uA
with uA,uB,uA,uB ∈ R.
Below we present the result on existence of stable patterns in a team economy
based on collective production.
Proposition 2.5.5 There exists a stable star pattern in a team economy based on col-
lective production, if the set of potential links does not contain a directed cycle.
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.5.1 since the absence of directed cycles
in this setting guarantees the analogous result to the result in Lemma 2.5.2.
The converse of Proposition 2.5.5, however, does not hold. That is, there are
team economies of collective production in which the sets of potential links contains
a directed cycle and there are stable activity patterns. Such a case is illustrated in
Example 2.5.6.
Example 2.5.6 Consider the economy that has been developed in Examples 2.3.3 and
2.4.6. We modify these examples by introducing one more player who is specialized
in the production of the intermediate good and who has a potential link only with
player 4. The set of potential links is given by D = {(1,4),(2,1),(3,2),(4,3),(5,4)}































Due to the symmetry between the links (1,4) and (5,4), the team utility proﬁles
of the star patterns that contain the components d1 = {(5,4)} and d2 = {(4,3),(5,4)}
are analogous to the team utility proﬁles of the star patterns containing the compon-
ents d′
1 = {(1,4)} and d′
2 = {(1,4),(4,3)} with v5(d1) = v1(d′
1). A new star com-
ponent that we need to consider is the component {(1,4),(5,4)}. The same type of
component in terms of the specialization of the players connected and in the dir-
ection of authority has already been analyzed in Example 2.5.3, i.e., the compon-
ent {(1,4),(3,4)}. Hence, we know that v5({(1,4),(5,4)}) = v3({(1,4),(3,4)}) =
1 − (2¯ y)
1
α and v4({(1,4),(5,4)}) = 1 −
3
2α+1. The only new type of pattern that has
not been considered so far is {(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}. Here, by assumption of the team
utility proﬁle v1({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}) = v5({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}) = 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α, and
v3 = ({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}) = v3(4,3) = 0. Player 4 has to contribute the min-
imum amount of hours in the production of the consumption good such that given the
amounts of the intermediate good produced by players 1, 3 and 5, four times the sub-
sistence level is being produced, i.e., ly,4({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}) = 4¯ y(1 + 2(2¯ y)
1
α)−α
and hence v4({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}) = 1−4¯ y(1+2(2¯ y)
1
α)−α. In addition recall that the
utility level in a state of autarky for each player equals −∞.
Consider the star pattern H⋆ = {(1,4),(3,2),(5,4)}. This star pattern is stable: the
only players who might want to deviate are players 2 and 4, however, the non-blocking
conditions are satisﬁed: u2(2,1) = 1 − 2¯ y > 0 = v2(H⋆), however, v1(2,1) = 0 <
1 − (2¯ y)
1
α = v1(H⋆); and v4(H⋆ ∪ {(4,3)} = 1 − 4¯ y(1 + 2(2¯ y)
1
α)−α > 1 −
3
2α+1 =
v4({(1,4),(5,4)}) for instance for α = 2, however, v3(H⋆) = 1 − (2¯ y)
1
α > 0 =
v3({(1,4),(4,3),(5,4)}). ￿
2.6 Team Generic Stability
As we discussed in Section 2.1, the set of potential links deﬁnes the social constraints
and the social ﬂow of authority between people, while the star pattern which emerges72 STABILITY AND SOCIAL RECOGNITION OF AUTHORITY
deﬁnes the productive patterns within a society. It is important to identify conditions
which ensure the existence of stable productive patterns in any social arrangements.
Suchconditionswillensurewhatwecallteamgenericstabilityoftheactivitystructure
(N,D) with respect to the emergence of team patterns.
Deﬁnition 2.6.1 Let (N,D) be an activity structure and let V(D) be a set of permiss-
ible proﬁles of team utility functions deﬁned on D. The activity structure (N,D) is
team generically stable if for every v ∈ V(D) there is a stable star pattern in the team
economy ET = (N,D,u,v).
The main existence theorem follows. Similarly to Theorem 2.5.1, the condition is
based on presence of cycles and the direction of the cycle is not important.
Theorem 2.6.2 The activity structure (N,D) is team generically stable if and only if
the set of potential links D does not contain a cycle or if it contains a cycle, it is a
cycle with m − 1 = 3s and s ∈ {2,3,...}.
Proof. If: Let (N,D) be an activity structure and let V(D) be the set of permissible
proﬁles of team utility functions deﬁned on the set D.
The suﬃciency of the conditions directly follows from Theorem 2.5.1 applied to
every team economy (N,D,u,v) for every proﬁle of team utility functions v ∈ V(D).
Only if: Let (N,D) be an activity structure and let V(D) be the set of permissible
proﬁles of team utility function in D, and let v ∈ V(D) be a particular proﬁle of
team utility functions. We will show the necessity of the condition that D contains no
cycles or that if it contains a cycle, it is a cycle with m−1 = 3s and s = {2,3,...}, by
contradiction.
So, let there be a stable star pattern in any team economy (N,D,u,v) for all v ∈
V(D) and let the set of potential links contain a cycleC = (i1,i2,...,im} with ik,ik+1 ∈
  for all k = 1,...,m − 1 and m ≥ 4 and suppose m − 1 , 3s with s = {2,3,...}.
Consider a proﬁle of team utility functions v ∈ V(D) such that the hedonic utility
proﬁle u is given by: uik(ik, j) < uik(ik,ik) < uik(ik−1,ik) < uik(ik,ik+1) for all k =
1,...,m − 1 with i0 = im−1 and all j ∈ Nik(D) \ {ik−1,ik+1}. Let H⋆ be a stable star
pattern in this economy. Note that in the stable star pattern H⋆ the largest number of
players connected in the cycle C that form a component in a star pattern, is three. We
will consider three cases.
First, suppose that ikik ∈ H⋆ for some k = 1,...,m − 1. Since H⋆ is a stable star
pattern, the individual rationality condition is satisﬁed for all players in N. Hence,CHAPTER 2 73
player ik−1 is in a state of autarky or connected to player ik−2 either in the compon-
ent g′ = {ik−1ik−2} where she is a star central player, or in the component g′′ =
{ik−1ik−2,ik−2ik−3} with i0 = im−1, i−1 = im−2, and i−2 = im−3 where she is not
a star central player. In all three cases one of the non-blocking conditions is vi-
olated: if player ik−1 < N⋆(H⋆), then the condition [NB] is violated since by the
construction of the proﬁle of hedonic utility functions uik(ik−1,ik) > uik(H⋆) and
uik−1(ik−1,ik) > uik−1(H⋆); in case ik−1 ∈ N⋆(H⋆), then the condition [NB*] is violated
since uik(ik−1,ik) > uik(H⋆) and vik−1(H⋆∪{ik−1,ik}) ≥ uik−1(ik−2,ik−1)+uik−1(ik−1,ik) >
uik−1(H⋆). Since H⋆ is stable, then it cannot be that {ik,ik} ∈ H⋆ for some ik ∈ C18.
Next, suppose that there is no player along the cycle’s path such that ikik ∈ H⋆
and in addition m − 1 ≥ 4. Since H⋆ is a stable star pattern, the individual rationality
condition is satisﬁed for all players in N. Since m − 1 , 3s with s = {2,3...},
m − 1 ≥ 4 and there is no player ik along the cycle’s path such that ikik ∈ H⋆, there
must be at least two distinct players along the cycle’s path ik−1 and ik for some k =
1,...,m−1 and k0 = m−1 such that the component {ik−1,ik} ∈ H⋆. However, in that
case, the non-blocking condition [NB*] is violated: uik−2(ik−2,ik−1) > uik−2(H⋆) and
vik−1({ik−2ik−1,ik−1ik}) ≥ uik−1(ik−2ik−1)+uik−1(ik−1ik) > uik−1(H⋆) with k−1 = m−2 and
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the superadditivity of the team utility function.
Last, consider the case when there is no player ik along the cycle’s path such that
ikik ∈ H⋆ and m − 1 = 3. Since ikik < H⋆, the players in along the cycles path must
be connected in a component {ik−1ik,ikik+1} ∈ H⋆ for some k = 1,2,3 with i0 = i3
and i4 = i1. Again the non-blocking condition [NB*] is violated: uik+1(ik−1ik+1) >
uik+1(H⋆) and vik−1 ({ik−1ik+1, ik−1,ik}) ≥ uik−1(ik−1ik+1) + uik−1(ik−1ik) > uik−1(H⋆)
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the superadditivity of the team utility function.
This exhausts the possible cases and thus establishes a contradiction to the existence
of a stable pattern H⋆.
In team economies based on collective production, where we consider only a sub-
class of utility functions Uc such that the hedonic utility function is contingent on the
direction of the directed links, the suﬃcient condition for the existence of a stable pat-
tern requires the absence of directed cycles. Furthermore, as Example 2.5.6 showed,
the absence of directed cycles is not a necessary condition. The necessary and suﬃ-
cient condition presented in Proposition 2.6.4 requires that the set of potential links
does not contain components that consist of directed cycles.
18Here again we slightly abuse the notation and use C to denote the set of connected players in the
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First, we deﬁne the activity structure pertaining to a team economy based on col-
lective production.
Deﬁnition 2.6.3 Let (N,D) be an activity structure. Let {A, B} be a set of roles, let
r: N → {A, B} be a role-assignment function such that there are a non-empty set NA
of players assigned to the role A and a non-empty set NB of players assigned to the
role B with NA ∪ NB = N and NA ∩ NB = ∅. The pair (N,Dc) is an activity structure





on collective production. Then (N,Dc) is team generically stable if and only if the set
of potential links does not contain a component consisting of a directed cycle Cd with
m − 1 , 3s with s ∈ N.
The proof of Proposition 2.6.4 is very similar to the one of Theorem 2.6.2 and
uses the results of Proposition 2.5.5. What should be kept in mind is that in team
economies based on collective production only cycles of even number of players are
possible. This follows from the restriction on the set of potential links that it can only
include links between players of diﬀerent role assignments.
2.7 Final Remarks
The results that we derive in our application to pre-market collective production, are
in line with the anthropological insights that the recognition of authority is a necessary
condition for the emergence of complex production. To ensure team generic stability
in a team economy based on collective production a social structure must not contain
components of directed cycles, which implies that there must be a well-deﬁned ﬂow
of authority in all components of the social structure. The presence of directed cycles
in a set of potential links has a very intuitive interpretation in term of the structure
of an organization in which the potential links stand for value generating activities.
Within such an organization a directed cycle would mean that players have authority
over players who have indirect authority over them.
Note that in our application of collective production we have not assumed an ex-
ante relation between a production role and authority, i.e., it has not been assumed that
all players specialized in the production in one of the types of goods, intermediate or
consumption, have authority over the players specialized in the other type of group.CHAPTER 2 75
Such a one-to-one relation between labor specialization and authority, however, would
imply that the set of potential links does not contain a directed cycle. Hence, what
some anthropologists identify as the path for the emergence of complex relations,
labor specialization, in our framework is an ex-ante realization of the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for guaranteed ex-post stability.
A one-to-one relation between production roles and authority, however, is just one
possible way of satisfying the necessary and suﬃcient condition for stability. There
are other organizations of the sets of potential links that would satisfy this condition.
For instance, one such structure is a set of potential links in which producers of inter-
mediate goods belong to either one of two types: either they have authority over all the
producers of the consumption good with whom they are linked, or all the producers of
the consumption good with whom they are linked have authority over them.
Moreover, we should reiterate that, according to our analysis, it is not necessary
that authority emanates from a star central player. This may be the case, if the set of
potential links is such that there is a one-to-one relation between production role and
authority as discussed above.
We should also point out the fact that in the theoretical results applicable to the
general framework, Theorems 2.5.1 and 2.6.2, the direction of a cycle does not play
a role. This is because in the general setting we have not assumed a relation between
a player’s possession of authority and the utility she derives from a link with another
player. This makes this framework applicable to a broad class of situations, also such
which can be modeled by undirected graphs.
Last, we should mention some limitations of our general framework. In particular,
in our work we focus on very special class of activity patterns, which consists of star
structures. For complex production processes, such as hierarchies of several levels,
predominant in today’s economic world, these tools are inadequate. A clear goal for
future work is the development of a framework where more complex patterns can be
analyzed.Part II




Contracts and Coalition Formation by Anonymous
Players∗
This chapter views coalition formation as a problem of cooperative nature in which
two intertwined processes are simultaneously studied: the organization of economic
agents into coalitions and the allocation of coalition values among the coalition mem-
bers. Aumann and Dreze (1974) state that answering the simultaneous questions
would be providing a general equilibrium type of analysis. Recently, several au-
thors oﬀer solution suitable to answer this question, e.g. Zhou (1994) and Morelli
and Montero (2003) based on a notion of bargaining set. Instead, we investigate the
stability of endogenous coalition formation under various contractual arrangements.
Our approach is applicable to environments in which contracts are enforceable. We
regard the coalition1 and an individual member as two sides in a contract. The ar-
rangement gives particular rights, such as the right to end the contract and the right to
be compensated to one or both of the parties. Depending on the allocation of rights,
we distinguish between three types of contractual arrangements leading to the notions
of individual, contractual, and compensation stability. Individual and contractual sta-
bility give the individual member the right to end the contract but do not allow for
compensation rights. Contractual stability setting in addition gives a veto right to the
coalition. To end the contract a member needs the agreement of the rest of the coali-
tion members. If they are worse-oﬀ after the change, they disagree. The third concept,
compensation stability, gives both parties the right to end the contract and the right to
be compensated in case they are worse-oﬀ after the change. Compensation stability
has two complementary sides to it: pull-in and push-out stability. Pull-in stability re-
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Lazarova, Borm and van Velzen (2005).
1Here by coalition we mean the rest of the coalition members.
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ﬂects external stability by allowing a coalition to attract new members. On the other
hand, push-out stability reﬂects internal stability by allowing coalitions to push out
one of their members.
The focus on contractual arrangements is justiﬁed, on one hand, by the fact that
contracts are common arrangements in economic organization in which economic
value is generated by the cooperation of group members, e.g., business alliances and
consumer clubs. Moreover, it is motivated by the observation that agents, being part
of large groups, are anonymous to each other. Thus, no group deviations are allowed
in our setting. This makes other well established equilibrium notions, such as the core,
an inadequate equilibrium concept for stability analysis.
The use of these type of stability concepts to study endogenous coalition formation
has been extensively motivated by Dreze and Greenberg (1980). Dreze and Greenberg
(1980) are also the ﬁrst to deﬁne the notions of individual and contractual stability in
a setting in which transfers between groups coalition structure elements are allowed,
thus, an individual (a coalition) may compensate her former coalition members (the
individual who leaves the coalition) in case that the change makes them (her) worse-
oﬀ.
However, to the best of our knowledge the subsequent literature that was spurred
by their seminal paper, e.g., Banerjee et al. (2001), Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2004),
and Pápai (2004), abstracted away from the problem of value allocation. In these
works, it is assumed that each player has exogenously determined preferences over
membership in all coalitions of which she can be a member.
In our setting, as well as in the seminal paper by Dreze and Greenberg (1980) a
player’s preferences are endogenous since they depend on her share from the coali-
tion’s value and her outside options.
To make this point more clear, we elaborate on the behavioral assumptions we
make. We assume that each player makes a decision to join/leave a coalition based
on her own perceived payoﬀ without taking into account the eﬀect of her actions on
other players’ payoﬀs. A player’s payoﬀ from a coalition membership is endogen-
ously determined. It depends on her “power”2 to obtain a share of the coalition value.
This power-based measure, though related, is not entirely determined by the player’s
marginal contribution to the coalition value but it also depends on her outside options,
i.e., what other coalitions are being formed and how much she can possibly get as a
2Here by ”power” we refer to the bargaining strength of a player in the value allocation process.
However, since there is no explicit bargaining process that we analyse, we use this term loosely to
indicate that some players obtain larger share of the value than other and that’s what makes them more
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share of their payoﬀ, i.e., the endogenous coalition structure. In this way a member of
a coalition with high value might prefer to switch to a coalition with a smaller value
because her payoﬀ in the latter is higher than the share she gets from the former. By
switching coalitions, though, a player changes the outside options for the rest of the
players, which she does not take into account at the time of the move. Accordingly,
by switching coalitions, the player also aﬀects another player’s relative power in bar-
gaining for a share from the coalition value, not only in the two coalitions in which
the membership has changed, but also in the rest of the coalitions in the coalition
structure. Not taking into accounts the market-wide eﬀects of her actions makes each
player myopic.
We oﬀer alternative formulations of the notions of individual, contractual, and
compensation stability than the ones introduced by Dreze and Greenberg (1980). Our
main critique to their deﬁnitions is that it only considers deviations that would lead to
the same number of groups in the group structure. For example, in a coalition forma-
tion problem, the grand coalition, and any feasible payoﬀ allocation will be individu-
ally stable since a deviation of a single player to the empty set is not contemplated.
Clearly, this implication of their deﬁnition of individual stability is not recognized by
Dreze and Greenberg (1980) since they claim that in Example 3.1 of their paper—a
three-player “game of pairs” such that coalitions of two members have a value of 1,
and the singletons and the grand coalition have values of 0—there is no individually
stable equilibrium. This, as explained above, is not true.
The alternative deﬁnition of individual stability furthermore, implies individual
rationality. Individual rationality is a natural requirement in an equilibrium concept as
players should have the ability to opt out of a coalition and be alone if not restricted
by binding contracts.
Moreover, in their work Dreze and Greenberg (1980) claim that they provide an
example in which, supposedly, there is no contractually stable equilibrium in a setting
in which no transfers between coalitions are allowed. We disagree with this claim. As
we show in Theorem 3.2.2, even when allowing for possibilities of deviation to the
empty set, there is a contractually stable outcome in any coalition formation problem.
With the alternative deﬁnition of individual stability, we ﬁnd that there are coali-
tion formation problems in which there are no individually stable outcomes. This is
the case if the value of the grand coalition is less than the sum of the values of the
singleton coalitions. Moreover, coalition structures of maximum worth may not be
individually stable either. We use individual stability as a stepping stone for the con-
struction of the other two stability concepts. Contractual stability and compensation
stability have positive existence results. The contractual stability setting, however,82 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
does not allow for one-player value increasing deviations to take place, while com-
pensation stability does.
As an application of our theoretical framework we consider group formation prob-
lem of agricultural cooperation driven by the beneﬁt from mutual insurance. In this
setting wheat producers experience the risk of a damage of their seeds. The value of
a cooperating group is generated by the ability of group members to smoothen their
wheat production by pooling the risk of a seed loss and sharing the harvest. The ob-
jective of a mutual insurance group is to maximize the welfare of the group members.
In this setting the members of an insurance group are stakeholders. As such they
divide the value of the group generated by their cooperation amongst themselves.3
To illustrate the risk of damage, we adopt the model studied by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). To the best of our knowledge all other works oﬀering cooperative
approach to insurance group formation, e.g., Demange and Guesnerie (2001)4, Kahn
and Mookherjee (1995), Boyd et al. (1988), and Boyd and Prescott (1986) allow for
group deviations and do not consider pooling production risk. These works focus
on studying informational asymmetry and the properties of the core-stable insurance
group structure under various channels of signalling. Instead we abstract from the
asymmetric information problem to develop contract-based stability concepts.
We refer to the setting as “mutual insurance” to emphasize the cooperative nature
of the problem and distinguish it from the third-party market insurance setting stud-
ied by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We furthermore, consider production rather
than a utility-maximization setting. We focus on the stability of two types of out-
comes widely studied in the literature: pooling and separating outcomes. We ﬁnd
that given the assumption of risk averse players, all pooling outcomes are contractu-
ally and compensation stable, while no separating outcomes are individually or com-
pensation stable. The individually rational pooling outcomes are individually stable
and, moreover, this type of outcomes exists in every mutual insurance formation prob-
lem. Finally, no individually rational separating outcome is contractually stable either.
What drives these results is the possibility for side-payments within groups and, in the
case of the compensation setting, between groups.
Last we suggest an extension of the notions of stability based on contractual ar-
rangements to two-sided problems that take into account coalitional formation on
one side of the market and matching between the formed coalitions and players on
3The advantages of employing a cooperative approach to studying insurance organizations has been
discussed by Boyd, Prescott and Smith (1988).
4Demange and Guesnerie (2001) explicitly model anonymous agents, however, this assumption
only concerns the information channels rather than the group-wide deviation possibilities.CHAPTER 3 83
the other side of the market. The matching problem that we discuss here diﬀers
from the matching studied in Chapter 1 because here we consider only matchings
between members of two dichotomous groups. Moreover, the attention focuses the
inter-relation between the coalition formation and matching problems. We think that
studying these problems further may bring better understanding of large range of ser-
vice activities in which on one side of the market professional organizations are being
formed which generate economic value by interacting with organization on the other
side of the market e.g. insurance groups and health care providers. The chapter is
structured in the following way. In Section 3.1 we deﬁne the coalition formation prob-
lem and present the three stability concepts. We present existence results as well as
a technical discussion on the relation between the concepts in Section 3.2. In Section
3.3 we apply the problem to mutual insurance in agricultural production to which we
adapt the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and discuss the stable outcomes in
terms of the risk composition of the groups. In Section 3.4, we extend the framework
to coalitional matching problem and introduce possible notions of stability.
3.1 Contractual Settings
There is a ﬁnite set of players N = {1,2,...,n}. Players in the set N form coalitions.
The collection of subsets of N is denoted by 2N. A player cannot be a member of more
than one coalition. A partition of N into non-empty coalitions forms a coalition struc-
ture and it is denoted by P. The set of all possible coalition structures is denoted by P.
Each coalition generates value by the cooperation of its members. This value diﬀers
depending on the identity of the group members. For the purposes of the general ana-
lysis, it suﬃces to regard this relation as given by a value function v : 2N → R. The
pair (N,v) such that v(∅) = 0 deﬁnes a coalitional game. Without loss of generality,
we study zero-normalized problems, i.e., v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N.
An outcome of a coalitional game is represented by a payoﬀ conﬁguration. A
payoﬀ conﬁguration is a pair (P, x) where P ∈ P is a coalition structure of N and
x ∈ R




We refer to a coalition structure P which has a maximum total coalition structure





for all coalition structures P′ ∈ P. Similarly the payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) such that
P is a coalition structure of maximum social worth and x is eﬃcient is called a payoﬀ
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Given the coalition value, a player’s payoﬀ depends on an endogenous allocation
of the group value. A player i ∈ N prefers to be a member of a coalition which yields a
higher payoﬀ to her. A fair player’s payoﬀ in a coalition will also depend on the exact
coalition structure of the set of players, since the composition of the coalition structure
deﬁnes the outside options. This point will become more clear with the discussion of
the stability concepts below.
3.1.1 Individual Stability
In the contractual arrangement of individual stability the right to end the contract is
given only to the individual players and no compensatory obligations are imposed.
Individual stability thus entails that a player cannot obtain a higher payoﬀ by joining
another coalition structure element or by forming a singleton coalition.5
Deﬁnition 3.1.1 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is in-
dividually stable if there are no i ∈ N and S ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i < S such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S).
The following example is used to illustrate the concept of individual stability.
Example 3.1.2 Let N = {1,2,3}, v({1,2}) = 2, v({1,3}) = 3, v({2,3}) = 4, and
v(S) = 0, otherwise.
In the given coalitional game there is only one individually stable payoﬀ conﬁg-
uration, namely, ({N},0). Clearly, this is an individually stable outcome: the players
can deviate only by joining the empty set and obtain a payoﬀ of zero.
No other payoﬀ conﬁguration is individually stable because there is always at least
one player who wants to deviate. As an example consider the payoﬀ conﬁgurations






with α ∈ R. The best outside
option for player 2 is to join 1 in the coalition {1,2} where player 2’s marginal con-
tribution is two. Thus for player 2 not to have incentives to deviate it must be that
x2 = α ≥ 2. Similarly, for player3 not to deviate, it must hold that x3 = 4−α ≥ 3. The
twoconditionscannotholdsimultaneouslyinanyeﬃcientpayoﬀvectorandhencethis
type of payoﬀ conﬁgurations cannot be individually stable. ￿
5Implicit in the deﬁnition of individual stability is that a player can join a coalition only if her
membership is unanimously approved by the current coalition members. This is to say, a player can
joinacoalitionifthecurrentmembershaveatleastashighpayoﬀaftershejoinsastheyhadbefore. This
is why when a player decides on joining a coalition she bases her decision on her marginal contribution
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As seen above there are coalitional games in which no payoﬀ conﬁguration of
maximum social worth is individually stable. The next example shows that there are
coalitional games in which there are no individually stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations.
Example 3.1.3 Let N = {1,2,3}, v({1,2}) = 2, v({1,3}) = 3, v({2,3}) = 4, v(N) =
−1, and v(S) = 0, otherwise.
Note that the only diﬀerence with Example 3.1.2 is that here the grand coalition
has a negative value. The payoﬀ conﬁguration that consists of the grand coalition and
an eﬃcient payoﬀ vector cannot be individually stable: by the eﬃciency of the payoﬀ
vector follows that there is at least one player who has a negative payoﬀ, thus, such
player will deviate by forming a singleton coalition. ￿
3.1.2 Contractual Stability
Contractual stability is based on individual incentives under the additional condition
that a deviating player needs to acquire permission from the coalition, whose member
she is, in case she wants to end the contract, i.e. each individual member has the right
to end the contract and each coalition has the right to veto the end of the contract. we
assume that a coalition grants the permission, i.e., does not use its veto power, only if
the rest of the coalition members are as well-oﬀ without that particular player as when
she is part of the coalition. Therefore, in a contractually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration
no player can obtain a higher payoﬀ by joining another coalition structure element
without making the members of her current coalition worse-oﬀ.
Deﬁnition 3.1.4 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is
contractually stable if there are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T
such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) and x(T \ {i}) ≤ v(T \ {i}).
The next example illustrates how contractual stability limits the deviating possib-
ilities of a player in contrast to individual stability.
Example 3.1.5 Let (N,v) be the coalitional game of Example 3.1.2.
There are inﬁnitely many contractually stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations in this coali-
tional game. Any coalition structure with the exclusion of the coalition structure that
consists of all singletons can be part of a contractually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration.
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option is to join {1,3} in the grand coalition but there her marginal contribution is neg-
ative. Neither player 1 nor 3 will give a permission to the other who has incentives to
join player 2 since by being alone that player will have a strictly lower payoﬀ.







Player 3’s outside option to join player 2 in coalition {2,3} gives her a higher payoﬀ
than what she has, i.e. v({2,3}) − v({2}) = 4 > 3 = x3. Player 1 grants permission to
player 3 to leave as she is indiﬀerent between having a payoﬀ of zero in the coalition
{1,3} or as a member of the singleton coalition {1}. ￿
The above example shows that in the contractual stability setting, there are situ-
ations in which a one-person deviation can lead to an increase in the total value of
the coalition structure, yet, it is not performed because one of the parties of the con-
tract is strictly worse-oﬀ. To overcome this restriction on proﬁtable deviations, in the
next contractual speciﬁcation we allow for side payments between players after the
contract between them has ended .
3.1.3 Compensation Stability
First, the two complementary sides of compensation stability, pull-in stability and
push-out stability, are introduced.
In the contractual setting of pull-in stability, the individual player is the only party
who can end the contract. In case the remaining group members are worse-oﬀ, the new
coalition of the deviating player is obliged to compensate them for this loss. Thus, in a
pull-in stable outcome there is no coalition structure element that by attracting a new
member may increase its value enough to give higher payoﬀs to its members after
possible compensation of the incoming player’s previous coalition.
Deﬁnition 3.1.6 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is
pull-in stable if there are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T and S , T such that6
v(S) < v(S ∪ {i}) − xi − max
 
0, x(T \ {i}) − v(T \ {i})
 
.
In push-out stability the right to end the contract is given only to the coalition.
A coalition wants to end the contract with one of its members if by doing so, it can
increasethepayoﬀsoftheremainingmembers. Inthepush-outsettingacompensation
is required in case the member whose contract has been ended has a lower best outside
option than her current payoﬀ as a coalition member.
6Since the empty set is not regarded as a coalition structure element, it is not included in the possible
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Deﬁnition 3.1.7 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is
push-out stable if there are no i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P∪{∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that




v(S ∪ {i} − v(S)
  
.
Combining pull-in and push-out stability, we have compensation stability.
Deﬁnition 3.1.8 An outcome of a coalitional game is compensation stable if it is
pull-in and push-out stable.
To illustrate that compensation setting may overcome the restriction on proﬁtable
deviations of the contractual stability setting, we consider the following example.
Example 3.1.9 Let (N,v) be as in Example 3.1.2.
There is one type of compensation stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations, i.e., the payoﬀ






with α ∈ R.
These payoﬀ conﬁgurations are pull-in stable. Coalition {2,3} does not want to
attractplayer1asamembersincethegrandcoalitionhaslowervaluethantheircurrent
value. Player 1 can increase the value of its coalition by attracting either player 2 or
3. Yet, the increase is not enough to give her a higher payoﬀ after she compensates
the remaining member of coalition {2,3} for the change. These payoﬀ conﬁgurations
are also push-out stable. Neither player 2 nor 3 can increase her payoﬀ by pushing the
other player out to join player 1 in a coalition and compensate her for the change, if
needed. Player 1 cannot be pushed out of the singleton coalition either. ￿
3.2 Existence and Relations
The discussion of existence and relations between the stability contracts is focused on
the notions of compensation and contractual stability. Example 3.1.3 shows that there
are coalitional games with no individually stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations.
From the deﬁnitions of the stability concepts the following results can be obtained
in a straightforward fashion.
Proposition 3.2.1 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. Then the following results hold:
(i) Any individually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration is contractually stable;
(ii) Any individually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration is pull-in stable;
(iii) Any payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) is pull-in stable;88 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
(iv) Any payoﬀ conﬁguration ({i}i∈N,0) is push-out stable.
We establish positive existence results with respect to compensation and contrac-
tual stability. In particular, all payoﬀ conﬁgurations of maximum social worth are
compensation and contractually stable.
Theorem 3.2.2 Any payoﬀ conﬁguration of maximum social worth is both compens-
ation and contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. Let (P⋆, x) be a payoﬀ conﬁguration of
maximum social worth of (N,v).
Compensation stability: Suppose (P⋆, x) is not a compensation stable payoﬀ con-
ﬁguration. Then either (P⋆, x) is not pull-in stable or (P⋆, x) is not push-out stable.
First, suppose (P⋆, x) is not a pull-in stable payoﬀ conﬁguration. Then there are
i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P⋆ with i ∈ T and S , T such that
v(S) < v(S ∪ {i}) − xi − max
 
0, x(T \ {i}) − v(T \ {i})
 
.
Using the eﬃciency of the payoﬀ vector, the above inequality implies
v(S) + v(T) < v(S ∪ {i}) + v(T \ {i}).




∪ {S ∪ {i},T \ {i}} has a higher total
value contradicting that P⋆ is a coalition structure of maximum social worth.
Now suppose (P⋆, x) is not a push-out stable outcome. Then there are i ∈ N and
S,T ∈ P⋆ ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that




v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)
  
.
Using the eﬃciency of the payoﬀ vector, the above inequality implies
v(T) + v(S) < v(T \ {i}) + v(S ∪ {i}),
establishing a contradiction.
Contractual stability: Suppose (P⋆, x) is not a contractually stable outcome. Then
there are i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P⋆ ∪ {∅} with i ∈ T and S , T such that
xi < v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)
x(T \ {i}) ≤ v(T \ {i}).CHAPTER 3 89
Adding up the two inequalities and using the eﬃciency of the payoﬀ vector, we ﬁnd
v(T) + v(S) < v(T \ {i}) + v(S ∪ {i}),
establishing a contradiction.
For establishing a relation between compensation stability and contractual stabil-
ity we need to introduce one additional property. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is
individually rational if xi ≥ v({i}) − v(∅) for all i ∈ N.
Proposition 3.2.3 Any compensation stable payoﬀ conﬁguration which is individu-
ally rational is also contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. Let (P, x) be a compensation stable payoﬀ
conﬁguration which is individually rational. Then for all i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T
and S , T:
v(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − xi − max
 
0, x(T \ {i}) − v(T \ {i})
 
.
This implies that for all i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P with i ∈ T and S , T
xi ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) or x(T \ {i}) > v(T \ {i}).
Since (P, x) is individually rational xi ≥ 0 = v({i}) − v({∅}). We conclude that for all
i ∈ N and S,T ∈ P ∪ ∅ with i ∈ T and S , T, it holds that
xi ≥ v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S) or x(T \ {i}) > v(T \ {i}).
So, (P, x) is contractually stable.
NotethattheproofofProposition3.2.3infactimpliesthatanypull-instablepayoﬀ
conﬁguration which is individually rational is contractually stable.
We have seen that individually stable outcomes may not always exist. However, if
they do, they are necessarily individually rational, as stated in Proposition 3.2.4.
Proposition 3.2.4 Any individually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration is individually stable.
A trivial restriction on the characteristic value function that ensures the existence
of individual stable outcomes is a restriction that ensures the existence of individually
rational payoﬀ conﬁgurations of which the grand coalition is an element.90 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
Proposition 3.2.5 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game such that v(N) ≥
 
i∈N v({i}).
Then the payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) with xi ≥ v({i}) for every player i ∈ N is an
individually stable outcome of (N,v).
On the other hand, contractual and compensation stable outcomes, can be found in
anycoalitional game. However, notalloftheseoutcomesmaybeindividually rational.
3.3 Mutual Insurance
We apply our stability concepts to the formation of mutual insurance groups in wheat
production when the wheat producers experience the risk of a damage. This is an
important question that is of concern to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) since the risk of seed damage due to natural causes is seen
as a major disrupting factor to the sustainability of food production in developing
countries.7 Toillustratethissetting, weadoptthemodelofaninsurancemarketstudied
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Here we will refer to a coalition as an insurance
group. We use the three types of stability concepts to analyze payoﬀ conﬁgurations
which diﬀer in terms of the risk composition of the insurance group. In particular,
we discuss the pooling and separating outcomes which have received much attention
in the literature. In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) framework, the separating type of
outcomes is the only type that may be stable.
First, we describe the demand for insurance against seed damage. There is a ﬁnite
set of players N. All players are expected output maximizers each with the same
increasingandstrictlyconcaveproductionfunctionY deﬁnedovertheamountofseeds
a, i.e., Y : R → R with Y′ > 0 and Y′′ < 0. Each player is endorsed with an initial
amount of seeds w. With some probability π a player incurs a damage of his seed
endowment which has an equivalent amount D with D < w. There are two groups of
players, L and H, forming a partition of N. Players in L have a low probability πL of
incurring a damage. Those in H have a high probability πH. So πL < πH.
We assume that each insurance group oﬀers the same amount of insurance to all
members equalling the total damage, i.e., in case her seeds are damaged, a wheat
producer will receive the same amount of good quality seeds as the amount of her
damaged seeds. However, the group may require a diﬀerent contribution “fee” per
unit of insurance measured in terms of seeds. The contribution fee q(S) of group S is
7See Sperling, Osborn and Cooper (2004) for a discussion on seed security and policies concerning
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determined by a break-even condition given by:
|S|q(S)D − πL|S ∩ L|D − πH|S ∩ H|D = 0.








So, the contribution fee depends only on the relative size of the risk-pool of the in-
surance group. In particular, q(S) ∈ [πL,πH]. It is lowest when an insurance group
consists of low-risk players only, and it is highest when it consists of high-risk players
only.
The value of an insurance group S is deﬁned to be the total production of its
members. Formally,




for all S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}. (3.2)
A coalitional game (N,vπ) derived from the above described tuple (L,H,Y,w,
D,πL,πH,q) with N = L ∪ H and vπ deﬁned by (3.2) is called a mutual insurance
coalitional game to which we refer as an insurance game for brevity. Note that the
value function is not zero-normalized. However this aﬀects neither the deﬁnitions of
stability nor the results in Section 3.2.
The next example is used to illustrate the mutual insurance setting.
Example 3.3.1 Consider L = {1,2} and H = {3}, so N = {1,2,3}. The probabilities
of incurring a damage are given by πL = 0.1 and πH = 0.7, respectively. Every player
is endowed with the same amount of seed endowment w = 10 while D = 9. Every
player has production abilities represented by the same increasing and strictly concave
production function Y deﬁned by Y(a) =
√
a for a ≥ 0.
The break-even contribution fee of each insurance group is calculated using Equa-
tion (3.1). The numbers are given below:
q(S) =

   
   
0.1 : S = {1},{2},{1,2};
0.3 : S = {1,2,3};
0.4 : S = {1,3},{2,3};
0.7 : S = {3}.
Using the deﬁnition of group value given by Equation (3.2) and the break-even
contribution fees, we obtain the following value function: vπ({1}) = vπ({2}) = 3,
vπ({3}) = 1.9, vπ({1,2}) = 6, vπ({1,3}) = vπ({2,3}) = 5, and vπ(N) = 8.1.92 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
In this insurance game all individually stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations (P, x) are of
the form P = {N}, x(N) = 8.1 and x1 ≥ 3, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 1.9.
The contractual and compensation stable payoﬀ conﬁgurations (P, x) coincide and
are given by P = {N} and x(N) = 8.1. ￿
In the rest of the section the analysis is focused on pooling8 and separating types
of payoﬀ conﬁgurations. Below we give the formal deﬁnitions of these outcomes.
Deﬁnition 3.3.2 Let (N,vπ) be an insurance game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration is called
pooling if P = {N}.
Deﬁnition 3.3.3 Let (N,vπ) with N = L ∪ H be an insurance game. A payoﬀ conﬁg-
uration (P, x) is called separating if P = {L,H}.
We ﬁrst show that the value function of an insurance game satisﬁes superadditivity.
Lemma 3.3.4 Let (N,vπ) be an insurance game. Then for all S,T ∈ 2N with S∩T = ∅
vπ(S) + vπ(T) ≤ vπ(S ∪ T).
Proof. Let (N,vπ) be an insurance game derived from (L,H,Y,w,D,πL,πH,q) with
N = L ∪ H and vπ deﬁned by Equation (3.2). Without loss of generality, consider
S,T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ∩ T = ∅. Then













































= vπ(S ∪ T).
The above inequality follows from the strict concavity of Y. The inequality holds
as equality in three cases: S,T ⊂ L; S,T ⊂ H; or |S| = |T| with q(S) = q(T).
8Unlike Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) we refer to pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration only as those out-
comes which contain the grand coalition.CHAPTER 3 93
Theorem 3.3.5 In an insurance game we have
(i) Any pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration is compensation stable;
(ii) Any pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration is contractually stable;
(iii) Any individually rational pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration is individually stable;
(iv) An individually rational pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration exists.
Proof. Lemma 3.3.4 implies that any pooling payoﬀ conﬁguration is a payoﬀ conﬁg-
uration of maximum social worth. Therefore, (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 3.2.2.
(iii) is immediate from the deﬁnitions of individual rationality and individual stability:
the only coalition to which a player may deviate from the grand coalition is the empty
set, such deviation cannot lead to a higher payoﬀ in an individually rational pooling
outcome, while (iv) follows from the fact that vπ(N) ≥
 
i∈N(vπ({i}) − v(∅)), which is
a consequence of Lemma 3.3.4.
Next, we discuss the stability of the separating payoﬀ conﬁgurations.
Theorem 3.3.6 In an insurance game we have
(i) No separating payoﬀ conﬁguration is individually stable;
(ii) No separating payoﬀ conﬁguration is compensation stable;
(iii) No individually rational separating payoﬀ conﬁguration is contractually stable.
Proof. Let (N,vπ) be an insurance game derived from (L,H,Y,w,D,πL,πH,q) with
N = L ∪ H and vπ deﬁned by Equation (3.2).
(i) Consider a separating payoﬀ conﬁguration ({L,H}, x). We will show that the
value of the high-risk insurance group is insuﬃcient to give each member at least her
outside option of joining the low-risk insurance group. For all i ∈ H, the outside
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Here, the inequality follows from the strict concavity of Y.
(ii) Consider a separating payoﬀ conﬁguration ({L,H}, x). We will ﬁrst show that
total coalition structure value increases when a high-risk player joins the low-risk
group.
For any i ∈ H











− Y(w − πHD) − |L|Y(w − πLD)


















The above inequality follows from the strict concavity of Y.
Using the eﬃciency of the payoﬀs we have
vπ(L ∪ {i}) + vπ(H \ {i}) −
 
vπ(L) + xi + x(H \ {i})
 
> 0.
The above inequality implies that at least one of the inequalities below holds for
any i ∈ H
 
vπ(L ∪ {i}) − vπ(L) − xi
 
> 0 or vπ(H \ {i}) − x(H \ {i}) > 0.
So for any i ∈ H,
vπ(L) < vπ(L ∪ {i}) − xi − max
 
0, x(H \ {i}) − vπ(H \ {i})
 
or




vπ(L ∪ {i}) − vπ(L)
  
.
Therefore, at least one of the pull-in and push-out conditions is violated.
(iii) Consider an individually rational separating payoﬀ conﬁguration ({L,H}, x).
By individual rationality, for all i ∈ H
xi ≥ vπ({i}) = Y(w − πHD).
By the eﬃciency of the payoﬀ vector, for all i ∈ H
x(H) = vπ(H) = |H|Y(w − πHD).
Combining both conditions, we obtain that xi = Y(w − πHD) for all i ∈ H.CHAPTER 3 95
Hence, if any player wants to leave the high risk-group, the rest of the members
will grant permission: for all i ∈ H
x(H \ {i}) = |H − 1|Y(w − πHD) = vπ(H \ {i}).
To show that this outcome is not contractually stable, we need to show that the value
of the high-risk group is insuﬃcient to give all of its members their best outside op-
tion, i.e., what they can get by joining the low-risk insurance group. This is already
shown in the proof of (i) above.
3.4 Coalitional Matching Problem
The framework discussed in Section 3.1 can be extended to analyse the organization
of a health care sector that in addition to insurance groups formation takes into ac-
count the matching between patients and doctors. To do so, we develop and analyze
a coalitional matching problem. We also propose several possible adjustments of our
notions of stability to capture the possibility for deviation on both sides of the match-
ing problem. In the exposition, we focus only on the notion of individual stability.
The notions of contractual stability and compensation stability can be re-formulated
in a similar fashion.
There are two ﬁnite sets of players N = {1,...,i,...,n} and M = {1,...,k,...,
m}. Players in the set N form coalitions S. The collection of subsets of N is denoted
by 2N. A partition of N into non-empty coalitions is called coalition structure and is
denoted by P. The collection of all coalition structures on N is denoted as P. Players
in M cannot form coalitions.
In addition we deﬁne a bi-matrix A of size M × 2N, which has players k ∈ M as
row labels and coalitions S ∈ 2N as column labels. Each cell in the bi-matrix, akS,
k ∈ M and S ∈ 2N, contains a pair of numbers (uS(k),vk(S)) that characterizes the
matching between a player k ∈ M and a coalition S ∈ 2N: uS(k) is the utility player k
when matched to coalition S and vk(S) is the value of S when matched to player k. It
is assumed that u∅(k) = 0 and vk(∅) = 0 for all k ∈ M. The triple (N, M,A) denotes a
coalitional matching problem.
An outcome of a coalitional matching problem is represented by a payoﬀ matching
conﬁguration. A payoﬀ matching conﬁguration is a triple (P, ,r) with P ∈ P, a
function   : P → M, and a payoﬀ vector r ∈ RN∪M such that r(S) = v (S)(S), for all96 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
S ∈ P and rk = u −1(k)(k) where u −1(k)(k) :=
 
S∈P| (S)=k uS(k) for all k ∈ M. We call
the pair (P, ) a coalitional matching.
Note that in a coalitional matching (P, ), it is possible for a player k ∈ M to be
matched to several coalition structure elements of P or not at all while all players in N
are matched to a player in M.
Next, we propose two possible formulations of the notion of individual stability
in the context of coalitional matching problems that takes into account deviational
possibilities by players in M as well. The ﬁrst deﬁnition is closely related to the one
used in the matching literature. In particular we allow coalitions in P and players in
M who are not matched to each other and prefer each other to their current matching
partners to deviate.
Deﬁnition 3.4.1 Let (N, M,A), be a coalitional matching problem. A payoﬀ matching
conﬁguration (P, ,r) is two-sided individually stable if the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
(i) there are no i ∈ N and S ∈ P ∪ {∅} with i < S such that
ri < v
 (S)(S ∪ {i}) − v
 (S)(S);
(ii) there is no k ∈ M such that rk < 0;
(iii) there are no S ∈ P and k ∈ M with  (S) , k such that
v
 (S)(S) < v
k(S) and 0 < u
S(k).
Condition (i) is the same as the one in Deﬁnition 3.1.1. Condition (ii) guarantees
individual rationality for the players in M. Condition (iii) is similar to the no-blocking
condition in Sotomayor (1996). The following example illustrates the concepts.
Example 3.4.2 Let N = {1,2,3} and M = {k,l} andthebi-matrix Abeasgivenbelow.
M/2N ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
k (0,0) (1,0) (1,0) (1,0) (2,5) (2,5) (2,5) (1,0)
l (0,0) (2,1) (2,1) (2,1) (1,4) (1,4) (1,4) (0,0)
.
Consider cell ak,{1,2}. It characterizes a matching between player k with the coali-
tion{1,2}. thepairofnumbers(2,5)indicatethattheutilityofplayerk inthematching
with the coalition {1,2} is 2, and the value of the coalition {1,2} in the matching with
player k is 5. The rest of the cells can be read in a similar fashion.CHAPTER 3 97
In this coalitional matching problem there are no two-sided individually stable
payoﬀ matching conﬁgurations. First consider the coalition structure {{1},{2},{3}}. It
cannot be an element of a two-sided individually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration because
players 2 and 3 always prefer to form a coalition than stay singletons, vk({2,3}) >
vk({2})+vk({3}) and vl({2,3}) > vl({2})+vl({3}). Next, consider the coalition structure
{N}. It cannot be an element of a two-sided individually stable payoﬀ conﬁguration
because at least one player prefers to deviate to a singleton coalition matched to player
l because vk(N) = vl(N) < vl({1}) + vl({2}) + vl({3}). Finally, consider the coalition
structure {{1,2},{3}} and matching   such that  ({1,2}) = k  ({3}) = l. Note that   is
the only matching that satisﬁes condition (iii). These coalition structure and matching
cannot be elements of a two-sided individually stable matching payoﬀ conﬁguration
because condition (i) cannot be satisﬁed for players 1 and 2 simultaneously by any
payoﬀ vector, i.e., vk({1,2}) < vl({1,3}) − vl({3}) + vl({2,3}) − vl({3}). Similarly, one
can show that the coalition structures {{1,3},{3}} and {{1},{2,3}} cannot be elements
of a two-sided individually stable matching payoﬀ conﬁguration either. ￿
There are other possible formulations of the notion of individual stability in the
context of a coalitional matching problem.
Deﬁnition 3.4.3 Let (N, M,A) be a coalitional matching problem. A payoﬀ matching
conﬁguration (P, ,r) is two-sided individually stable with a possibility of blocking if
the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) there are no i ∈ N, S, T ∈ P ∪ {∅}, with S , T and i ∈ T such that
ri < v
 (S)(S ∪ {i}) − v
 (S)(S) and
u
S( (S)) < u
S∪{i}( (S)) if  (S) ,  (T)
u
S( (S)) + u
T( (T)) < u
S∪{i}( (S)) + u
T\{i}( (T)) if  (S) =  (T);
(ii) there is no k ∈ M such that rk < 0;
(iii) there are no S ∈ P and k ∈ M with  (S) , k such that
v
 (S)(S) < v
k(S) and 0 < u
S(k).
The diﬀerence between Deﬁnition 3.4.1 and Deﬁnition 3.4.3 is in condition (i).
The underlying assumption in Deﬁnition 3.4.1 is that players in the set M do not have
a blocking power in the coalition formation process among the players in the set N.
This assumption is relaxed in Deﬁnition 3.4.3.98 CONTRACTS AND INSURANCE GROUP FORMATION
The following example illustrates the diﬀerence between the two notions of stabil-
ity.
Example 3.4.4 Let (N, M,A) be as in Example 3.4.2. Consider the coalition structure
P = {{1,2},{3}}, the matching function   such that  ({1,2}) = k and  ({3}) = l, and
the payoﬀ vector r such that r1 = 0, r2 = 5, r3 = 1, rk = 2, and rl = 1. It is easy to see
that the payoﬀ matching conﬁguration (P, ,r) is two-sided individually stable with a
possibility of blocking: player 2 would like to join player 3 in a coalition matched to
player l, however, l will be worse oﬀ if the deviation were executed, so she blocks it;
for all other players conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisﬁed. ￿
Our motivation for developing the new class of problems called coalitional match-
ing problems is to study in a comprehensive manner the organization of a sector such
as the health care sector. In reality health care is a sector which is heavily regulated
and countries diﬀer in the extent and type of regulation. This is why the choice of
stability concept used in predicting an organizational outcome should be tailored to
the particular case under investigation. Here we propose two such deﬁnitions. What
is left for future work is to investigate the conditions for existence of a stable outcome
in each case.CHAPTER
FOUR
A Bargaining Set Based on External and Internal
Stability and Endogenous Coalition Formation∗
4.1 Introduction
Economic entities, such as medical practices, insurance groups, research teams and
coalitional governments, involve agents who generate value by cooperating in groups.
In some situations the groups that actually form will partition the whole population
into smaller groups, while in others the population as a whole will form one cooperat-
inggroup. Studying thisendogenousformation ofgroups andpredicting whichgroups
will break up or will be stable is a captivating area of research. In politics it can pre-
dict which governments can be stable. In organizational science it can predict which
researchers can be grouped together or alternatively should work alone. The value
generated by a coalition in most cases cannot be traced back to the individual eﬀorts.
This brings about an additional question of how the group value should be translated
into individual payoﬀs.
These two questions, of coalition formation and of value allocation, are interde-
pendent and require a simultaneous answer as argued by Maschler (1992). They were
addressed simultaneously in the seminal work of Aumann and Maschler (1964) where
an outcome of a cooperative game consists of a coalition structure, i.e., a partition
of the player set into coalitions, and a payoﬀ vector which divides the value of each
coalition in the partition among its members. To analyze the stability properties of an
outcome Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduce the Maschler bargaining set1. The
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Lazarova, Borm, Montero and Reijnierse (2006).
1Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduce several deﬁnitions of bargaining sets and study in depth
only one of them, which is not the Maschler bargaining set. The Maschler bargaining set gains pop-
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Maschler bargaining set is the set of outcomes which survive a speciﬁc bargaining
process among all players. In this bargaining process over a given outcome, players
put forward “objections” and “counterobjections” against other members of the same
coalition in the coalition structure of the outcome. An objection consists of a new
coalition, of which the objecting player is a member and the player against whom the
objection has been raised is not, such that all members of the new coalition can obtain
higher payoﬀs than what is allocated to them in the proposed outcome. The player
against whom the objection has been raised can launch a counterobjection. A counter-
objection consists of a coalition and a payoﬀ vector such that the coalition members
can obtain at least as high a payoﬀ as in the original outcome and those of them who
also participate in the coalition used in the objection can get at least as much as they
would have obtained if the objection had been executed. The player who launches
the counterobjection must be a member of the coalition used in the counterobjection,
while the player who has raised the objection must be excluded from it. The bargain-
ing set contains those outcomes for which each objection can be countered.
An early work by Peleg (1967) shows that any coalition structure is stable for a
coalitional game with a non-empty imputation set in terms of the Maschler bargaining
set, i.e., there is a payoﬀ vector which allocates the value of each coalition in the
coalition structure among its members such that the coalition structure and this payoﬀ
vector constitute an outcome in the Maschler bargaining set. This ﬁnding precludes
the use of the Maschler bargaining set in analyzing endogenous coalition formation.
Zhou (1994) oﬀers a new bargaining set which has the desirable property that in this
setting it does not support all possible coalition structures. A more recent work by
Morelli and Montero (2003) introduces another solution concept which selects “more
desirable” outcomes out of those selected in the Zhou’s bargaining set.
A common aspect of these bargaining sets is that they treat the deviation possibil-
ities within a coalition structure element and between coalition structure elements in
a symmetric way. This, in our opinion, is a serious limitation since in many economic
situations transaction costs and institutional arrangements will require to make a dis-
tinction between the two. When considering a deviation within a group, all subsets
of this group should be taken as a possible threat point against the group.2 However,
when considering a deviation involving more than one coalition structure element,
our new bargaining set only allows a player to join an already formed group. As a
motivation one can think of prohibitively high transaction costs in terms of licensing
requirements, which make it impossible that new groups are formed based on sub-
ularity and is studied in more detail in later works, e.g., Davis and Maschler (1967).
2This is also the case in all other existing bargaining sets.CHAPTER 4 101
groups of distinct coalition structure elements. The diﬀerent treatment of internal and
external stability distinguishes our bargaining set from the previously studied bargain-
ing sets. Below we oﬀer two examples that illustrate the diﬀerence between internal
and external objections in an endogenous coalition formation setting.
Consider a parliament of representatives of four parties and a seat distribution such
thatnopartycanformagovernmentonitsown. Supposethatthereisonebigpartyand
three small ones such that the big party with any of the three small parties can form a
government, andsocanthethreesmallpartiestogether. Consideranoutcomeinwhich
a government is formed by the big party and one of the small parties. Our bargaining
set predicts that the allocation of government value is diﬀerent if the opposition parties
act together or separately. In the ﬁrst case any of the government parties may threaten
to split oﬀ the government by joining the opposition to form a new government. In the
second case, such a threat is only available to the big party.
Investigating the outcomes in our bargaining set in the general setting of weighted
majority games is the ﬁrst application that we oﬀer. We show that in any weighted
majority game, the minimal winning coalition formed by the players with the highest
weights and all other players acting alone leads to a coalition structure that is sup-
ported by an outcome in our bargaining set.3 This implies that a coalitional govern-
ment based on the biggest parties in the parliament when the opposition parties do
not cooperate is stable. However, in practice one also observes situations of united
opposition. This raises the question whether in any weighted majority game, there is
a stable partition comprised of a minimal winning coalition and its complement. We
answer this question negatively for the general case but for the case of homogeneous
weighted majority games the answer is positive.
Now consider a diﬀerent setting of a group of researchers who have the same
research capabilities and only diﬀer in a cooperation parameter. Some researchers ex-
perience positive spillovers when working in teams and have team building abilities,
while others tend to free-ride when they are in a team and thus carry negative cooper-
ation eﬀect. Consider a coalition structure consisting of teams of researchers. For
a coalition structure to be internally stable, there should not be an internal objection
of a researcher against another researcher member of the same team, which the lat-
ter researcher cannot counter. An internal objection in a coalition structure element
is analogous to an objection in the Maschler bargaining set of the coalition-restricted
cooperative game. A valid counterobjection in our setting has an additional require-
ment over the counterobjection deﬁned in the Maschler bargaining set: the subset
3Burani and Zwicker (2003) show that the same type of coalitional structure is both core and Nash
stable in the setting of hedonic coalition formation games with descending separable preferences.102 A BARGAINING SET BASED ON EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STABILITY
of the team used in the objection and the one used in the counterobjection have at
least one member in common. This type of modiﬁcation was originally introduced by
Zhou (1994) and it tailors the bargaining set to select coalition structures with higher
total partition value. In addition, a researcher may raise an external objection against
another researcher of her team by threatening to join another team in the coalition
structure. Such an external objection can be countered if the researcher against whom
it has been raised is at least as desirable to the outside team as the researcher who
launches the objection. A coalition structure and a payoﬀ vector such that for any in-
ternal objection there is an internal counterobjection and for every external objection
there is an external counterobjection will constitute an outcome in our bargaining set.
This example illustrates the second application that is studied. In this application
researchers will diﬀer not only in the direction of the cooperation eﬀect, but also
in the degree of positive or negative cooperation abilities that they exhibit. In the
symmetric case in which each researcher has either a ﬁxed “negative” (less than 1)
or “positive” cooperation parameter (higher than 1), the free-riding ability weakly
dominates the team-building ability, and in which there are at least two players who
have a cooperation parameter higher than 1, we ﬁnd that the unique coalition structure
supported by the bargaining set is the one in which the “cooperative” researchers form
a coalition, while the “non-cooperative” researchers are singletons. 4
In addition to the distinction between internal and external deviations, we intro-
duce two types of coalitional rationality conditions, splitting-proofness, which is a
weak form of the coalitional rationality condition present in the bargaining set studied
in depth by Aumann and Maschler (1964), and merging-proofness. These conditions
require that total payoﬀs do not increase if a coalition structure element is split in two
or if two coalition structure elements merge.
The remainder of the chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 4.2 we
formally introduce our bargaining set. Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 consider applica-
tions to weighted majority games and games with cooperation , respectively.
4.2 The Bargaining Set
We ﬁrst give some basic notions. Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of players.
Players can form coalitions S ⊆ N. The set of all possible coalitions is denoted by 2N.
A value function v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0, provides the value each coalition generates
by cooperation of its members. In addition and without loss of generality we assume
4This result is also reminiscent of the one described in Burani and Zwicker (2003).CHAPTER 4 103
v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N. The pair (N,v) is a coalitional game. A partition of N into
non-empty coalitions is called a coalition structure. The set of all possible coalition
structures of N is denoted by P.
An outcome of a coalitional game is represented by a payoﬀ conﬁguration. A
payoﬀ conﬁguration is a pair (P, x) where P ∈ P is a coalition structure of N and x ∈
R
N is an eﬃcient payoﬀ vector for P, i.e., x(S) = v(S) for all S ∈ P, where x(S) :=
 
i∈S xi. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) of a coalitional game (N,v) is individually
rational if xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
For the sake of completeness and comparison we ﬁrst present the Maschler and
Zhou bargaining sets.
For the deﬁnition of the Maschler bargaining set we follow Maschler (1992). Let
(P, x) be an individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration of a coalitional game (N,v). Let
players k and l be two distinct members of some coalition S ∈ P. The pair (T,y) with
T ∈ 2N and y ∈ RT is called an objection of k against l in (P, x) if k ∈ T, l < T,
y(T) = v(T) , yk > xk, and yi ≥ xi for all i ∈ T. The pair (Q,z) with z ∈ RQ is called a
counterobjection to the above objection (T,y) in (P, x) if l ∈ Q, k < Q, z(Q) = v(Q),
zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ T.
The Maschler bargaining set M(v) consists of those individually rational payoﬀ
conﬁgurations for which each objection can be countered.
The bargaining set introduced in Zhou (1994) diﬀers from the Maschler bargaining
set in the deﬁnitions of both an objection and a counterobjection. Let (P, x) be a payoﬀ
conﬁguration of a coalitional game (N,v). The pair (T,y) with y ∈ RT is called a Z-
objection of coalition T ∈ 2N in payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) if y(T) = v(T) and yi > xi
for all i ∈ T . The pair (Q,z) with z ∈ RQ is called a Z -counterobjection to the above
objection (T,y) in (P, x) if z(Q) = v(Q), Q \ T , ∅, T \ Q , ∅ , T ∩ Q , ∅, zi ≥ xi
for all i ∈ Q, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ T.
The Zhou bargaining set Z(v) consists of those payoﬀ conﬁgurations for which
each Z-objection can be countered.
Note that the above condition will imply that any element of Z(v) is individually
rational.
Our new bargaining set will combine separate notions of internal stability and
external stability. First we present the internal bargaining set. The following two
conditions reﬂect the notions of internal coalitional rationality and stability against
internal deviations, respectively.
Deﬁnition 4.2.1 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A coalition structure P is splitting-
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v(S) ≥ v(T) + v(Q).
Let (P, x) be a payoﬀ conﬁguration of a coalitional game (N,v) and let k and l be
two distinct members of the same coalition S ∈ P. The pair (T,y) with T ⊆ S \ {l},
k ∈ T and y ∈ RT is called an internal objection of k against l in (P, x) if yi > xi
for all i ∈ T and y(T) = v(T) . The pair (Q,z) with z ∈ RQ is called an internal
counterobjection to the above internal objection (T,y) in (P, x) if z(Q) = v(Q), l ∈ Q,
Q ⊆ S \ {k}, Q ∩ T , ∅, zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ T. We say
that an internal objection (T,y) of player k against l in (P, x) is justiﬁed if there is no
internal counterobjection.
Deﬁnition 4.2.2 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is in
the internal bargaining set BI(v) if
(i) P is splitting-proof, and
(ii) there is no justiﬁed internal objection.
A payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) of the internal bargaining set is in the Maschler
bargaining set as well: the deﬁnition of objection is the same and that of counterob-
jection imposes the additional requirement that the coalition used in the objection and
the coalition used in the counterobjection are not disjoint. Moreover, {N} is required
to be splitting-proof. For payoﬀ conﬁgurations comprising other coalition structures
than {N}, there is no general relation since we require the coalitions used both in the
objection and the counterobjection to be subsets of one speciﬁc coalition structure
element.
Compared to the Zhou bargaining set we have the following diﬀerences. First,
any coalition is allowed to object in the Zhou bargaining set; in our bargaining set
the coalition T used in the objection is a subset of one coalition structure element
and, moreover, must exclude at least one player. On the other hand, countering an
objection is easier in the deﬁnition of Zhou. We require the counterobjection to be
launched by the player against whom the objection has been raised, whereas in the
Zhou approach a counterobjection can be launched by any player. Furthermore, we
require that the coalition used in the counterobjection must be a subset of the same
coalition structure element of which T is a subset, whereas any coalition which has
a non-empty intersection with T can be used to counterobject in Zhou’s framework.
Given the diﬀerences it is easy to see that a payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) of the internal
bargaining set is in the Zhou bargaining set as well: any Z-objection can be translated
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used as a Z-counterobjection. However, the reverse does not necessarily hold. The
next example clearly illustrates the diﬀerences.
Example 4.2.3 Let N = {1,2,3}, v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N, v({2,3}) = 0, v({1,2}) =
v({1,3}) = 20, and v(N) = 21.
Consider the payoﬀ conﬁguration ({1,2,3},(7,7,7)). It is in the Zhou bargaining
set: any Z-objection ({1,2},y) can be countered using Z-counterobjection ({1,3},z)
with z1 = y1. Similarly, Z-objections using coalition {1,3} can be countered using
coalition {1,2}. However, it is not in the internal bargaining set: player 1 has a justiﬁed
internal objection ({1,2},(10,10)) against player 3.
Consider the payoﬀ conﬁguration ({{1,2},{3}},(10,10,0)). It is in the internal
bargaining set because there are no internal objections. However, it is not in the Zhou
bargaining set: the pair ({1,2,3},(101
3,101
3, 1
3)) constitutes a Z-objection that cannot
be countered. ￿
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 4.2.4 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. Then
(i) ( N 5,0) ∈ BI(v);
(ii) (P, x) ∈ BI(v) implies that (P, x) is individually rational.
Next we present the external bargaining set. Similar to the internal bargaining set,
the external bargaining set is based on two notions which reﬂect external coalitional
rationality and stability against external deviations, respectively.
Deﬁnition 4.2.5 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A coalition structure P is merging-
proof if for all S,T ∈ P we have v(S) + v(T) ≥ v(S ∪ T).
Let (P, x) be a payoﬀ conﬁguration of a coalitional game (N,v) and let k and l
be two distinct members of the same coalition S ∈ P. The pair (T ∪ {k},y) with
y ∈ RT∪{k} is called an external objection of k against l in (P, x) if T ∈ P, T , S,
y(T ∪ {k}) = v(T ∪ {k}) and yi > xi for all i ∈ T ∪ {k}. The pair (T ∪ {l},z) with
z ∈ RT∪{l} is called an external counterobjection to the above objection (T ∪ {k},y) in
(P, x) if z(T ∪ {l}) = v(T ∪ {l}), zk ≥ xk, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ T. We say that an
external objection (T,y) of player k against l in (P, x) is justiﬁed if there is no external
counterobjection.
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Deﬁnition 4.2.6 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game. A payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is in
the external bargaining set BE(v) if
(i) P is merging-proof, and
(ii) there is no justiﬁed external objection.
Since no external objections can be launched against the grand coalition, we ﬁnd the
following result.
Proposition 4.2.7 For a coalitional game (N,v) any payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) lies
within BE(v).
Note that the payoﬀ conﬁgurations in the external bargaining set are not necessar-
ily individually rational.
The new bargaining set B(v) consists of all payoﬀ conﬁgurations that are both in
the internal bargaining set and in the external bargaining set.




We say that the coalition structure P is stable if there is a payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN
such that the payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is an element of B(v).
Unfortunately, the bargaining set can be empty. Below we provide two examples
of coalitional games in which the bargaining set is empty. Example 4.2.9 illustrates
tension between the internal and external stability. In this example for any given
coalition structure P for which there exists a payoﬀ vector x such that (P, x) ∈ BI(v),
it holds that (P, x) < BE(v). Similarly, for any given coalition structure P for which
there exists a payoﬀ vector z such that (P,z) ∈ BE(v), it holds that (P,z) < BI(v).
Example 4.2.9 Consider the coalitional game (N,v) given by N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
with v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = v({2,3}) = v({5,6}) = v({5,7}) = v({6,7}) = 20,
v({1,2,3}) = v({5,6,7}) = 21, v({1,2,3,4}) = v({4,5,6,7}) = 30, v(S) = 0 for
|S| = 1, and v(S) < 0, otherwise. For this game B(v) = ∅.
First note that no coalition with a negative value can be a coalition structure ele-
ment of a payoﬀ conﬁguration which belongs to our bargaining set since such a payoﬀ
conﬁguration will not be individually rational.CHAPTER 4 107




. First suppose x4 = 0. Then
player 4 has a justiﬁed external objection ({4,5,6,7},y) against any other member of
the coalition {1,2,3,4}. Next suppose x4 > 0. Then it must be the case that at least
one of the other players, 1, 2, or 3, receives a payoﬀ of strictly less than 10, e.g., player
1; and that the sum of the payoﬀs of two of these players must be strictly less than
20, e.g., x1 + x2 < 20. Player 1 can then launch a justiﬁed internal objection against
player 4 using coalition {1,2} and a payoﬀ vector that gives to both players more than
what is allocated to them. Hence (P, x) < B(v).




. It is not stable since
it is not merging-proof: v({1,2,3,4}) > v({1,2,3}) + v({4}).
In a similar fashion it can be shown that no payoﬀ conﬁguration belongs to the
bargaining set. ￿
Example 4.2.10 illustrates that the internal bargaining set is empty for the grand
coalition of a strictly superadditive game.
Example 4.2.10 Consider N = {1,2,3,4,5}, v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N, v({1,3}) =
v({2,4}) = 30, v({1,2,5}) = v({3,4,5}) = 60 and v({N}) = 66, v(S) is minimal with
respect to strict superadditivity, otherwise.
Since the coalitional game is strictly superadditive, the only coalition structure
which is merging proof is {N}.
Considerthepayoﬀconﬁguration({N}, x). First, suppose x5 > 30. So, x1+x3 < 30
or x2 + x4 < 30. Without loss of generality let x1 + x3 ≤ x2 + x4. Either player 1 or
player 3 can launch a justiﬁed objection using coalition {1,3} against player 5: either
30 − x1 + x4 + x5 > 60 or 30 − x3 + x2 + x5 > 60. Next suppose x5 = 30. Without
loss of generality let x1 + x3 ≤ x2 + x4. Either player 1 or player 3 can launch a
justiﬁed objection using coalition {1,3} against player 2: either 30−x1+x2+x4 > 30
or 30 − x3 + x2 + x4 > 30 Finally suppose x5 < 30. Without loss of generality, let
x1 + x2 ≤ x3 + x4. Player 5 can launch a justiﬁed objection using coalition {1,2,5}
againsteitherplayer3orplayer4: either60−x2−x5+x3 > 30or60−x1−x5+x4 > 30.
￿
However, the bargaining set is not empty in a coalitional game with three players.
Proposition 4.2.11 Let (N,v) be a coalitional game with N = {1,2,3}. Let P be such
that
 
S∈P v(S) is maximized. Then there exists a payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN such that
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Proof. First note that P is splitting-proof and merging-proof. Recall that M(v) is
nonempty for all coalition structures. So there is a payoﬀ vector x ∈ R3 such that
(P, x) ∈ M(v). We will show that (P, x) ∈ B(v).
Let P = {N}. By individual rationality of M(v), if a player i has an objection
against another player j at x it must be using coalition {i,k}. Because {N} is the coali-
tion structure with maximum total value, an objection of i against j can only exist if
xj > 0. A counterobjection in the Maschler sense must then use coalition {j,k}, which
is also a valid counterobjection in the sense of B(v).
Similar arguments can be used in case P = {{i, j},{k}}. The case P =  N  is
straightforward since objections are not possible.
The result of Proposition 4.2.11 cannot be extended to coalitional game with four
players as the next example illustrates.
Example 4.2.12 Consider the coalitional game (N,v) given by N = {1,2,3,4} with
characteristic value function v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = v({2,3} = 20, v({N}) = 21, and
v(S) = 0, otherwise.
Clearly P = {N} is the coalition structure with the maximal
 
S∈P v(S). However,
it is not stable. At least two of the three players 1, 2, and 3 have a justiﬁed objection
against player 4 in any individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration because the three
inequalities x1 + x2 ≥ 20, x1 + x3 ≥ 20, and x2 + x3 ≥ 20 cannot be satisﬁed simultan-
eously by any individually rational payoﬀ vector and no coalition containing player 4
but {N} has a strictly positive value. ￿
Yet, we establish a positive result for a superadditive coalitional game with four
players.
Proposition 4.2.13 Let(N,v)beasuperadditivecoalitionalgamewith N = {1,2,3,4}.
Then there exists a payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN such that ({N}, x) ∈ B(v).
Proof. Note that {N} is splitting-proof since (N,v) is superadditive. Furthermore {N}
is merging-proof. Consider a payoﬀ vector x ∈ RN such that ({N}, x) ∈ M(v). We will
show that ({N}, x) ∈ B(v).
There are no external objections. Suppose there is an objection in the Maschler
sense of player k against l using (T,y). Then (T,y) is also an internal objection of
player k against l. Since any payoﬀ conﬁguration in M(v) is individually rational
|T| ≥ 2. First suppose xl ≥ 0. Since ({N}, x) ∈ M(v) there is a counterobjection of
player l in the Maschler sense using a pair (Q,z). Then it must be that |Q| ≥ 2 since
v{i} = 0and Q∩T , ∅, otherwisev(Q)+v(T) ≥ x(Q)+y(T) > x(Q)+x(T) = v({N}),CHAPTER 4 109
which violates the superadditivity of (N,v). So, player l can use (Q,z) as an internal
counterobjection. Next suppose xl = 0. Then there must be another player j ∈ N \ T,
j , l such that xj > 0, otherwise v(T) = y(T) > x(T) = v({N}. So, |T| = 2. Then
player k can launch an objection in the Maschler sense against player j using (T,y).
Since {N, x} ∈ M(v), player j must have a counterobjection ( ^ Q,^ z) in the Maschler
sense and as it was shown above it must be that | ^ Q| ≥ 2 and ^ Q ∩ T , ∅. If l ∈ ^ Q,
then player l can use ( ^ Q,^ z) to counterobject. If l < ^ Q, then player l can use the pair
( ˜ Q, ˜ z) with ˜ Q = ^ Q ∪ {l}, ˜ zl = 0, ˜ zi = ^ zi for all i ∈ ^ Q to counter object since since by
superadditivity v( ˜ Q) ≥ v( ^ Q).
4.3 Monotonic Proper Simple Games
First we provide some basic deﬁnitions. A coalitional game (N,v) is called simple
if v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ∈ {0,1}, otherwise. A simple game is monotonic if
v(T) = 1 whenever v(S) = 1 for some S ⊆ T. We denote the set of winning coalitions
in a simple game by W := {S ∈ 2N | v(S) = 1} and by Wm := {S ∈ 2N | v(S) =
1 and v(T) = 0 for all T   S} the set of minimal winning coalitions. A simple game
is proper if for all S,T ∈ W it holds that S ∩ T , ∅.
We can establish the following result with respect to monotonic proper simple
games.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let (N,v) be a monotonic proper simple game. Then
({N}, x) ∈ B(v) ⇐⇒ ({N}, x) ∈ M(v).
Proof. Wehavealreadyseenthatforgeneralcoalitionalgames({N}, x) ∈ B(v)implies
({N}, x) ∈ M(v). To show the converse, consider a payoﬀ conﬁguration ({N}, x) ∈
M(v). Proposition 4.2.7 gives that ({N}, x) ∈ BE(v). Next we show that ({N}, x) ∈
BI(v). In all proper simple games {N} is splitting-proof. Furthermore, every internal
objection can be countered. Let (T,y) be an internal objection of player k against
player l. Since ({N}, x) ∈ M(v), there exists a counterobjection (Q,z) in the Maschler
sense. We have to ﬁnd a counterobjection ( ˜ Q, ˜ z) in the new sense. If Q ∩ T , ∅, we
can take ( ˜ Q, ˜ z) = (Q,z). So assume Q∩T = ∅. Since ({N}, x) is individually rational,
it follows that T ∈ W. Then by properness v(Q) = 0 and zi = xi for all i ∈ Q. Hence,
there must be a player j ∈ N \ T such that xj > 0. Player k can launch an objection
against player j by (T,y) as well. Let (Q′,z′) be the counterobjection of player j in
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implies that Q′ ∪ {l} ∈ W. So we can take ˜ Q = Q′ ∪ {l} and ˜ z such that ˜ zi = z′
i for all
i ∈ Q′ and ˜ zl = xl = 0.
Note that Theorem 4.3.1 implies that the bargaining set is non-empty for all mono-
tonic proper simple games.
Next we provide a characterization of the payoﬀ conﬁgurations in the bargaining
setofaweightedmajoritygamethatcontainaminimalwinningcoalitionasacoalition
structure element . A weighted majority game (N,v) is a simple game for which there
exists a vector of weights w ∈ RN
+ and a threshold q ∈ R+ with 0 ≤ q ≤ w(N) such that
S ∈ W if and only if w(S) ≥ q. The pair (q;w) is called a representation of weighted
majority game (N,v). Let S ∈ Wm and let P ∈ P with S ∈ P. We denote the set of
members of S who can make another coalition in P winning by joining it E(S,P), i.e.,
E(S,P) = {i ∈ S | v(T ∪ {i}) = 1 for some T ∈ P \ {S}}.
Further we denote the indicator vector of a coalition S ∈ 2N by eS, i.e., eS(i) = 1 if
i ∈ S and eS(i) = 0 if i ∈ N \ S.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let (N,v) be a proper weighted majority game. Let S ∈ Wm and let
P ∈ P be a coalition structure with S ∈ P. Then
 
(P, x) | x ∈ RN 
∩ B(v) equals:
(i) {(P, x) | x ∈ RN
+, x(S) = 1, x(N \ S) = 0} if E(S,P) = ∅,
(ii) {(P,ei} if E(S,P) = {i},
(iii) ∅ if E(S,P)   S and |E(S,P)| ≥ 2,
(iv) {(P, 1
|S| eS)} if E(S,P) = S and |E(S,P)| ≥ 2.
Proof. Observe that P is robust against merging and splitting. Let (P, x) be a payoﬀ
conﬁguration in the bargaining set. It is immediate that x ∈ RN
+, x(S) = 1, and
x(N \S) = 0. Clearly, there are no internal objections. Moreover, external objections
can be made only by members of E(S,P) who are allocated less than one.
If E(S,P) = ∅, there are no further requirements for (P, x) being an element of the
bargaining set. Hence we are in case (i).
If E(S,P) = {i} and furthermore E(S,P)   S, then player i has a justiﬁed external
objection against any player in S \ E(S,P), unless xi equals 1. If E(S,P) = {i} and
E(S,P) = S, there are no external or internal objections possible. We are in case (ii).
If E(S,P)   S and |E(S,P)| ≥ 2, then there are at least two distinct players i and
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unless both i and j have payoﬀs equal to 1. Since by deﬁnition v(S) = 1, xi = xj = 1
is not feasible. This gives case (iii).
If E(S,P) = S and |E(S,P)| ≥ 2, let i ∈ S and let (T ∪ {i},y) be an objection
against another player j in S. Clearly, y(T) equals 1 − xi − ε for some ε > 0. A
counterobjection exists if 1 − xi − ε + xj ≤ 1, i.e., xj ≤ xi + ε. From this argument,
we may conclude that xi = xj for all i, j ∈ S. Hence we are in case (iv).
The following example illustrates the above result.
Example 4.3.3 Let (6;3,2,2,2,1) be a representation of a proper weighted majority
game.
There are three types of minimal winning coalitions: a coalition formed by all
players with weight 2; coalitions formed by the player with weight 3 and two play-
ers with weight 2; and coalitions formed by the player with weight 3, a player with
weight 2 and the player with weight 1. Depending on the type of the minimal winning
coalition and the coalitions formed by the players outside the minimal winning coali-
tion, we distinguish between six types of coalition structures that contain a minimal
winning coalition. We will discuss an example of each of the six types.





. Clearly, E(S 1,P1) = ∅and wearein case(i)ofTheorem
4.3.2. The payoﬀ conﬁgurations in the set {(P1, x) | x ∈ RN
+, x(S 1) = 1, x(N\S 1) = 0}
are elements of the bargaining set.
Another coalition structure that contains the same minimal winning coalition is





). Since E(S 1,P′
1) = S 1, we are in case




3,0) is in the bargaining
set: internal objections are not possible and any external objection can be countered.





. Since E(S 2,P2) = ∅, we are in case (i) of Theorem 4.3.2





. Here the set
E(S 2,P′
2) = {1}. Clearly, we are in case (ii) of Theorem 4.3.2. The payoﬀ conﬁgura-
tion (P′
2,(1,0,0,0,0,0) is in the bargaining set since internal and external objections
are not possible.





. Since E(S 3,P3) = ∅, we are in case (i) of Theorem
4.3.2.





. In this coalition structure
E(S 3,P′
3) = {1,2}. Since |E(S 3,P′
3)| = 2 and E(S 3,P′
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Theorem 4.3.2. There is no payoﬀ conﬁguration in the bargaining set pertaining to P3
since either player 1 or player 2 can have a justiﬁed external objection against player
5. ￿
The next result concerns types of stable coalition structures of any proper weighted
majority game.
Theorem 4.3.4 Let(q;w)withw1 ≥ ... ≥ wn bearepresentationofaproperweighted
majority game (N,v). Then the coalition structure {{1,2,...,k},{k + 1},
{k + 2},...,{n}} with k such that {1,2,...,k} ∈ Wm is stable.
Proof. Consider the coalition structure P = {{1,2,...,k},{k + 1},{k + 2},...,{n}}
with k such that {1,2,...,k} ∈ Wm. First, assume w1 + wk+1 < q. Then the payoﬀ
conﬁguration (P,(1,0,...,0)) is an element of the bargaining set: no player can raise
an objection. Next, assume w1 + wk+1 ≥ q. Hence, w1 + w2 ≥ q and therefore k ≤ 2.
If k = 1 or if both k = 2 and w2 + wk+1 < q, (P,(1,0,...,0)) ∈ B(v). If k = 2 and
w2 + wk+1 ≥ q, then (P,(1
2, 1
2,0,...,0)) is an element of the bargaining set. Hence P
is stable.
Theorem 4.3.4 implies that the coalition structure containing the minimal winning
coalition formed by the players with the highest weights and the rest of the players as
singletons is stable in any proper weighed majority game.
In the remainder of this section we address the question whether for any proper
weighted majority game, there is a stable coalition structure that consists of a minimal
winning coalition and its complement. The following example illustrates that this is
not true for the general class of proper weighted majority games.
Example 4.3.5 Let the following (11;4,4,2,2,2,1,1,1,1,1,1) be a representation of
a proper weighted majority game.
We provide the main arguments why coalition structures containing a minimal
winning coalition and its complement are not stable. We distinguish between minimal
winning coalitions with weight 11 and minimal winning coalitions with weight 12.
A minimal winning coalition with weight 11 always contains a player with weight
1 and at least two players with weights higher than 1. At least one of these two players
with weight higher than 1 has a justiﬁed external objection against the player with
weight 1, e.g. in the payoﬀ conﬁguration ({{1,3,4,5,6},{2,7,8,9,10}}(1,0,...,0))
player 3 has a justiﬁed objection against player 6.
A minimal winning coalition with weight 12 consists of all players with weight 4
and two players with weight 2. At least one the players with weight 4 has a justiﬁedCHAPTER 4 113
external objection against a player with weight 2. For instance, consider the payoﬀ
conﬁguration ({{1,2,3,4}, {5,6,7,8,9,10,11}},(1,0,...,0)) where player 2 has a
justiﬁed external objection against player 3. ￿
There is however a stable coalition structure containing a minimal winning coali-
tion and its complement for all proper and homogenous weighted majority games. A
proper weighted majority game (N,v) is homogeneous if there exists a representation
(q;w) such that w(S) = q for all S ∈ Wm.
Theorem 4.3.6 Let (N,v) be a proper homogeneous weighted majority game. Then
there exists a minimal winning coalition S such that the coalition structure {S,N \ S}
is stable.
Proof. Let (q;w) be a representation of (N,v). For ease of exposition all players i ∈ N
for whom wi +w(N)−q ≥ q are called strong and all others weak. Homogeneity im-
plies that strong players with a minimal winning coalition S are exactly those players
in the set E(S,{S,N \ S}).
If there are no strong players, it is easily derived that any coalition structure con-
taining a minimal winning coalition is stable.
So we may assume there are strong players. If the set of strong players is winning,
following the same line of argument as in the proof of case (iv) in Theorem 4.3.2,
there exists a minimal winning coalition S consisting of strong players only, and,
({S,N \S}, 1
S eS) ∈ B(v). If the set of strong players is losing, take a minimal winning
coalition T ∈ Wm which contains all strong players. Take any strong player i ∈ T.
Then the coalition (N \T)∪{i} is winning. This coalition contains a minimal winning
coalition S with i ∈ S. Again using the same argument as in the proof of case (ii) of
Theorem 4.3.2, one can check that ({S,N \ S},ei) ∈ B(v).
Finally, it is easy to see that there is a stable coalition structure consisting of a
minimalwinningcoalitionanditscomplementforallstrongweightedmajoritygames.
A weighted majority game (N,v) is strong if S < W implies N \ S ∈ W. Since
E(S,P) = S for all S ∈ Wm the coalition structure {S,N \S} is stable for any minimal
winning coalition S: either |S| = 1 and we are in case (ii) or |S| ≥ 2 and we are in
case (iv) of Theorem 4.3.2.
4.4 Team-buildersandFree-ridersinCoalitionalGames
We now construct a special type of coalitional games that model settings in which the
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either negative marginal contribution or positive marginal contribution that a player
carries in cooperation with others. If a player’s marginal contribution to a group value
is positive, we say that she has team-building abilities with respect to that group. Con-
versely, if a player’s contribution is negative, we say that she has a free-riding tend-
ency with respect to that group. If a player’s marginal contribution to a group value is
zero, then we say that the player exhibits neutral cooperation skills with respect to that
group. A player may be a team-builder in one group and a free-rider in another group
depending on the composition of the group. Players may not only vary in the direction
but also in the degree of her cooperation contribution. Apart from their heterogeneity
in the cooperation abilities, which becomes evident only when they are members of a
group, players are homogeneous. These ideas are captured in the characteristic func-
tion of the coalitional game given below.
Let N be the set of players. The vector ε ∈ RN
+ with 0 ≤ εi ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N is
the vector of cooperation parameters of the players. The cooperation game (N,vε) is
deﬁned by
vε(S) = |S|
¯ ε(S) − |S| with ¯ ε(S) := 1
|S|
 
i∈S εi for all S ∈ 2
N. (4.1)
The ﬁrst term captures the cooperation productivity. Note that all singletons have a
zero value, hence, players are homogeneous in their individual productivity. Consider
a coalition of more than one player. A coalition formed by players with ε > 1 has
value higher than zero, while a coalition formed by players with ε < 1 has value
lower than zero. A mixed coalition formed by players of both types may have either
higher, equal, or lower value than zero, depending on whether the players with ε > 1
outweigh, balance, or have lower impact than the one of the players with ε < 1.
Example 4.4.1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} and ε = (0.5,1,1,1.5). Then the corresponding
cooperation game (N,vε) is given by vε({1,2}) = vε({1,3}) = −0.318, vε({2,4}) =
vε({3,4}) = 0.378, vε({1,2,3}) = −0.502, vε({2,3,4}) = 0.603, and vε(S) = 0
otherwise.
The payoﬀ conﬁguration ({{1},{2,3,4}},(0,0.201,0.201,0.201)) is an element of
the bargaining set B(vε) since it does not allow for any (internal or external) objec-
tions. ￿
To facilitate the exposition below, we introduce the following additional notation.
The set of players with a cooperation parameter at least one is denoted by H := {i ∈
N | εi ≥ 1}; the set of players with a cooperation parameter lower than one is denoted
by L := {i ∈ N | εi < 1}. The vector ε is called symmetric if there are real numbers εHCHAPTER 4 115
and εL such that εi = εH for all i ∈ H and εi = εL for all i ∈ L. A cooperation game is
called symmetric if the underlying vector ε is symmetric.
Theorem 4.4.2 Let (N,vε) be a symmetric cooperation game with cooperation para-





is stable. It is the unique stable coalition structure if
additionally εH > 1 and |H| , 1.
The proof requires three auxiliary results.




Proof. The following assertion is equivalent to (4.2)
 s + t
s
 s
< (s + t)
t.























Hence, for s + t ≥ 3, (4.2) is valid.








> 0 for α ∈ (1,∞)
= 0 for α = 1
< 0 for α ∈ [0,1)
(4.3)
Proof. Let g : [1,∞) × [1,∞) −→ R be deﬁned by




The ﬁrst order derivative with respect to s, yields
g
′
s(s,t) = α(s + t)
α−1 − αs
α−1,
which is positive for α > 1, zero for α = 1 and negative for α < 1. A similar analysis
holds for the ﬁrst order derivative with respect to t. Furthermore,
g(1,1) = 2
α − 2,
which is positive for α > 1, zero for α = 1 and negative for α < 1. This completes the
proof.116 A BARGAINING SET BASED ON EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STABILITY
Lemma 4.4.5 Let i ∈ L and S ⊆ N \ {i} such that vε(S) ≥ 0. Then
vε(S ∪ {i}) ≤ vε(S) + vε({i}).
Proof. Denote ¯ ε(S) by ε. Because vε(S) ≥ 0, we have that ε ≥ 1. Deﬁne g : [1,2] −→
R by




Because εL ≤ 2−ε, we have vε(S ∪{i})−vε(S)−vε({i}) ≤ g(ε) for ε ∈ [1,2]. Hence
it suﬃces to show that g(ε) ≤ 0. If s = 1, then g(ε) = 0. If s ≥ 2, denote (s + 1)
s−1
s+1
by a. So g(ε) = (s+1)
2
s+1  aε − sε −1. Because of Lemma 4.4.3, we have that a < s.
Furthermore,
g
′(ε) = ln(a)   (s + 1)
2
s+1   a
ε − ln(s)   s
ε.
If ε = 1, this boils down to
g
′(1) = ln(a)   (s + 1)
2
s+1   a − ln(s)   s
= ln(s + 1)  
s − 1
s + 1
  (s + 1)
2
s+1   (s + 1)
s−1
s+1 − ln(s)   s
= ln(s + 1)   (s − 1) − ln(s)   s
= ln(s + 1)
(s−1) − ln s
s,
which is negative because of Lemma 4.4.3. Suppose ε is such that g′(ε) < 0. Then
g
′′(ε) = ln
2(a)   (s + 1)
2
s+1   a
ε − ln
2(s)   s
ε
< ln(s)   ln(a)   (s + 1)
2
s+1   a
ε − ln
2(s)   s
ε
= ln(s)   g
′(ε)
< 0.
Summarizing we ﬁnd g′(1) < 0 and g′′(ε) < 0 for all ε ∈ [1,2] with g′(ε) < 0. This
implies that g′(ε) < 0 for all ε ∈ [1,2]. Since g(1) = 0, this completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.2. Let εH + εL ≤ 2. Consider the payoﬀ conﬁguration
({H, L }, x) with x ∈ RN given by x :=
v(H)
|H| eH. We show that ({H, L }, x) ∈ B(vε).6
First, we show that there are no internal objections. Obviously, there are no internal
objections in {i} for all i ∈ L. Suppose there is an internal objection of player k ∈ H
against player l ∈ H using coalition T ⊆ H \ {l} with k ∈ T. Then |T| ≥ 2, since
6There are other payoﬀ vectors pertaining to the coalition structure {{H}, L } that lead to a payoﬀ
conﬁguration in our bargaining set, e.g., each element of the Core of the H-restricted game and a zero
payoﬀ to all players in L.CHAPTER 4 117
vε({k}) = 0. Player l can use coalition Q = (T \{k})∪{l} to counterobject since vε(T)
and vε(Q) coincide.
Next, we show that H is splitting-proof and  L  is merging-proof. For the re-
mainder of the proof we denote the cardinalities of the coalitions called S and T by s
and t, respectively. First, consider S, T ⊆ H such that S ∩ T = ∅ and S ∪ T = H.
Then
vε(H) − vε(S) − vε(T) = (s + t)
εH − s − t − (s
εH + t
εH − s − t) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from εH ≥ 1 and Lemma 4.4.4.
Next, consider i, j ∈ L. Then
vε({i, j}) − vε({i}) − vε({j}) = (2)
εL − 2 < 0,
where the last inequality follows from εL < 1.
In order for {H, L } to be merging-proof, vε(H∪{i}) ≤ vε(H)+v({i}) for all i ∈ L.
This is the case because of lemma 4.4.5.
Finally, we show that there are no external objections by players in H. Since
vε({i, j}) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ H and j ∈ L, no player with εH can launch an external
objection.
In order to show the part of the proposition concerning uniqueness, we need to
prove that no coalition structure but {H, L } is stable under the additional conditions
εH > 1 and |H| ≥ 2. Let (P′, x) be an individually rational payoﬀ conﬁguration of
(N,v).
Firstly, if there are coalitions S,T ∈ P′ with S,T ⊂ H and S , T, then P′ is not
merging-proof with respect to these coalitions: Lemma 4.4.4 gives




Next, suppose there is a player i ∈ L and a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N \ {i} such
that S ∪ {i} ∈ P′. Because x is individually rational, vε(S ∪ {i}) ≥ 0 and hence,
vε(S) ≥ 0 as well. Moreover, lemma 4.4.5 gives vε(S ∪ {i}) ≤ vε(S) + vε({i}). For
S ∪ {i} to be splitting proof, we need an equality. This is only the case when s = 1
and εH = 2 − εL. So let us focus on this case. Let S = {j}, and εj = εH = 2 − εL.
We have vε(S ∪ {i}) = 0, so xi = xj = 0 as well. Since |H| ≥ 2, there must be another
coalition T ∈ P′ with T ∩ H , ∅. Player j has a justiﬁed external objection using
coalition T ∪ {j} against player i, since
vε(T ∪ {j}) − vε(T) = (t + 1)
t¯ ε(T)+εH
t+1 − t
¯ ε(T) − 1 > 0.118 A BARGAINING SET BASED ON EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL STABILITY
The inequality follows from 1 ≤ ε(T) ≤ εH and Lemma 4.4.4. So, P′ is not stable. ￿
Lemma 4.4.5 and the proof of Theorem 4.4.2 show that in a symmetric cooper-
ation game (N,vε) with εH + εL ≤ 2 and εH > 1, all players in H have positive
marginal contribution with respect to any coalition with a nonnegative value, except
for singleton coalitions consisting of a member of L. All players in L have negative
marginal contribution with respect to any coalition.




and x ∈ RN given
by x :=
v(H)
|H| eH of the coalitional game (N,v) is also an element of the Maschler and
Zhou bargaining sets. To see that (P, x) ∈ M(vε) recall that all objections in terms of
our bargaining set are also possible in terms of the Maschler bargaining set and that
it is more diﬃcult to counter an objection in our bargaining set than in the Maschler
setting. There are other types of objections that are possible in terms of the Maschler
bargaining set, which are not possible in terms of our bargaining set: a team-building
player k can launch an objection against another team-building player l with respect
to (P, x) using a coalition T with k ∈ T which contains more than one free-riding
player and more than one team-building player. Such an objection can be countered
by player l using coalition Q = T \ {k} ∪ {l} since v(T) and v(Q) coincide.
To see that (P, x) ∈ Z(vε) note that coalitions composed by the same number
of free-riding players and team-building players have equal values. Hence any Z-
objection (T,y) can be countered unless T = {i} for any i ∈ N, T = {N}, T = {L}, or
T = {H}. Since the payoﬀ conﬁguration (P, x) is individually rational T cannot be a
singleton. Since v({N}) ≤ v({H}) as it can be deduced from the Proof of Proposition
4.4.2, T cannot be the grand coalition. Similarly, Z-objection by means of the coali-
tion {L} is not possible. Since {H} ∈ P, Z-objection by means of the coalition {H} is
not possible.
Next we will discuss the necessity of the various conditions provided in Theorem
4.4.2 for the stability of the coalition structure {H, L }. The ﬁrst example shows that
when the cooperation game is not symmetric, {H, L } may not be stable.
Example 4.4.6 Let N = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, ε = (1.1,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2,2)
and ˜ H := {i ∈ N | εi = 2}. The value function can be calculated using Equation
(4.1). Here we give just some of the values. vε({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N; vε(N) = 71.283,
vε( ˜ H) = 72. Note that H = N. The coalition structure {N} is not stable since it is not
splitting-proof. ￿
The next example illustrates the necessity of the condition that εH + εL ≤ 2.CHAPTER 4 119
Example 4.4.7 Let N = {1,2,3}, and ε = (0.9,0.9,1.9). The value function is calcu-
lated using Equation (4.1) which yields vε({1,2}) = −0.134, vε({1,3}) = vε({2,3}) =
0.639, vε({1,2,3}) = 0.876andvε(S) = 0, otherwise. Thecoalitionstructure{{1},{2},
{3}} is not stable since it is not merging proof. ￿
The next example shows that the condition εH > 1 is necessary to obtain unique-
ness.
Example 4.4.8 Let N = {1,2} and ε = (1,1). So, v(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N.
Both coalition structures {N} and {{1},{2}} are stable since ({N},(0,0)) ∈ B(vε) and
({{1},{2}},(0,0)) ∈ B(vε). ￿
In addition, to guarantee uniqueness in Theorem 4.4.2, it is required that |H| , 1.
The next example illustrates the necessity of this condition.
Example 4.4.9 Let N = {1,2} and ε = (0.9,1.1). Using equation (4.1), we obtain
vε(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N. Both coalition structures {N} and {{1},{2}} are stable since




Governance in relation to Socioeconomic Development:
Evidence from around the World∗
5.1 Introduction
By the beginning of the nineties “governance” took a permanent place in the reports of
policy makers. At the European Union level “eﬀective implementation” of EU rules
was declared to be one of the most important criteria for accession by the General
Aﬀairs Council in December 2000. A country has ‘eﬀective implementation capa-
city’, according to Nicolaides (2001), if it has institutions which have the necessary
resources and legal discretion and which act and adjust under the proper incentives.1
At the World Bank (WB) the decision of aid allocation to developing countries is also
based on the governance quality of the applicants.
One may ask what justiﬁes the central place of “governance” in the political lex-
icon. To answer this question in the beginning of the 1990’s the WB launched a project
with the goal to make a rigorous and testable theory about “how governance aﬀects the
socioeconomic and economic development.” A part of the project is the compilation
of a governance indices database for a large sample of countries, which now allow
the researchers to embark on empirical investigations of the eﬀects of governance on
the actual economy. One such investigation by (Kaufmann and Kray 2003) shows
that governance has a positive causal eﬀect on aggregate income growth. In the cur-
rent work, the impact of governance on socioeconomic development measured by life
expectancy is studied.
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on Lazarova and Mosca (2006).
1See Nicolaides (2001) for broader discussion of the link between eﬀective implementation capacity
and governance.
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the data and the empirical results we review
the conceptual understanding of governance and suggest paths via which it aﬀects so-
cioeconomic development. Governance is a concept that emerged in the development
literature around the late 1980s. The ﬁrst classical political science essays discussed
the topic of “governability,” which made the rule of law the core of development. With
the end of the Cold War, “governability” was then substituted by the concept of gov-
ernance, deﬁned as redesigning or reinventing public administration to meet the new
challenges, and be able to deal with them, in the era of globalization.
The concept of governance has gained momentum and a wider meaning over the
years. Various international organizations have given diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the term.
In particular, the WB, whose data of governance is used in this work, understands
‘by governance ‘[...] the manner in which power is exercised in the management of
a country’s economic and social resources for development" (WB (1992)). The WB
deﬁnition clearly diﬀerentiates a political from an economic dimension.
The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) deﬁnition of governance
goes beyond the idea of the state and takes into consideration the private sector that
creates jobs and income, which make the economy work, and the civil society that fa-
cilitates political and social interactions, mobilizing groups to participate in economic,
political and social arenas. Similar to the WB’s view the state has again the role to cre-
ate a conducive political and legal environment. Good governance is achieved when
the three parts reach a constructive interaction (UNDP (1997)).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) takes the concept of governance a step
further by adding a new focus on enabled participation, and equitable and sustainable
outcomes in diﬀerent sectors (WHO (1998)).
Governance is thus a complex notion of a country’s eﬀective organization and one
would expect that the style of governance has far reaching consequences in many areas
of human life. For instance Das Gupta (1999) argues that governance that fosters local
accountability and social mobility may also inﬂuence fertility rates while Kaufmann
and Kray (2003) have shown that it inﬂuences income growth.
The legacy of using variables such as life expectancy as an indicator of socioeco-
nomic development is established in the works of Amartya Sen.2 Indeed the groups of
the elderly and of the youngest members of a society are some of the most vulnerable
of the social groups and as such they are dependent on facilitated access to resources.
That is why their health capital, measured as life expectancy and infant mortality rate,
respectively, are indicative to both the economic and the socio-ethical development of
2Among others see Sen (1981), Sen (1987).CHAPTER 5 125
a society.
One would expect to see broad diﬀerentials of life expectancy of rich and poor
countries mainly due to the scarcity of resources in the latter. Even taking into account
these scarcities though there remain diﬀerentials between the two groups as well as
within these groups which remain unexplained.
There are a number of branches in the literature aiming at explaining these dif-
ferentials.3 A large volume of empirical literature started with the seminal work of
Rodgers (1979), investigating the eﬀect of absolute and relative income on aggregate
health.4 Some recent work based on cross-country regressions that ﬁnd support for the
relation between absolute income and health is van Doorslaer, Wagstaﬀ et al. (1997);
while Kennelly, O’Shea and Earvey (2003), Kennedy, Kawachi and Prothrow-Smith
(1996), and Chiang (1999) ﬁnd support for the causal eﬀect of income inequality on
health. A much studied theory in this branch of the literature is the epidemiological
transition theory established by Wilkinson (1996). The theory predicts the existence
of an absolute income threshold below which only absolute income and above which
only relative income matters for a nation’s aggregate health capital5. However, this
theory faces some criticism with respect to its empirical veriﬁcation. In a recent work
Gravelle, Wildman and Sutton (2002) argue that if the relation between individual
health and income is non-linear one should not use aggregate data to test for a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect of the income distribution on the aggregate health capital, e.g. life
expectancy. The essence of the aggregation problem is that if at the individual level
the relation between personal income and health is not linear but concave, then one
might ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of aggregate relative income on aggregate aver-
age level of health, while such an eﬀect does not exist. Gravelle et al. (2002) support
their conclusion with empirical evidence.
In our work we use Rodgers (1979) regression model as a point of departure. How-
ever, we suggest an alternative speciﬁcation in which relative income is substituted for
a governance index. In such a way we also take into account the critique of Gravelle
et al. (2002). Our main hypothesis is that the way a state formulates regulations has
a direct impact on a country’s socioeconomic development. It is a matter of good
governance if public funds reach the needy and essential drugs, eﬀective clinical and
medicalservicesareprovided. Badgovernance, ontheotherhand, killsviacorruption,
bad management of people and institutions, and neglect.
3A considerable part of the literature contributes these diﬀerentials to some diﬀerences in eating
habits and to the propensity of people to have an active social life. Here we only refer to those branches
of the literature to which this work is more closely related.
4In this literature aggregate health is measured as life expectancy and infant mortality rate.
5Life expectancy is treated as a measure of a country’s aggregate health in this theory.126 GOVERNANCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STABILITY
As such our work is closely related to the branch of the literature that associates
the diﬀerentials in socioeconomic development with diﬀerences in the economic and
political freedom of a country. Economic freedom is considered to be the freedom of
personal choice, the protection of private rights, and the freedom of exchange while
political freedom is considered to be a democratic political system.
In an overview of the social choice theories relating political systems to economic
development6, Sirowy and Inkeles (1990), identify three major empirical predictions
on the eﬀect of political freedom on economic development: positive, if political free-
dom is believed to facilitate growth by allowing private parties to make the best choice
in their own interest; negative, if political freedom is believed to facilitate the form-
ation of special interest groups allowing those to divert funds to suboptimal ends;
neutral, which is based on the argument that the notion of a political freedom is too
broad to be related to economic growth in a systematic way. The empirical evidence
as summarized in Esposto and Zaleski (1999) seems to support the third view.
Economic freedom, according to Esposto and Zaleski (1999), has a clear-cut posit-
ive predicted eﬀect on socioeconomic development since it guarantees the channelling
of funds to their most productive ends. Since political liberties, though important, do
not have a clear-cut prediction, they should be separated from the channel running
through the economic institutions, argue these author. Indeed, their empirical ﬁndings
are of a positive eﬀect running from an economic freedom index to quality of life
measured in terms of life expectancy.
Socioeconomic development is arguably aﬀected not only by economic mechan-
isms but also by social mechanisms. The governance index employed in the current
work is based on the eﬀectiveness of the social and economic mechanisms rather than
on their mere presence. As such, this index overcomes the problems of other social
and political indices as described by Esposto and Zaleski (1999), and, we believe, it
has a clear cur positive predicted eﬀect on socioeconomic development. We also test
the validity of the epidemiological threshold theory in our sample, and, in addition we
oﬀer an alternative conjecture based on the governance diﬀerentials.
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following way. In Section 5.2 the data
and the regression model are presented. In Section 5.3 the regression results are dis-
cussed.
6Here the term economic development is meant to capture both monetary growth as well as so-
cioeconomic development. In this literature often the authors study quality of life rather than socioeco-
nomic development. In practice, they use life expectancy among the indices of quality of life.CHAPTER 5 127
5.2 Data and Empirical Model
Data on four data series has been collected. Life expectancy (LE) measures the av-
erage life expectancy at birth in a country. Absolute income per capita of a country
is measured by the Gross Domestic Product per capita measured at purchasing power
parity (PPP), expressed in constant international dollars (GDP). Relative income is
measure by the Gini index of income inequality (GINI). The data on governance (Gov)
is composed by four separate governance indices discussed below. The database con-
sists of 116 countries of which 112 have data on governance.7 The years covered are
1996, 1998 and 2000. The choice of this time period is due to the governance data
availability. Data were obtained by several sources, as reported in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Data Sources
Series Source
LE US Census International database
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbsprd.html
GDP World Bank Development Indicators 2005
GINI World Bank Development Indicators 2003 and some country statistics
Gov World Bank Institute
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/index.html
The governance indicator that we use is a multidimensional concept. The WB
deﬁnes six exclusive components of it, however, we use only four of them in our
analysis as political stability and voice and accountability have misleading interpreta-
tion. A broad discussion of the governance indices can be found Kaufmann, Kray and
7The countries in the sample are Algeria, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bel-
gium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong China, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic
Rep., Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Kyrgyz Republic, Lao
PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia,
Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philip-
pines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Lucia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela RB,
Vietnam, Yemen Rep., Zambia, and Zimbabwe. There are four countries for which there is not data on
governance, these are Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritania, and St. Lucia.128 GOVERNANCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STABILITY
Zoido-Lobatón (2003). We give a short summary for the indices that are used here in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: The WB Governance Indices
Index Deﬁnition
Government Eﬀectiveness (GE) looks at the ability of the government to implement
socially sound policies, i.e. the level and quality of
publicserviceprovisionandthesmoothfunctioning
of the bureaucracy;
Regulatory Quality (RQ) evaluates the policies themselves: whether they are
facilitating or burdening social interactions and/or
transactions;
Rule of Law (RL) measuring the eﬃciencyof the judiciary systemand
the enforcement of contracts;
Control of Corruption (CC) self-explanatory; encompasses corruption initiated
from both sides, e.g. the giver and the taker.
Since the four governance indices exhibit high correlation (see Table 5.3), they
cannot be used simultaneously in the regression analysis. Instead we construct a com-
posite governance index (GOV) equal to the average of the four separate governance
indicators. The numbers in the correlation matrix show that life expectancy is cor-
related the most with the rule of law and out of the variables that will be used in the
regression analysis with the composite governance index. Life expectancy is correl-
ated the least with the relative income. Governance and the absolute income exhibit
high correlation. Since in the regression model the reciprocal transformation of ab-
solute income will be used, this is not an indication of a multicollinearity problem.
The composite governance index may vary in the range from -2.5 to 2.5 where a
higher number stands for better quality. In our sample it varies between -1.56 and 2.25
as shown in Table 5.4. The country with the lowest governance index in the sample
is Turkmenistan and the one with the highest is Singapore. Japan has the highest life
expectancy while Lesotho the lowest. Malawi has the lowest life expectancy, 40.05,
in the sample of countries which have data on governance. Luxemburg has the highest
absolute income and Guatemala the lowest. Belarus is the country with the most equal
distribution of income while Brazil has the highest Gini index.CHAPTER 5 129
Table 5.3: Correlation Matrix
Variable LE GDP GINI GOV GE RQ RL CC
LE 1.000
GDP 0.657 1.000
GINI -0.318 -0.377 1.000
GOV 0.659 0.863 -0.234 1.000
GE 0.643 0.865 -0.262 0.973 1.000
RQ 0.555 0.642 -0.034 0.877 0.780 1.000
RL 0.684 0.867 -0.290 0.977 0.948 0.799 1.000
CC 0.610 0.882 -0.290 0.955 0.932 0.728 0.946 1.000
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
LE 137 65.966 10.512 39.51 80.21
GDP 137 7,827.478 8,652.766 386.39 44527
GINI 137 39.023 9.155 21.7 60.66
GOV 133 0.059 0.886 -1.56 2.25
For our estimations we use the ordinary least squares (OLS) model with robust
standard errors. Since for most of the countries in the sample, GINI data is available
only for one year, we cannot conduct panel analysis.
Our main hypothesis is that governance has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on aggreg-
ate health capital. Moreover, governance is a better predictor of life expectancy of a
country than relative income. The basic Rodgers’ (1979) model is given in Equation
(5.1) and the alternative model is given in Equation (5.2).







+ β3GINIit + ǫit (5.1)







+ β3GOVit + ǫit (5.2)
where i stands for the country and t for the year, GDP, GINI, and GOV are deﬁned
above, and ǫ is the error term. To test which model ﬁts the data better we use the J-test
foralinearnon-nestedhypothesisﬁrstsuggestedbyDavidsonandMacKinnon(1981).
We evaluate the statistical performance of the regression using the score (Lagrange
multiplier) test against multiplicative heteroskedasticity, which is also interpreted as a
test of omitted variable bias or non-linear functional form. (Breusch and Pagan 1979),
(Cook and Weisberg 1983)130 GOVERNANCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STABILITY
5.3 Estimation Results and Discussion
The regression results are given in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Regression Results: GINI vs Governance
[A] [B] [C]
Expl. Variable OLS(robust) OLS(robust) OLS(robust)
-38,641.41 -31,596 -31,847.55 1
GDP (−14.39)⋆ (−6.47)⋆ (−6.57)⋆
1.30 × 107 9.89×106 9.80×106
1




( 1.93)⋆⋆⋆ ( 2.12)⋆⋆
81.309 78.355 75.591 Constant
(37.38)⋆ ( 31.17 )⋆ ( 55.91)⋆
N 137 133 133
Adj R2 0.708 0.749 0.747
Het. Test 7.95⋆ 18.81⋆ 22.65⋆
t-statistics in parentheses;
⋆ means signiﬁcance at 99 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 95 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 90 percent conﬁdence level.
Column [A] shows the regression results of the standard Rodgers’ (1979) model.
The coeﬃcients have the predicted sign and they are all signiﬁcant at the 95 percent
conﬁdence level. In column [B] GOV is included in the standard model. The overall
explanatory power of the model increases with 4.1 percent compared to column [A].
It is notable that the statistical signiﬁcance of GINI in the model is zero, while GOV
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 90 percent conﬁdence level, which provides some
evidence in favour of our hypothesis. In column [C] we present the regression results
of the alternative model given in Equation (5.2). There GOV is signiﬁcant at the 95
percent conﬁdence level.
Next we perform J test for non-nested hypothesis. First we consider
H0 : Equation(5.1) is the valid model H1 : Equation(5.2) is the valid model.
The test statistics has the form
^ γ
se(^ γ) where ^ γ is the OLS estimate of the parameter γ inCHAPTER 5 131
the following regression model:







+ β3GINIit + γ^ yit + ǫit,
where ^ yit are the predicted values of LEit from estimating Equation ( 5.2). The test
statistics has a standard normal distribution. Using our sample, the value of the test
statistics is 1.93 so we can reject the null hypothesis at the 90 percent conﬁdence level.
Similarly, we test the hypotheses
H0 : Equation(5.2) is the valid model H1 : Equation(5.1) is the valid model.
In this case we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model (5.2) is the one better
ﬁtting the data (the J-statistics is 1.48).
Table 5.6: Regression Results: Threshold Eﬀects
[Threshold: GDP]a [Threshold: GOV]b
Expl. Variable [LIC] [HIC] [LGC] [HGC]
-40,226.57 -67,664.62 -32,771.64 -18,231.6 1
GDP (-10.30)⋆ ( -1.08) ( -7.53)⋆ (-1.07)
1.30×107 4.14×108 1.02×7 4.21×106
1
GDP2 ( 8.14)⋆ ( 2.21)⋆⋆ (4.87)⋆ (0.19)
-0.216 5.726 0.243 3.240 GOV
(-0.12 ) (1.84 )⋆⋆⋆ (0.11 ) (3.09 )⋆
78.645 70.750 74.920 73.068 Constant
(45.40)⋆ (9.79)⋆ ( 39.34 )⋆ ( 30.46 )⋆
N 70 63 77 56
Adj. R2 0.642 0.561 0.556 0.623
Het. Test 8.67⋆ 43.87⋆ 0.14 3.44⋆⋆⋆
a LIC and HIC are estimated using OLS(robust).
b LGC is estimated using OLS and HGC using OLS(robust).
t-statistics in parentheses;
⋆ means signiﬁcance at 99 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 95 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 90 percent conﬁdence level.
We also investigate the existence of a threshold eﬀect in terms of both absolute
income and quality of governance. These results are presented in Table 5.6. In the ﬁrst
two columns the estimate of the model with a threshold of absolute income of 5,000
PPP international dollars per capita are presented.8 According to the epidemiological
8The same level of absolute income (5,000 PPP dollars per capita) is used by Gravelle et al. (2002)
to investigate an absolute income threshold eﬀect.132 GOVERNANCE AND SOCIOECONOMIC STABILITY
transition theory established, we test the hypothesis that for countries with income
below this threshold only absolute income will matter, while for countries above the
threshold only governance will matter for life expectancy.9 We ﬁnd some evidence in
support of this hypothesis. In the regression results for the low-income countries (LIC)
group, absolute income is signiﬁcant at the 99 percent conﬁdence level, while GOV
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Conversely, in the high-income countries (HIC) group
GOV is signiﬁcant at the 90 percent conﬁdence level and only the second regressor
based on absolute income is signiﬁcant at the 95 percent conﬁdence level.
In the last two columns the estimates of the model including a threshold based
on the governance index equal to zero are presented. There are clear diﬀerences in
the regression results between the two groups. In the low-governance-countries group
(LGC), only absolute income is statistically signiﬁcant at the 99 percent conﬁdence
level, while in the high-governance-countries group, (HGC) only governance is signi-
ﬁcant at the 99 percent conﬁdence level.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the favored speciﬁcation of the econometric
model investigating the determinants of life expectancy includes the governance in-
dex rather than the Gini index. Moreover, governance matters for a country’s so-
cioeconomic development when a certain level of wealth has been reached; prior to
this threshold, absolute income is the main driving factor of improving life expect-
ancy. The evidence for a threshold eﬀect is statistically stronger when the sample is
split on the basis of the level of governance. The ﬁndings reinforce the need to study
better the paths via which governance impacts socioeconomic activities as well as the
way improvements in the governance quality can be achieved.
9We also expect that the intercept is signiﬁcant in all models. This is conﬁrmed by the regression
results: the constant term is signiﬁcant at the 99 percent conﬁdence level.CHAPTER
SIX
Effectiveness of Treatment based on H2 Blockers vs
Proton Pump Inhibitors: An Empirical Study using
Administrative Data ∗
6.1 Introduction
There is a notable increase in the burden of chronic type of illness relative to acute
disease throughout the world.1 Davis, Wagner and Groves (1999) claim that people
in most countries are suﬀering of non-communicable diseases, which are chronic.
Some statistics show that an estimated 691 million of the world population suﬀers
from high blood pressure, 29 million people suﬀers from dementia, 165 million are
aﬀected by rheumatoid arthritis, and the number of diabetics will reach 300 million
people by 2025. Some of these diseases have an initial acute form, which, if untreated
properly, transforms into a chronic problem. An important question, thus, is whether
the medical system functions in a way that is able to prevent the worsening of the
condition of a patient from acute to chronic.
Among these chronic diseases we should also count stomach-related troubles such
as peptic acid diseases, which might develop into gastric (or, stomach) cancer – the
secondmostcommoncancerintheworld2–GastroesophagealReﬂuxDisease(GERD),
heartburn that represents the core symptom of GERD, and gastropathy.3 Figure 6.1
∗This chapter is based to a great extent on a joint work with Ilaria Mosca and fruitful discussions
with Arthur van Soest and Gema Zamarro.
1It is important to stress the diﬀerence between acute and chronic disease. With acute disease, the
treatment aims at return to normal. With chronic disease, the patient’s life is irreversibly changed,
because neither the disease nor its consequences are static.
2Note that the ﬁrst major cause of death is the circulatory system illnesses, and the second is cancer.
3GERD is also known as Acid Reﬂux Disease and describes the condition of backﬂow of stomach
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Source: OECD Health Data 2005
represents the rate of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants due to digestive system illnesses
in a number of OECD countries. Heartburn aﬀects 25 percent of the adult population
on a monthly basis while 5 percent suﬀer from it on a daily basis, according to the
statistics provided by van Pinxteren et al. (2004). Some studies indicate that up to 44
percent of apparently healthy subjects experience heartburn at least once per month,
e.g., see Sridhar et al. (1996).
Othertypes ofpeptic acid diseasesare peptic ulcers that develop due to an H.Pylori
infection4, andNon-SteroidalAnti-InﬂammatoryDrugs(NSAID)-inducedgastropathy.
Inﬂammation in the stomach (gastritis) as well as ulceration of the stomach or duo-
denum (peptic ulcer disease) is the result of an infection of the stomach caused by the
bacterium H.Pylori, which is present in about 50 percent of all humans. In countries
with high socio-economic standards of living the H.Pylori infection is considerably
less common than in developing countries where virtually everyone may be infected.
An antibiotic cure eradicates the bacteria in 90 percent of the cases; however, an in-
discriminate use may also lead to severe problems with bacterial resistance against
these important drugs. NSAID include drugs with analgesic, antipyretic, and anti-
acid into the esophagus, which frequently happens when the lower esophageal sphincter relaxes more
often than it should and/or at inappropriate times.
4The discovery of the bacteria H.Pylori dates back to 1982 and is due to Robin Warren and Barry
Marshall who won the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 2005.CHAPTER 6 135



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inﬂammatory eﬀects to reduce pain, fever, and inﬂammation.5
All these diseases are treated with acid-suppressing medicaments, such as proton
pump inhibitors (PPI), and H2-blockers (H2B) with a diﬀerent success. Depending
on the particular case, GERD can be completely cured, though relapses may occur.
An early stage of H. pylori infection can also be cured. In the case of suspicion of
the development of NSAID-induced gastropathy, an acid-suppressing drug may be
prescribed preventively. If neglected, these diseases may lead to stomach ulcer and
stomach cancer.
There is a growing and emerging literature that has summarized, quantiﬁed, and
compared the eﬃcacy of these medicaments, e.g., van Pinxteren et al. (2004), Briggs
et al. (2002), Vanderhoﬀ and Tahbour (2002), Jones and Bytzer (2001), and Sridhar
et al. (1996). The main results of all meta-analysis studies based on clinical research
point into the direction of the superiority of PPI to H2B in the treatments of GERD,
peptic ulcers, and NSAID-induced gastropathy.6 Table 6.1 brieﬂy summarizes the
main clinical characteristics of PPI and H2B emerging from these studies.
In practice, there are two common therapeutic protocols: step-up therapy and step-
5The most known example of NSAID is the aspirin.
6Studies measuring the superiority of PPI to H2B show that a 20 mg/day dosage of PPI gives a
healing rate from GERD of 56 and 75 percent for grade I disease at 4 and 8 weeks respectively. Healing
for grade IV disease is 51 percent at 4 weeks and 71 percent at 8 weeks. With higher doses (40 mg/day)
the healing rate increases for the lower grades of the disease to 74 percent at 4 weeks and 81 percent at
8 weeks according to Sridhar et al. (1996). The same authors claim that a 300 mg treatment with H2B
has a healing rate between 8 and 19 percent at 6 weeks for grade III and IV disease and between 53 and
69 percent at 12 weeks for grade I disease.136 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
Figure 6.2: Expenditure on Pharmaceuticals as a Percentage of Total Health Expendit-
ure, 2002
















Source: OECD Health Data 2005
public private
down therapy. The step-up therapy starts with standard dosages of H2B for symptom
control, and if the symptoms worsen, PPI is prescribed. The step-down therapy starts
with a full dose PPI therapy, and subsequently the dosage of PPI is decreased or H2B
is prescribed for symptom control.
Evidently, despite the clinical superiority of PPI to H2B type of drugs, H2B type
of drugs are being prescribed together with PPI by General Practitioners (GP). One
reason for this is that the per-unit price of H2B’s is much lower than the per unit price
of PPI’s. Indeed, given the fact that most developed countries have a relatively high
quota of GDP spent on health care, as shown in Figure 6.2, controlling the spending
on pharmaceutical drugs has been seen as a priority.
This is also the case in the Netherlands, where GP’s are advised to follow the step-
up therapy. In particular, the Dutch College of General Practitioners (NHG), (Neder-
lands Huisartsen Genootschap), provides the following guidelines for treatment of
patients who have stomach related complaints (see Figure 6.3). According to them, a
patient who comes for the ﬁrst time with stomach related complaints should be pre-
scribed H2B’s, provided that the initial symptoms are not alarming, and, if the com-
plaints persist, the physician should consider prescribing PPI type of medicaments.
The question that we ask is, is this practice cost-eﬀective? Indeed, there might beCHAPTER 6 137



















patients, who delay their visits to the GP until their illness has considerably advanced.7
Such patients should be treated with the more eﬀective PPI type of medication to
reduce the chance of transition from a state of acute to chronic disease, while the GP
might prescribe H2B’s on the basis of ﬁrst-time occurrence. Hence, in analyzing this
question it should be taken into account not only the immediate costs of the drugs,
but also the downstream cuts savings from using the more eﬀective drug. What is
also important to attest are the indirect costs borne by patients, which result from
lost production caused by morbidity or mortality, and intangible costs– such as the
decrease in the quality of life – that are very problematic to measure, and, therefore,
to include in an economic evaluation study.
There are several studies which aim at analyzing the cost-eﬀectiveness of altern-
ative therapies based on H2B and PPI. For instance, Vanderhoﬀ and Tahbour (2002)
and Sridhar et al. (1996) argue that PPI’s are more cost-eﬀective when compared with
H2B’s. In their recommendations, they claim that although H2B’s are less expens-
ive than PPI’s, the latter provide superior acid suppression, healing rates, and symp-
tom relief. Therefore, PPI’s could be more cost-eﬀective especially for those patients
7The demand for health care might be distorted due to the imperfect knowledge of the patient of her
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suﬀering from severe acid-peptic disorders, because of their lower and less frequent
dosages and the comparatively shorter duration of the required therapy.
The conclusions of the above studies are based on results of clinical experiments
in which there is perfect knowledge about the condition and the diagnosis of the pa-
tient. In practice, however, the precise diagnosis might be unknown to the GP when
prescribing the drugs. In our study, we use administrative data in order to address the
cost-eﬀectiveness issue of using alternative therapies as used by the medical practi-
tioners. Our point of analysis is the medical practice rather than the clinical eﬀective-
ness of the two types of medicaments. The data are provided by the Dutch insurance
company, the CZ Insurance Group (CZ). The Netherlands is an interesting case to
study, because it is a country where the GPs prescribe both types of acid-suppressing
drugs, and receive diﬀerent incentives by the insurance companies to control spending
on pharmaceuticals.8,9 The advantages of using administrative data, rather than sur-
vey data is that we have a relatively good measure of the amount of medication that
a patient has bought, and the time intervals in which medication treatment has taken
place. However, we lack important information on the diagnosis for which the patient
is being treated. Thus, the main econometric challenge is to isolate the eﬀect of the
eﬀectiveness of the drug therapy from the eﬀect of the severity of the case, given that
PPI’s are in practice prescribed to “more severe cases”. Since we have two types of
medicinal treatment information: what kind of drugs the patient has been prescribed
and the amount of each type of drugs she has been prescribed over the course of tie,
we expect that one of the two variables will pick up the severity eﬀect, while the
other the eﬀectiveness eﬀect. The econometric models that we employ are a binary
choice model and a duration analysis model. In the binary choice model we analyse
the probability that a patient enters hospital conditioning on her medicinal treatment
history and some socioeconomic variables. The estimates of this model indicate that
for individuals with low consumption of medicaments, the H2B’s are indeed the more
cost eﬀective drugs, while for individuals with high consumption the PPI’s are more
costs eﬀective. The binary choice model is restrictive because it does not take into
account the time dimension of the treatment. In our sample we observe patients who
take medication for years and others who just start taking medication at the end of
the observation period. To take this into account we also use duration model in which
we are able to model the heterogeneous treatment time among the individuals in the
8For example, to contain costs, the insurance company, that provided us with the data gives bonuses
to GPs who incur lower spending on pharmaceuticals.
9In the Dutch Health System the GP has the role of a gate-keeper. Hence, a patient cannot visit a
specialist without being referred by a GP.CHAPTER 6 139
sample. The point of analysis in the duration model in contrast to the binary choice
model is the time period between the date when an individual starts taking medication
and the date when she enters hospital. The estimates of the duration model indicate
that taking relatively more PPI type of medication, indeed, reduces the hazard rate for
entering the hospital, all else equal. Thus, conﬁrming that therapeutic treatment based
relatively more on PPI is more eﬀective.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 we describe
our data set. In Section 6.3 we present the Logit and the Cox Proportional Hazard
models and discuss the econometric results. In section 6.4 we summarize the main
ﬁnding and discuss the limitations of the dataset.
6.2 Data
Our data set is compiled using the administrative database of the Dutch insurance
group CZ for the period 2000–2005. The sample contains information about people
who have been insured by the CZ in this period. The data set is based on four types
of databases: insurance invoices, hospital invoices, a policy holder register, and a re-
gister containing the social codes of some policy holders. Using the pharmaceutical
invoices we identify the sample of people insured by the CZ who purchased an acid-
suppressing drug using their insurance policy in the period January 2000-December
2004.10 These are 310,337 individuals, about whom we have information on the type
of acid-suppressing drug (PPI versus H2B), the amount of pills, the total amount paid
by the CZ, and the date of the purchase. However, due to recording mistakes, for
some of these individuals, the quantity of either number of pills or amount reimbursed
is equal to 0, we drop these observations from the data set (39,937 patients). Using
a unique policy holder identiﬁer, we link the pharmaceutical invoices to the hospital
invoices and we identify the sub-group of people who were hospitalized for an illness
related to the digestive system.11 We keep in our database only patients about whom
we have some information about the pharmaceutical treatment before hospitalization.
This reduces the number of individuals in our data set to 265,862 out of whom 626
have been hospitalized. From the hospital invoices we derive information on the total
cost of hospitalization, and the date of entering the hospital. Person-speciﬁc character-
istics are collected using the CZ policy holders register. These characteristics include
10We do not have information on the purchases of acid-suppressing drugs such as over-the-counter
H2 blocker type of drugs that have not been reimbursed by the CZ .
11We identiﬁed in the hospital invoices database, the in-patient treatment of individuals in the gastro-
entherological unit, and in the surgical units for a stomach-related treatment.140 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
the birth date, the gender, the data of purchase of a CZ policy, whether the person has
a family policy, whether a person is the main contract holder of the insurance policy,
and whether the insurance policy is private or compulsory12. We keep in our data set
only individuals who are matched to an entry in the register. This further excludes
5,265 individuals. We have also excluded individuals whose starting date of contract
with CZ is after the ﬁrst observed reimbursement for medication: 7,857 individuals.
Finally, we have information on some additional socioeconomic indicators which val-
ues are available only for a subset13 of the sample. As a baseline case, we take patients
who have the social code “other”14 These characteristics are classiﬁed in Table 6.2. To
reduce the noise in the data, we have only kept in our database patients who have star-
ted taking pills in 2001 or after one year of the beginning of their contract if this date
is after January 2000. In reducing the sample, the possibility for biasedness due to
left-censoring is lower. In doing so, we have assumed that if a patient was not taking
pills for one year, she had not been taking pills before, or, she has been healed in her
previous treatment. Some summary statistics of the sample that will be used in the
Logit estimations are shown in Table 6.3.
In the sample 0.17 percent of the patients who have only taken PPI have been hos-
pitalized (195 patients out of 111,716); 0.02 percent of the patients who have only
taken H2B have been hospitalized (6 patients out of 25,254); and, out of those who
have taken both types of medicaments, 0.27 percent have been hospitalized (43 pa-
tients out of 16,086). So, simple between-group comparison indicates diﬀerent fre-
quency of the incidence of hospitalization among patients with diﬀerent medicinal
treatment history. As expected, the group of patients who have only taken H2B has
the lowest proportion of patients who have been hospitalized because these are the
patients who are to be treated for having light symptoms, according to the treatment
guidelines.
To perform robustness analysis of the Logit estimation, we also analyse the prob-
ability that a patient enters hospital within one year from the ﬁrst purchase of acid-
suppressing drugs. This prevents us from using data for patients who have ﬁrst pur-
chased the medication in 2004 and reduces the sample to 113,431 patients of which
12The Netherlands was characterized until 2005 by a two-tier health insurance system. People with
an annual income above a yearly speciﬁed threshold set by the government had to insure themselves
privately (particulier). The rest of the population had the so-called compulsory insurance (zieken-
fonds). The basic diﬀerences were in the premium paid and the greater variety of co-payment packages
available to the privately insured.
13By deﬁnition, these codes should be available only for people who have a compulsory insurance.
However, in the database we see people who do not have a compulsory insurance but do have a social
code for being disabled or below a social minimum.
14In the baseline group we include two patients who have the social code “foreign”.CHAPTER 6 141
Table 6.2: Deﬁnitions of Some of the Variables
Series Deﬁnition
PPI a dummy that equals 1 if PPI
H2B a dummy that equals 1 if H2B
PPIall a dummy that equals 1 for the patients who have only taken PPI
H2Ball a dummy that equals 1 for the patients have only taken H2B
HOSP a dummy that equals 1 for the patients who have been hospitalized
DAYSBED the number of days a patient stayed in a hospital
PILLSppi the total number of PPI pills purchased by a patient
PILLSh2b the total number of H2B pills purchased by a patient
COSTSppi the total cost of the PPI medication purchase
COSTSh2b the total cost of the H2B medication purchase
COSTSh the total cost of the hospitalization
ZKFOND a dummy that equals 1 for the compulsory insured patients
FEM a dummy that equals 1 for the female patients
SINGLE a dummy that equals 1 for the patients who are single
HEAD a dummy that equals 1 for the patients who are the head of a family
insurance package
AGE a patient’s age on the day of ﬁrst medication purchase measured in years
DISABLE∗ a dummy that equals 1 for the patients with disabilities
D65∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients above 65 years of age
SEMP∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients who are self-employed
EMP∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients who are employees
NSC∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients without a social code
BPL∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients below a poverty line
OOB∗ a dummy that equals 1 for patients who are out of the budget of the CZ
∗ These variables are only available for patients with a social code
138 have been hospitalized within 1 year.
For the purposes of the duration analysis, we use detailed data on the medicinal
treatment history of each patient who has bought an acid-suppressing type of drug for
the ﬁrst time at least one year after she enters the sample. We use information on the
date each patient purchased the drugs and the amount of pills she purchased at each
instant of time. Hence, for each of the 153,056 patients there are diﬀerent numbers of
observations depending on the number of times she has purchased acid-suppressing
drugs. We perform a continuous time analysis with time-varying regressors. One of
the time-varying regressors for patients who have bought both types of drugs during
their medicinal treatment is the dummy variable PPI which equals 1 if the drug that142 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
Table 6.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
HOSP 153,056 0.002 0.041 0 1
DAYSBEDa 244 19.01639 17.29244 0 120
COSTSha 244 12,833.47 10,888.28 654 79,084
PPI 153,056 0.730 0.444 0 1
H2B 153,056 0.165 0.37 0 1
PILLSppib 127,802 149.882 270.161 1 5,230
PILLSh2rac 41,340 104.302 248.679 1 6,904
COSTSppib 127,802 218.9616 414.4518 0.03 8,303.87
COSTSh2rac 41,340 53.93564 112.0024 0.3 2228.88
AGE 153,056 51.566 18.340 1.001 102.933
ZKFOND 153,056 0.853 0.354 0 1
FEM 153,056 0.554 0.497 0 1
HEAD 153,056 0.711 0.453 0 1
SINGLE 153,056 0.423 0.494 0 1
NSC 153,056 0.140 0.347 0 1
DISABLE 153,056 0.134 0.341 0 1
D65 153,056 0.197 0.398 0 1
BPL 153,056 0.0483 0.214 0 1
SEMP 153,056 .044 0.205 0 1
EMP 153,056 0.393 0.488 0 1
a measured for those patients who stayed in hospital;
b measured for those patients who have taken a PPI drug;
c measured for those patients who have taken a H2B drug;
has been bought is a PPI type of drug and 0 if it is a H2B type of drug. We furthermore
include two new time-varying regressors. These are the rate at which a patient takes
the purchased pills per day and the proportion of instances in which a PPI type of
drug is purchased relative to the total number of times a patient has purchased an
acid-suppressing type of drug. In measuring the rate at which pills are taken per day,
it is assumed that the patient takes the total amount of pills purchased at a constant
rate, e.g., if a patient buys 30 pills on January 1, 2001 and then the same patient
buys pills again on January 30, 2001 we assume she has taken 1 pill per day in the
period January 1–30, 2001. This assumption may not be a good approximation for a
number of cases. For instance, a patient may purchase the total dose for a treatment
on several installments, e.g., a patient bought 300 pills in one day and then in the
following day she bought 300 pills again. This might be due to the unavailability ofCHAPTER 6 143
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Duration Sample
per subject
Category Total Mean Minimum Median Maximum
No. of subjects 152,935
No. of records 579,997 3.792 1 2 204
(ﬁrst) entry time 0 0 0 0
(ﬁnal) exit time 727.070 1 726 1,461
time at risk 1.112×108 727.070 1 726 1,461
failures 242 0.0016 0 0 1
the medication in the pharmacy. To correct for this, we manipulate the data in the
following way: if a patient has a rate of more than 15 pills per day, and the type of
pills purchased in the beginning and at the end of the observed period is the same15,
then we record both purchases at the beginning of the ﬁrst period and re-estimate
the pills rate. This manipulation occurred for 971 patients out of 2,905 patients who
have a rate of taking pills higher than 15 per day. The remainder of the cases could
not be manipulated because either they took two diﬀerent types of medicaments in a
relatively short period, or because the high rate of taking pills occurred close to the
censoring time, i.e., December 2004. To avoid bias due to outliers, patients who had
a rate of taking pills more than 100 per day have been dropped from the sample. The
resulting sample consists of 152,935 patients. The minimum number of observations
per patient is 1 and the maximum is 204 as presented in Table 6.4. In Table 6.5 we
Table 6.5: Summary Statistics for Time-varying Regressors
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
PPI 579,997 0.836 0.371 0 1
PIILSRATE 579,997 1.123 2.738 0.0007 91
PPIHISTRL 579,997 0.813 0.359 0 1
present the summary statistics of the time-varying regressors described above. The
variable PILLSRATE measures the number of pills purchased divided by the number
of days between the date the pills were purchased and the next date of purchase. The
15There are a number of cases in which a patient buys a PPI type of drug and in a few days buys an
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variable PPIHISTRL measures the number of instances when a PPI type of drug was
purchased relative to the total number of times an acid-suppressing type of drug has
been purchased as measured at the current date of purchase.
To conduct a robustness check of the obtained results, we furthermore extend the
duration analysis to incorporate the possibility of a patient to exit the risk pool of
patients entering hospital prior to January 2005. That is, we allow patients to stop
being at risk either because they have been cured or because they die prior to entering
hospital and before the end of the observation period. We assume that a patient exits
the risk pool, if she does not purchase acid-suppressing drugs for a year after she
has taken the amount of medication last purchased.16 This seems to be a reasonable
assumption since according to Jones and Bytzer (2001) the cessation of medicinal
therapy of patients with chronic condition of GERD results in symptomatic relapse
within 6 months in approximately 90 percent of the patients with oesophagitis, and 75
percent of the patients without.
In our sample, there are 91,823 instances at which a patient ceases medicinal treat-
ment for more than one year. Out of these, in 18,385 of the cases the patient resumes
the medicinal treatment after at least one year. In our analysis, patients whom we ob-
serve not taking the drugs for at least one year and who do not resume treatment, will
be assumed to leave the risk pool after consuming the amount of drugs last purchased.
For patients who interrupt treatment for at least a year and then resume treatment, it is
assumed that we observe two diﬀerent incidents of illnesses, i.e., for the time between
the ﬁrst episode and the relapse we assume the patient is not at risk of entering hos-
pital.
6.3 Regression Models and Estimation Results
We assume that each patient i = 1,...,n is characterized by her disease status denoted
by Y∗
i which is a function of some patient speciﬁc attributes, i.e.,
Y
∗
i = βXi + γMi + ui, (6.1)
where Xi is the vector of the socioeconomic characteristics of patient i (e.g., age, mar-
ital status, type of insurance, social code, etc.), and Mi is the vector of variables that
reﬂect the medicinal treatment history, (e.g., type of medication, quantity of medica-
ments, etc.), β and γ are vectors of parameter values for the respective attributes, and
16The date when a patient is assumed to have consumed her purchased pills is calculated on the basis
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ui is a random term. The patient’s disease status is unobservable. What we observe is
whether a patient undergoes a hospital treatment or not (which is the point of analysis
in the Logit model) and the duration of her medicinal treatment before entering hos-
pital (which is the point of analysis in the Cox Proportional Hazard model). Below
we will present the assumptions and the estimation results of the Logit and the Cox
Proportional Hazard models.
6.3.1 Logit Estimates on the Probability to Enter Hospital
Since Y∗ is unobservable, we use its dichotomous realization where a patient either
enters hospital for treatment or does not. Let Yi be a binary variable such that Yi =1
if Y∗
i > ¯ Y∗ and Yi = 0 if Y∗
i ≤ ¯ Y∗ for the threshold of disease status ¯ Y∗ =017 above
which a patient is hospitalized, and below which she is not. We will further assume
for the purposes of this section that ui in Equation 6.1 is a logistically distributed
random variable for all patients i = 1,...,n with a cumulative distribution function
Λ(ui) = eui
1+eui. Hence,
P(Yi = 1 | Xi, Mi) = P(Y
∗
i > 0 | Xi, Mi) = P(βXi + γMi + ui > 0 | Xi, Mi)
= P(ui > −(βXi + γMi | Xi, Mi) = P(ui < βXi + γMi | Xi, Mi)
= Λ(βXi + γMi | Xi, Mi),
whichprovidestheunderlyingprobabilisticstructureoftheregressionmodel. Itisalso
assumed that the logistically distributed error terms ui are independently distributed of
the patient-speciﬁc attributes and the treatment-speciﬁc variables. The results of the
estimated Logit model are presented in Table 6.6. With respect to the regressors cap-
turing the medicinal treatment history, the estimation results indicate that the patients
who have taken both H2B and PPI types of medication have the highest probability to
enter hospital. The second highest is the probability to enter hospital of the patients
who have taken only PPI type of medication, and the lowest18 is the probability of the
patients who have taken only H2B. The marginal eﬀects show that on average taking
only PPI leads to a 0.0006 decrease in the probability compared to taking both types
of medication all else equal, while taking only H2B leads on average to a 0.0014 de-
crease in the probability all else equal. These numbers should be considered relative
to the sample percentage of people who have been hospitalized which is 0.16 percent.
17As it is shown in Green (2003) page 669, assuming that the value of the threshold is zero goes
without loss of generality.
18The 95 percent conﬁdence interval for the coeﬃcient of PPI lies above the 95 percent conﬁdence
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Table 6.6: Logit Estimates of the Probability to Enter Hospital
P(Y=1) Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects Estimates
Variable b z-val  y\ x z-val ¯ x
PPIalla -0.522 (-2.89)⋆⋆ -0.0006 (-2.51)⋆ 0.730
H2Balla -2.414 ( -5.51)⋆ -0.0014 (-9.93)⋆ 0.165
PILLSppi -0.0007 (-2.34)⋆⋆ -7.06×10−7 (-2.33)⋆⋆ 125.151
PILLSh2b 0.0004 ( 0.92) 3.71×10−7 ( 0.92 ) 28.172
AGE 0.057 (2.20)⋆⋆ 0.0001 (2.25)⋆⋆ 51.566
AGE2 -0.0003 (-1.43) -3.41×10−7 ( -1.45) 2,995.44
HEADa 0.235 (1.05) 0.0002 ( 1.10) 0.712
FEMa -0.249 ( -1.40) -0.0003 (-1.37) 0.554
SINGLEa -0.405 (-2.32)⋆⋆ -0.0004 (-2.34)⋆⋆ 0.423
ZKFONDa 0.231 (0.69) 0.0002 ( 0.75) 0.853
NSCa 1.003 (1.88)⋆⋆⋆ 0.0015 ( 1.17) 0.140
DISABLEa 0.611 (1.15) 0.0008 (0.92) 0.134
D65a 1.084 (2.04)⋆⋆ 0.0016 ( 1.44 ) 0.197
BPLa 1.164 (2.07)⋆⋆ 0.0021 (1.28) 0.0483
SEMPa 0.658 (1.09) 0.0009 ( 0.82) 0.044
EMPa 0.276 (0.52) 0.0003 (0.51) 0.393
OOBa -0.164 (-0.15) -0.0002 (-0.16) 0.0104
constant -8.623 (-8.64)⋆ – – –
N 153,056
LR Test 161.98 p-value (0.00)⋆
a marginal changes calculated for discrete changes; ⋆ means signiﬁcance at 99 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 95 percent conﬁdence level; ⋆⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 90 percent conﬁdence level.
Recall, that H2B’s have been advised for prescription to individuals with lower
symptomatic levels, hence, what the variable H2Ball might be capturing is the low
illness severity of the patient rather than the eﬀectiveness of the drug. Since we do not
have an explicit measure of case severity, this might be a sign of the violation the basic
assumptions that the regressors and the disturbances are independent. The violation of
this assumption would render the estimates inconsistent. The result that the baseline
group, the patients who have taken both types of drugs have the highest probability to
enter hospital might be attributed to an initial “misjudgement” by the GP, i.e., these are
patients with higher relative severity of illness who have been given H2B, while PPI
should have been prescribed. In the data we do not consistently observe that patients
are ﬁrst given H2B and then PPI. An alternative way of looking at these results is to
treat the dummy variables H2Ball and PPIall as controlling for the severity of the case
and the variables PILLSh2b and PILLSppi controlling for the eﬀectiveness of the type
of drug. The estimates show that the volume of H2B type of medication taken onCHAPTER 6 147
average does not inﬂuence the probability to enter hospital, while the volume of the
PPI medication has a negative eﬀect: taking 1,000 more PPI pills (per treatment) on
average leads to a 0.000706 decrease in the probability to enter hospital all else equal.
The problem with this analysis is that the baseline group, the patients who have taken
both types of medications, has to be treated as a group of patients with intermediate
severity, however, it exhibits the highest estimated probability to enter hospital.
Among the socioeconomic variables, age has the expected positive eﬀect on the
probability to enter hospital. In addition, there is an added increase in the probab-
ility to enter hospital for patients who are above 65 years of age. Having no social
code, which is a crude indicator of patients with high income, as well as being be-
low the poverty line have statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on the probability to
enter hospital at the 5 percent signiﬁcance level. On the other hand, being single has
a negative eﬀect on the probability to enter hospital: on average it leads to 0.0004
decrease. The Likelihood Ratio test for the validity of the model presented in Table
6.6 tests the null hypothesis that all the slope coeﬃcients are jointly equal to zero,
against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of them is not equal zero. The test
statistics is calculated according to 2(LU − LR) where LU is the log-likelihood of the
model presented in Table 6.6 and LU is the log-likelihood of the model that explains
the probability of hospitalization by a constant, is distributed as a χ2
17. The estimates
indicate that the statistical performance of the regression model is good: given the
p-value of the test, we can reject the null hypothesis at 1 percent signiﬁcance level.
Furthermore, we perform the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-ﬁt test in which the
ﬁtted values are clustered in 10 groups on the basis of similar predicted probabilities
of hospitalization.19 The null hypothesis is that the data are generated by the regres-
sion model that is speciﬁed. The test statistics is based on comparison between the
predicted frequencies of hospitalization and the actual frequencies observed in the
sample within the 10 groups of observations. The test statistics is distributed as χ2
8. In
our case the p-value is 0.616 which means that we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
Using a Logit model to estimate the eﬀect of medication history on the hospital-
ization outcome, may be restrictive since we do not take into account the diﬀerences
in the length of period during which patients are at risk of entering hospital, i.e., some
patients have been treated for years while others have been taking medication for
several months before entering hospital. Furthermore, we observe some patients pur-
chasing medication since the beginning of the sample period while others purchase
medication for the ﬁrst time just moths before the end of the observation period. To
19This test was developed by Hosmer and Lemeshow (1980).148 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
Table 6.7: Logit Estimates of the Probability to Enter Hospital within 1 Year
P(Y1yr) = 1 Coeﬃcient Estimates Marginal Eﬀects Estimates
Variable b z-val  y\ x z-val ¯ x
PPIalla -0.349 ( -1.20) -0.0002 (-1.13) 0.702
H2Balla -2.027 (-3.66)⋆ -0.0008 ( -5.60)⋆ 0.171
PILLSppi -0.002 (-4.07)⋆ -1.45×10−6 ( -4.04)⋆ 149.769
PILLSh2b -0.003 ( -1.26) -1.94×10−6 ( -1.30 ) 34.325
AGE 0.103 ( 2.62)⋆ 0.0001 ( 2.80)⋆ 51.624
AGE2 -0.0006 (-1.88)⋆⋆⋆ -3.89×10−7 ( -1.97)⋆⋆ 2,998.57
HEADa 0.209 ( 0.67) 0.0001 (0.70) 0.718
FEMa -0.359 (-1.53) -0.0002 (-1.47) 0.552
SINGLEa -0.131 (-0.58) -0.0001 ( -0.58) 0.563
ZKFONDa 0.465 (0.95) 0.0002 ( 1.11) 0.859
NSCa 1.167 (1.56) 0.001 (1.01) 0.128
DISABLEa 0.267 (0.42) 0.0002 (0.38) 0.139
D65 0.809 ( 1.31 ) 0.0007 (1.01) 0.206
BPLa 0.588 (0.83) 0.0005 (0.64) 0.050
SEMPa 0.036 (0.04) 2.31×10−5 (0.04) 0.044
EMPa 0.049 (0.08) 3.1×10−5 (0.08) 0.399
c -10.473 ( -6.99 )⋆ – – –
N 113,431
LR Test 137.35 p-value (0.00)⋆
a marginal changes calculated for discrete changes; ⋆ means signiﬁcance at 99 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 95 percent conﬁdence level; ⋆⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 90 percent conﬁdence level.
compare the eﬀectiveness between types of treatments relative to the same treatment
period, we analyze the probability that a patient enters hospital within one year after
we ﬁrst observe her purchasing acid-suppressing medication. The estimation results
are presented in Table 6.7. The estimates of the eﬀect of the volume of medication
are robust: taking higher volumes of PPI on average reduces the probability to enter
hospital. However, the results are not robust in terms of the eﬀect of the type of med-
ication, i.e., taking only PPI type of drugs does not lead on average to a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent probability than taking both types of medications. In terms of the socioeco-
nomic variables, only the eﬀect of age is robust. The Likelihood ratio statistics for the
validity of the model test as presented in Table 6.7 leads to the rejection of the null hy-
pothesis that the slope coeﬃcients are jointly equal to zero. The Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness-of-ﬁt statistics also lends support for the validity of the model by conclud-
ing that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the data is generated by the speciﬁedCHAPTER 6 149
regression model based on p-value 0.283. In this model we could not estimate the
OOB eﬀect because no patients with this social code have been hospitalized within 1
year of treatment.
Using the estimations shown in Table 6.6, we perform a cost-eﬀectiveness ana-
lysis. The costs of the medicinal therapy is the cost of drugs each patient purchased
using her insurance, denoted by COSTi for each person i. It is measured as:
COSTi = COSTppii + COSTh2bi,
where COSTSppii and COSTSh2bi as deﬁned above are the total amounts spent on
PPI and H2B drugs by the patient i.
The “beneﬁt” is the expected reduction in direct and indirect hospitalization costs.
The expected avoided costs for a patient i denoted by EBi is measured as:
EBi =
 




COSTSh + DAYSBED × I/365
 
,
where ^ P(Y1yr = 1) is the predicted probability of a patient to enter hospital, COSTSh
is the mean costs of hospitalization for the patients who entered hospital in the sample
(12833.47 euros), DAYSBED is the mean number of days spent in hospital by these
patients (19.01639 days), and I is the average annual income in the Netherlands in
2003 (17,700)20. The way we have constructed the expected beneﬁt function, we have
assumed that the number of days and the hospitalization costs do not depend on the
medication history of the patient given that a patient has been hospitalized.
At this stage, we can distinguish and compare two diﬀerent types of medicinal
therapies: based only on H2B or only on PPI. On Figure 6.4, we present a ﬁtted poly-
nomial relation between the drug costs and expected cost avoidance for two groups of
patient: those who in their medicinal therapy have taken only H2B type of drugs and
those who have taken only PPI type of drugs. The results show that for lower levels
of cost of drugs, H2B-only therapy yields higher future savings than PPI-only therapy
while for higher values the PPI-only therapy is more eﬀective. These results should be
interpreted with caution. The gap between the cost savings from the diﬀerent therapies
for every given level of dug costs should not be attributed fully to the eﬀectiveness of
the drug. They are also due to diﬀerences in the severity of illness. As was discussed
in the introduction, H2B type of acid-suppressing drugs have been advised for pre-
scription to patients with relatively low symptomatic levels, while PPI to patients with
relatively high symptomatic levels. Furthermore, recall the results in Tables 6.6 and
20The source of this number is the Dutch Statistical Oﬃce (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek).150 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
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6.7 according to which taking only H2B type of drugs reduces the probability of a
patient to enter hospital, while taking a greater quantity of PPI type of drugs reduces
this probability. This also implies that the diﬀerences along the lower cost range may
be due to the diﬀerences in the severity of the case all else equal.
6.3.2 Cox Regression Estimates on the Hazard Rate of Entering
Hospital
The focus of analysis is on the time interval of transition from the state before hospit-
alization, i.e., the instant an individual becomes a patient, to hospitalization of each
patient. Such intervals are called spells. The length of a spell is assumed to be a
realization of a random variable T with a cumulative distribution function F(t), i.e.,
P(T ≤ t) = F(t), and a probability density function f(t). The analysis entails es-
timating the hazard rate which summarizes the concentration of spell lengths at each
instant of time conditional on not ending the spell up to that instant of time. In terms





The estimation technique that we employ is the Cox Proportional Hazard ModelCHAPTER 6 151
with time-varying regressors. The seminal reference for introducing the Cox Propor-
tional Hazard Model is Cox (1972). Our discussion of the assumptions of the Cox
Proportional Hazard Models is based on Cameron and Trivedi (2005). The time-
varying regressors in our case are the type of medication that a patient takes for those
of the patients who take both H2B’s and PPI’s, and the rate of pills consumption in
diﬀerent periods. Our choice of using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model is based
on the fact that it has become a standard estimation technique in the literature due
to its less restrictive assumptions on the distributional parameters, and its relatively
straightforward estimation.
For the Cox Proportional Hazard Model with time-varying regressors, the hazard
rate is given by
λ(t | Z(t)) = λ0(t)φ(Z(t),δ,u),
where λ(t | Z(t)) is the hazard rate conditional only on the current values of the
regressors with Z(t) = (X, M(t)) and δ = (β,γ), and u is a disturbance term, λ0(t) is
the baseline hazard which is only a function of time and cannot be estimated in the
Cox Proportional Hazard Model, and φ(Z(t),δ) is a function only of the current values
of the regressors. To present the partial likelihood function used in the estimation of
the parameters of the model, we need to present the notions of the set of subjects
at risk, R(t), and the set of subjects whose spells end at instant t, D(t), respectively.
Let t1 < t2 < ... < tk
21 be the observed discrete time intervals in the state before
hospitalization, then
R(tj) = {l | tl ≥ tj} : set of spells at risk at tj.
D(tj) = {l | tl = tj} : set of spells completed at tj,
d(tj) =
 
l I(tl = tj) : number of spells completed at tj,
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For our estimation, we take φ(Z(t),β) = exp(Z(t)′δ) = exp(X′β+M(t)γ) An essential
assumption of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model is the proportionality assumption
of the hazard rate. The tests are developed by Grambsch and Therneau (1994) and
described in the Stata Manual (1999). We test for the validity of this assumption
21Note that k ≤ n since there may be patients who have the same length of spells.152 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
using the scaled Schoenfeld for the separate test for each regressor and the unscaled
Schoenfeld residuals for the global test. The Schoenfeld residuals are proposed by
Schoenfeld (1982). There is a separate residual for each individual patient and for
each regressor and they are not deﬁned for censored individuals. The Schoenfeld
residual is the value zik of the regressor for person i at the time when person i enters
hospital ti minus the weighted average of this regressor for the patients who are at risk
at this instant of time weighted by each individual’s likelihood to enter hospital at this
instant of time Pj. Formally,




The scaled adjustment of the Schoenfeld residuals is formulated as
rzkS ∗
i = ^ δzk + △(Sˆ V
−1
)zik,
where △ is the total number of patients who enter hospital, S is the matrix of
Schoenfeldresidualsand ˆ Vtheestimateofthevariancematrix. Theseresidualsshould
have slope zero when plotted against time if the proportional hazard assumption is
satisﬁed. The H0 hypothesis is that the proportional hazard assumptions is satisﬁed
and the H1 is that it is not. The test statistics is distributed as χ2
1 for the individual tests
and χ2
q for the global test where q is the number of regressors.
Like in the binary choice models used in the previous section, the independence
between the error term and the regressors is also a crucial assumption that ensures
the consistency of the estimates. Given the unobserved severity of the illness, which
might be correlated with the type of medication used, there are some concerns that
this assumption is not satisﬁed in our model.
In Table 6.8, Column A are presented the results of the basic model in terms of
hazard ratios, i.e., for each regressor zj, we show expδj, which is the coeﬃcient with
which the hazard ratio changes as a result of a change in zj. Whether the hazard rate
increases is determined by a one-sided test on expδj > 1. Alternatively, the hazard
rate decreases if expδj < 1.
As expected, a higher rate of taking pills is indicative of higher severity of the
illness and it is associated with a higher hazard rate to enter hospital. This eﬀect is
not estimated to be diﬀerent for PPI and H2B types of drugs because the hazard ratio
of the interaction term between PILLSRATE and the dummy PPI is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 0. Another regressor, that captures the severity of the case of the patient
is the dummy PPI: taking PPI type of drug rather than H2B increases the hazard rate
to enter hospital. The eﬀectiveness of the drug might be captured by the history ofCHAPTER 6 153
medicinal treatment. Taking a relatively higher proportion of PPI type of drugs than
H2B type of drugs decreases the hazard rate.
Table 6.8: Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates
Basic Model Cause-Speciﬁc
[A] [B]
Variable Hazard Ratio z-val Hazard Ratio z-val
PPIa 24.168 (6.25)⋆ 10.938 (3.58)⋆
PILLSRATE 1.120 (5.16)⋆ 1.108 (10.42)⋆
PPI*PILLSRATE 1.001 (0.05) 0.999 (−0.10)
PPIHISTRL 0.161 (-4.08)⋆ 0.302 (-2.12)⋆⋆
AGE 1.000 (3.28)⋆ 1.039 (1.70)⋆⋆⋆
AGE2 1 (-3.04)⋆ 1.000 (-1.06)
HEADa 1.327 ( 1.25) 1.300 (1.13)
FEMa 0.845 (-0.94) 0.827 (-1.01)
SINGLEa 0.675 (-2.23)⋆⋆ 0.643 (-2.32)⋆⋆
ZKFONDa 0.720 (-1.73)⋆⋆⋆ 0.815 (-1.11)
D65 2.755 (4.40 )⋆ 1.738 (2.44)⋆⋆
N 599,997 599,997
LR Test 247.55 653.04
p-value (0.00)⋆ (0.00)⋆
⋆ means signiﬁcance at 99 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 95 percent conﬁdence level;
⋆⋆⋆ means signiﬁcance at 90 percent conﬁdence level.
The estimated eﬀects of the regressors based on socioeconomic characteristics22
show similar results to those presented in Table 6.6. Age has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on the hazard rate. Being single or having a compulsory insurance, on the other
hand, on average decreases the hazard rate to enter hospital everything else equal.
The eﬀect of the type of insurance might be indicative of diﬀerent incentives in the
medical practice to hospitalize patients with private versus patients with compulsory
insurance.
We perform a formal test on the validity of the proportionality assumptions. The
test shows that we cannot reject the proportional hazard assumption at the 95 percent
conﬁdence level for all regressors but AGE, AGE2, FEM, and SINGLE.23 The global
22We have not included among the regressors the remainder of the dummies based on social codes
since they were insigniﬁcant in the Logit analysis and in order to save computational time.
23The p-values of the respective χ2 statistics of these variables are 0.004, 0.038, 0.001, and 0.030.154 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
test on proportionality rejects the null hypothesis of proportional hazard rates at the 99
conﬁdence level (χ2-statistics equals 99.78). Hence, estimates may not be consistent.
The results of the test on the proportionality assumptions indicate that the re-
gressors might have time-varying eﬀects on the hazard rate. For instance, it might
be that there are diﬀerences at the initial severity of the disease for female and male
patients, however, these diﬀerences disappear if the female and male patient undergo
medicinal treatment for a long period of time. It will be the case if, for example,
female patients are more likely to visit doctors at early stages of their illness while
male patients are more likely to wait longer before they visit a GP. The diﬀerences in
hazard rate after 3 years of medicinal treatment conditional on being treated after 3
years, however, might fade away.
The limitation of the above analysis is that in constructing the model whose es-
timates are presented in Table 6.8, we do not allow for patients to exit the risk pool
to enter hospital before the end of the observation period. However, a patient might
have taken an acid-suppressing drug preventively against NSAID-induced ulcer, or to
eradicate early stage of an H. Pylori infection, or early stage of GERD, or a patient
might have died.
To conduct a robustness analysis to the result above, we perform a competing
risk duration analysis. The seminal reference for the methodological tools in the ana-
lysis of duration models in the presence of competing risks is Prentice, Kalbﬂeisch et
al. (1978). The theoretical discussion presented here is based on Cleves (1999) and
Gichangi and Vach (2005). The basic assumption of this model is that an individual
can exit the risk pool due to a number of reasons, called causes, such that if he exits
due to one cause, he does not continue to be at risk of any other cause. We regard pa-
tients to be at risk of two possible causes: hospitalization and all others, e.g., healing
or death. We will index failure due to the cause hospitalization with a subscript h, and
failure due to alternative causes, with a subscript a. The cause-speciﬁc hazard rate is
given by
λh(t | Zh(t)) = λ0(t)φ(Zh(t),δ),
where λh(t | Zh(t)) is the hazard rate of entering hospital conditional only on the
current values of the regressors relevant for the process that causes hospital treatment
withZh(t) = (X, M(t))andδ = (β,γ), λ0(t), asdiscussedabove, isthebaselinehazard
which is only a function of time and cannot be estimated in the Cox Proportional
Hazard Model,24 and φ(Zh(t),δ) is a function only of the current values of regressors.
24Note that in estimating the general hazard rate of failure, one can allow for cause-speciﬁc baseline
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The main diﬀerence between the cause-speciﬁc partial likelihood function in a
competing risk model and the partial likelihood function in the standard Cox Propor-
tional Hazard Model is in the deﬁnition of the subjects who are at risk at every given
instant of time. We denote the set of subjects at risk of failure due to hospitalization
at time t as Rh(t), and the set of subjects whose spells end due to hospitalization at
instant t, Dh(t). Let th,1 < th,2 < ... < th,k be the observed discrete time intervals in the
state before hospitalization, and let ta,1 < ta,2 < ... < ta,s be the observed discrete time
intervals in the state before alternative causes of failure, then
Rh(th,j) = {l | th,l ≥ th,j and ta,j > th,j} :set of spells at risk of hospitalization at th,j.




I(th,l = th,j and ta,j > th,j) :number of spells completed at th,j in hospital,
where I is an index function.
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Using maximum likelihood method, one may obtain unbiased estimates of the
δ coeﬃcients assuming that the k observations are independent. However, given the
likelihood function, there are patients who may be observed under two diﬀerent events
of being at risk of hospitalization, i.e., these are patients who are healed the ﬁrst time
they are at risk, and experience a relapse after more than one year. Hence, the ob-
servation on k subjects may be divided into n independent groups where n < k is the






where I−1 = ∂2 lnL(δ)/∂δ∂δ and G is an n × p matrix of the group-eﬃcient score
residuals with p being the number of regressors.
The estimates of the parameters are presented in Table 6.8, Column B. The estim-
ations conﬁrm the ﬁndings with respect to the medicinal treatment variables: PPI and
pills rate have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the hazard rate, while having taken rel-
atively more PPI type of drugs decreases the hazard rate, all else equal. With respect
to the socioeconomic characteristics, the results of the dummy variable SINGLE are
conﬁrmed: being single leads to a lower hazard rate. Furthermore, patients above 65
have on average higher hazard rate to enter hospital, all else equal.156 EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT H2B vs. PPI
Based on the global rank test of the validity of the proportionality assumption, we
can reject the hypothesis that they are valid (p-value=0.013). The regressor speciﬁc
rank tests, show that the null hypothesis is rejected only for FEM (p-value=0.00004)
at the 99 percent conﬁdence level and HEAD (p-value=0.050) at the 95 percent con-
ﬁdence level.
6.4 Conclusion
The estimation results provide some evidence that, as prescribed by the guidelines,
PPI’s have been prescribed to patients with higher disease severity. Indeed, the estim-
ates of the baseline Logit model and those of the duration model show that taking a
PPI type of drug is an indirect measure of the severity of the patient illness. We see
that taking a PPI type of drug increases the likelihood of a bad outcome. The estim-
ation results also lend support to the ﬁndings in the clinical trial literature that PPI
type of medication is more eﬀective than H2B’s. In the Logit analysis, we see that
a higher quantity of PPI’s drugs decreases the probability of entering hospital, while
the quantity of H2B’s does not matter. In the durational analysis, we see that taking
relatively higher proportion of PPI drugs during a medicinal treatment, all else equal,
decreases the hazard rate to enter hospital. With some degree of caution, one may
interpret this result as an evidence of the ineﬀectiveness of the system. Had the prac-
tical evidence been that the relative amount of PPI type of drugs consumption does not
matter, we could have concluded that there is no evidence that there are no patients
who everything else equal would have had lower probability of hospitalization had
they been given a PPI type of drug rather than H2B.
The cost-beneﬁt analysis indicates that for patients who have taken relatively less
medication, medicinal therapy based on H2B’s is estimated to be more cost-eﬀective.
On the other hand, patients who require more prolonged medicinal therapy, PPI ther-
apy is estimated to be more cost-eﬀective. In our sample we identify an intermediate
range of costs of medication, in which some patients have been prescribed H2B types
of medication, while PPI therapy would have been more cost eﬀective. It should be
pointed out that in this analysis we do not control for the severity of each case. In
drawing conclusions about the cost-eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent therapies, we have
been careful to make it clear that the eﬀectiveness of the drugs is estimated for a given
cost-level. Assuming that patients who have similar spending on medication, have
similar disease severity, and thus using our estimates to derive an estimate of the “in-
eﬃciency” of the therapeutic practice, is not warranted given the limitations of theCHAPTER 6 157
data. Moreover, for this analysis we use the predicted probability of hospitalization
of each patient, which might not be a consistent measure of the true probability as
discussed below.
The estimation results, should be interpreted with caution. An important limitation
of the data is that it does not include an objective measure of the disease severity of
each patient. This unobservable heterogeneity among patients is thus captured by the
error term. Given that there is a relationship between the type of acid-suppressing drug
and the unobservable health status, as prescribed by the guidelines, in our regression
models there may be a correlation between a regressor and the error term, which may
render the coeﬃcient estimates inconsistent.
Finally, there are some interesting results with respect to the socioeconomic vari-
ables that may become a focus of future research. In particular, the estimated lower
hazard rate to enter hospital of patients who are single and the consistent failure of
the proportionality assumption of the dummy variable for gender, may be signals for
consistently diﬀerent behavior of these groups in the demand for health care. The
result that patient with diﬀerent type of insurance have diﬀerent hazard rate of hospit-
alization is also interesting as this might be indicative of the presence of underlying
incentives to have privately insured patients more often treated in hospitals than pa-
tients who have a compulsory insurance everything else being equal.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Stabiliteit, Governance en Eﬀectiviteit: Essays op het
gebied van de Diensteneconomie
De vragen die in de essays in dit proefschrift bestudeerd worden, kennen vele fa-
cetten. De belangrijkste thema’s, stabiliteit, governance, en eﬀectiviteit komen in
verschillende contexten terug: relationele activiteiten, samenwerking binnen groepen,
nationaal bestuur en een bepaalde klasse voorzieningen in de gezondheidszorg. Ook
de methoden in dit proefschrift zijn gevarieerd. De theoretische artikelen dragen bij
aan de literatuur op het gebied van netwerkvorming en endogene coalitievorming.
De empirische essays gebruiken lineaire en niet-lineaire regressiemodellen en maken
gebruik van zowel geaggregeerde data als data op microniveau.
Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift, “Stabiliteit en Sociale Erkenning” is geïn-
spireerd door het streven om de mogelijkheden van een methodologisch raamwerk
te verkennen waarin “relationele activiteiten” kunnen worden bestudeerd, waarbij de
identiteit van individuen die deelhebben aan de activiteit van invloed is op de uitkomst
ervan.
We bestuderen relationele activiteiten in het algemeen – en consument-producent-
eenheden in het bijzonder – in een vóór-marktomgeving. In Hoofdstuk 1 bestuderen
we productieprocessen die in bilaterale verbanden worden uitgevoerd. In deze omgev-




jectieve specialisatie, en, uiteindelijk, het ontstaan van objectieve specialisatie door de
sociale erkenning van subjectief gedeﬁnieerde economische functies.
In Hoofdstuk 2 breiden we onze analyse uit tot de analyse van productieprocessen
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die in teamverband worden uitgevoerd, dat is, relationele activiteiten tussen meerdere
personen die georganiseerd zijn in een primitief bedrijf. We laten zien dat de aan-
wezigheid van een autoriteit die sociaal erkend wordt ervoor zorgt dat productieve
teamverbanden gevormd worden.
Het tweede deel, “Stabiliteit en Endogene Coalitievorming” bestaat uit twee spel-
theoretische essays, waarin we nieuwe stabiliteitsconcepten ontwikkelen voor coöper-
atieve omgevingen. De essays kennen een gezamenlijke onderliggende vraag: wan-
neer een verzameling individuen geconfronteerd wordt met een coöperatieve omgev-
ing, welke groepen zullen dan gevormd worden, en hoe zullen de groepsleden de
opbrengsten van de coalitie verdelen?
In Hoofdstuk 3 zijn de nieuw ontwikkelde oplossingsconcepten gebaseerd op con-
tractuele overeenkomsten die de groep en ieder groepslid behandelen als twee con-
tractpartijen. De contracten verschillen in termen van welke partij het recht heeft de
overeenkomst te beëindigen, en of een partij die slechter af is door de beëindiging van
het contract recht heeft op compensatie. Wanneer we het algemene raamwerk toep-
assen op het voorbeeld van onderlinge verzekering in landbouwproductie vinden we
dat er voor elke klasse contractuele overeenkomsten stabiele pooling uitkomsten be-
staan die individueel rationeel zijn, terwijl individueel rationele separating uitkomsten
daarentegen niet stabiel zijn.
In Hoofdstuk 4 bespreken we stabiliteit die gebaseerd is op onderhandelingen.
Deze analyse is van toepassing op situaties waarin bindende contracten niet mogelijk
zijn, zoals wanneer individuele investeringen in de samenwerking of de opbrengst er-
van niet kunnen worden waargenomen en geveriﬁeerd. Ons oplossingsconcept houdt
expliciet rekening met het verschil in deviatiemogelijkheden binnen een reeds ge-
vormde groep en buiten de groep. Ter illustratie passen wij de concepten toe op ge-
wogen meerderheidsspelen en op een nieuwe klasse spelen, de klasse van spelen met
samenwerkingseﬀecten.
Het derde deel, “Governance en Eﬀectiviteit” bestaat uit twee empirische artikelen
die onderzoeken hoe diensten functioneren en de implicaties hiervan in het dagelijkse
leven.
In Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken we de invloed van governance op nationaal niveau op
de sociaal-economische ontwikkeling van landen door middel van een econometrische
vergelijking tussen landen. Als maat voor de sociaal-economische ontwikkeling van
eenlandnemenwedelevensverwachtinginhetland. Hetmodelmetdegovernancein-
dex als verklarende variabele is op statistische gronden te verkiezen boven een model
met de Gini-index van inkomensongelijkheid. Ook dragen we bewijs aan voor tweeNEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 169
soorten drempeleﬀecten: zowel in termen van inkomen in absolute zin als in termen
van governance. Voor de landen die onder de drempelwaarde zitten is inkomen in ab-
solute termen de meest signiﬁcante determinant van levensverwachting, terwijl voor
de landen boven de drempelwaarde governance het belangrijkste is.
In Hoofdstuk 6 richten we ons op een speciﬁeke casus in de gezondheidszorg,
namelijk de eﬀectieve behandeling van Nederlandse patiënten die aan ziekten lijden
als Gastro-Oesofagale Reﬂux, H. Pylori, en gastropathie geïnduceerd door niet - ster-
oïdale anti-inﬂammatoire geneesmiddelen met antacidum. We onderzoeken de re-
latieveeﬀectiviteitvantweetypenantacidadieopreceptverkrijgbaarzijn: H2-receptor-
antagonist, en proton pomp-remmers. Klinische testen suggereren dat protonpomp-
remmers eﬀectiever zijn in zowel het genezen van de aandoeningen als het vermind-
eren van de symptomen. Deze Nederlandse casus is interessant omdat huisartsen
wordt aanbevolen om H2-remmers voor te schrijven aan patiënten die voor de eerste
keer met klachten bij hen komen. Echter, in de praktijk is dit wellicht geen kostenef-
fectieve behandeling: sommige patiënten wachten misschien lang voordat zij naar de
huisarts gaan en hebben daardoor ernstiger klachten. Omdat huisartsen geen volledige
kennis hebben van de symptoomgeschiedenis, zouden ze de patiënt kunnen behan-
delen met het minder eﬀectieve medicijn.
Met een binair keuzemodel voor de kans dat een patiënt in het ziekenhuis wordt
opgenomen en een duurmodel met regressoren die in de tijd variëren om de periode
voor de opname te analyseren, laten we zien dat voor personen met een lage medicijn-
consumptie de H2-remmer inderdaad het kosteneﬀectievere medicijn is, terwijl voor
patiënten met een hoge medicijnconsumptie de protonpomp-remmer meer kostenef-
fectief is.